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ABSTRACT 
Taxes have an impact on both capital investment and capital-structure decisions 
(that is, balancing debt and equity) of firms. It has been theorised (Modigliani & 
Miller 1963) that when there is tax relief on debt, the cost of debt falls, which 
makes investment more attractive; and when corporate income is taxed less, there 
is more available in retained earnings which can be invested. Tax will, therefore, 
have an impact on the capital structure of the firm as well as on its capital 
expenditure. Some countries follow a classical tax system, while others follow an 
imputation system. The nature of the prevailing tax system in the economic 
jurisdiction under which a firm operates can be, intuitively, expected to have an 
impact on the firm’s capital investment and its capital-structure decisions. 
The impacts of taxes on firms’ capital structure have been the focus of much 
theoretical and empirical research in financial economics and public finance. Even 
so, the empirical evidence on the effects of taxes on capital structure and capital-
investment decisions—particularly following a switch from a classical to an 
imputation tax system—remains inconclusive. In the same vein, existing studies 
related to taxes and capital structure and capital investment within an imputation 
tax system contradict one another. The core issues are whether there are in fact 
any impacts at all from tax systems on capital-structure decisions, and whether a 
switch to an imputation tax system could induce a shift in capital structure 
towards equity. What is unclear is whether taxes and a tax-system shift to an 
imputation system have any discernible impact on a firm’s capital investment 
decisions.  
This study is designed to address these issues by examining:  
(1) The impacts of taxes on capital structure and (or) capital investment in 
Canada (1982–2015), which is a context with a well-established 
imputation tax system; and 
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(2) The impacts of the shift from a classical tax system to an imputation 
tax system on capital structure and (or) capital investment in Australia 
(1982–1998) and Taiwan (1989–2009).  
This is done in order to assess the impact of the switch on capital-structure and 
capital-investment decisions, particularly as extant financial theory suggests a 
relationship between an optimal capital structure and capital investment. The 
employed methodology is that of panel regression using a fixed-effects model to 
test the effects of taxes, as well as the effects of tax-system changes on a firm’s 
capital structure and their capital-investment decisions. 
The findings reveal that taxes and tax-system changes play a role in firms’ capital-
structure decisions. Specifically, taxes have significant effects on the reduction of 
debt levels of firms in countries with a well-established imputation-tax system and 
in those with a tax-system switch from a classical to an imputation system.  For 
capital investment decisions, it is found that while capital investment shows a 
significant increase in the Australian and Taiwanese cases following the 
introduction of an imputation-tax system, a significant decrease in capital 
investment is noticed for the post-2009 period in Canada, a country with a well-
established imputation-tax system. 
This present study is an extension of existing studies that focused only on 
Australian firms. Here, three countries under imputation-tax systems are 
examined. This provides a diversity of countries, which enables the researcher to 
examine not only the effects of taxes on capital structure and (or) capital 
investment, but also on how the introduction of an imputation-tax system affects a 
firm’s capital structure and its capital-investment decisions. This makes the 
present work stand out from previous literature in terms of its contribution to the 
theory of capital structure and its impact on investment. Given the current global 
economic climate characterised by deflation and economic contraction, this study 
will be of importance to policymakers who are in need of policy tools other than 
monetary policy to stimulate economic growth.  
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Governments have a limited set of policy tools that can be used to operationalise 
economic strategy. Fiscal policy and monetary policy have been the traditional 
options open to policymakers. Monetary policy has been a useful tool, and is the 
often-used tool because of its apolitical nature. It is operationalised by the central 
bank, which is independent and not controlled by the political party in power. 
However, recently, monetary policy is having less of an impact. According to 
Borio and Hofmann (2017, p. 4), this is because “monetary transmission is less 
effective when interest rates are persistently low”. 
Governments are always looking for ways to increase their stock of policy tools. 
Given that monetary policy is proving to be less than effective in managing the 
economy, policymakers are keen to find other means that they can use to manage 
the economy. One option is, of course, tax policy. This policy is more political in 
nature than monetary policy is, but it is also more direct. Given that monetary 
policy is less effective and taxation policy is more direct, policymakers have been 
keen to call upon the latter as an alternative policy. For example in order to boost 
economic performance, US President Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 
with individual income tax rates effective for the year ending 2017, and corporate 
tax rates for the year ending 2018 (Mertens 2018). In late 2018, the impact of 
these reductions has been questionable (Harris & Looney 2018). For similar 
reasons, in the same year, the Australian Government is relying on tax policy, 
with substantial corporate tax cuts, as a way of achieving economic development 
(Conifer 2018). Given this attention to taxation as an economic driver, the 
question is, ‘does taxing work?’ More specifically, ‘can policy makers use tax 
changes to manage economic growth effectively?’; and, ‘do tax systems and tax-
rate changes influence economic growth?’. 
Governments design tax systems so as to increase capital investment, to set 
economic direction, and to stimulate growth (Jorgenson & Yun 1990; Easterly & 
Rebelo 1993; Arnold et al. 2011). The objective of tax policy for governments is 
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to balance the national budget while creating efficiencies in the allocation of 
resources, so as to promote effective public and private capital expenditure. The 
tax system needs to allow the government to set the direction of the economy, to 
provide incentives for businesses to invest, and incentives for investors to provide 
capital (Zee, Stotsky & Ley 2002). 
The financial decisions of firms are often influenced by forces within the business 
environment. A prominent characteristic of this environment is the taxation 
regime. The owners of a firm making capital-investment and financing decisions 
will only be able to purchase more goods and services if they receive cash from 
the business (Petty et al. 2015). This seems fairly simple, but there is a 
complicating factor in determining the amount of cash that owners can receive 
from their business. This is tax (Saad 2014). In a modern economy, businesses are 
subject to tax systems that require the return of cash to the government (Fullerton 
1982). As a result, financial-management decision-making needs to consider ways 
via which residual free cash flows available to equity holders can be maximised 
(Feng 2016; Kiu et al. 2017). The financial-management decision-making 
objective needs to maximise shareholders’ value. Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
theorised that if there is tax relief on debt, the cost of debt falls, which makes 
investment more attractive. If corporate income is taxed less, more is available in 
retained earnings, which can enhance the residual free cash flows for investing or 
for paying out as dividends to equity holders. In other words, tax will have an 
influence on a firm’s capital structure and on its capital investment. To be able to 
understand this objective, we need to have an understanding of some of the major 
components of a country’s tax system. 
There are two main tax systems: the classical tax system (progressive taxation 
with an incentive to use debt to finance investment) and the imputation tax system 
(progressive taxation without the incentive to finance investment with debt, while 
avoiding the double taxation of income). These systems tax and provide 
incentives in different ways. In a classical tax system, shareholder income is 
effectively double-taxed—once at the corporate tax level, and once at the personal 
level. In an imputation tax system, shareholders receive a tax credit for corporate 
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taxes paid at the firm level, effectively eliminating dividend taxation for those 
who pay less than the corporate tax rate. Many governments have shifted from a 
classical to an imputation tax system to avoid double taxation, and to encourage 
equity-financed investment. 
There are good reasons why governments might move to an imputation tax 
system. These are to promote equity investment, to increase the liquidity of stock 
markets, and to broaden community opportunities to invest in share markets. 
Under an imputation tax system, according to theory, it is expected that 
companies will use less debt to finance their investment and rely more on private 
investment (Twite 2001). In addition, governments move to imputation tax 
regimes because they are designed to promote capital investment (Zee, Stotsky & 
Ley 2002).  
1.2 Research motivation  
Financial management has emerged as a vital concept to maximise shareholders’ 
value and, subsequently, to drive economic growth. The financial-management 
literature indicates that there are there important decisions for the firm to make 
(Petty et al. 2015). The first of these are investment decisions, which deal with the 
assets in which the firm should invest. This decision determines whether or not a 
firm can allocate its capital and resources in a reasonable and effective way. The 
second refers to the financing decision, and it addresses the question of how to 
raise the cash that is needed to fund a desired level of investment. The third is 
dividend decisions; it addresses a question of the proportion of earnings that 
should be distributed to shareholders and, possibly, how often it should be 
distributed. 
Among the three decisions, corporate investment and corporate financing are the 
fundamental decisions needed to maximise firm value and economic growth 
(Hanlon & Heitzman 2010). In other words, the key objective of financial 
management is about making financial decisions such as in which assets to invest, 
how to manage cash, and how to raise funds for growth (Petty et al. 2015). 
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A review of the literature highlights two important empirical questions: (1) do tax 
rates have a significant impact on a firm’s capital structure and (or) capital 
investment? and, (2) does moving to an imputation tax system result in a change 
in capital structure? Is there a shift away from debt to equity (as theory would 
predict, and which would broaden equity markets) and capital investment? 
The first research question is related to the relationship between tax and capital 
structure. Based on capital-structure theory, as proposed by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), much of the empirical research has examined capital-structure 
determinants at the firm level across many different countries (Myers 1984; 
Titman & Wessels 1988). Studies of how taxes affect capital structure have been 
undertaken (Desai, Foley & Hines 2004; Pattenden 2006; Overesch & Voeller 
2010; Bargeron, Denis & Lehn 2014; Faccio & Xu 2015; MacKinlay 2015). In 
general, they have found contradictory results. Some studies find a significant 
relationship between debt ratios and corporate tax rates supporting the evidence 
that with higher tax rates, firms have higher debt financing (MacKie‐Mason 1990; 
Scholes, Wilson & Wolfson 1990; Givoly et al. 1992; Bartholdy & Mateus 2011; 
Barclay, Heitzman & Smith 2017). Other finds that corporate tax has a negative 
impact on debt levels supporting the evidence that firms are likely to use less debt 
financing (Chiarella et al. 1991; Gordon & Lee 2007). A large segment of the 
research has focused on the effect of taxes on the leverage of firms operating in 
countries under the classical tax system. Much less research has been focused on 
examining the impact of a tax-regime shift on capital structure, and whether a 
shift from one tax system to another has an impact on capital structure. 
Extant capital-structure research addresses numerous issues affecting the capital 
structure of firms, but it does not fully explain the influence of taxes on capital 
structure in countries that have adopted an imputation tax system. Research points 
out the benefits of an imputation tax system, such as eliminating double taxation 
and decreasing the potential for financial distress (Handley & Maheswaran 2008). 
Studies such as Pattenden (2006) and Twite (2001) examine the results of tax-
system changes on the capital structure in Australia—focusing on a single 
country. Twite (2001) suggests that firms use less debt in the imputation tax 
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system. Tax incentives influence the use of debt financing; changes in tax laws 
alter these incentives, and lead to changes in the corporate capital structure. 
Pattenden (2006) focuses on the impact of tax incentives on debt by using the 
change of tax systems from a classical to an imputation regime. The results show 
that there is a significant effect of corporate tax on capital structure in a classical 
tax system. There is no relationship between corporate tax and debt levels in an 
imputation tax system. However, an opposing argument is that there will be no tax 
benefit to a company taking on more debt financing under an imputation system 
(Pattenden 2006). Capital-structure theory suggests that there is a relationship 
between taxes and capital structure in an imputation tax system; but the empirical 
findings often contradict one another (Nguyen 2016). 
The second part of the present research is related to tax and capital investment. 
Chang, Chen and Chen (2017) find that decreases in corporate-tax rates lead to 
increases in dividend payouts and foreign investment. They find this to be the case 
in Taiwan from 2008 to 2011. Their study focuses on the effects of corporate tax-
rate changes on foreign investment, and it does not examine the effect of tax-
system changes on capital investment within the country. Black, Legoria and 
Sellers (2000) investigate the effect of tax reform on capital investment in 
Australia and New Zealand from 1982 to 1991. The major tax change that was 
consistent across these countries was the implementation of dividend imputation 
in Australia in 1988, and in 1987 in New Zealand. After the introduction of 
dividend imputation, there was an increase in capital investment. It is important 
that researchers determine whether taxes or tax-system shifts have had an impact 
on capital investment. As yet, the empirical evidence on the effects of taxes on 
capital investment after the introduction of an imputation tax system remains 
inconclusive (Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000; Chang, Chen & Chen 2017). The 
purpose of the present study is to provide an explanation for these contradictory 
results. 
Studying the two identified research problems—about taxes and tax-system 
changes and their effects on capital structure and capital investment—is important 
for policymakers who are responsible for economic management, and for business 
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finance managers who are responsible for ensuring an optimal capital structure 
within their firm. This is particularly important in countries using imputation tax 
systems, where firms may use less debt in their capital structure. A lower 
corporate-tax rate could reduce the incentive to use debt financing for new 
investment. This would result in lower debt levels, while reducing the likelihood 
of financial distress and lessening the risk of bankruptcy. Thus, imputation tax 
regimes could decrease the likelihood of firms using debt financing. Corporate tax 
considerations do not drive new investment by using debt; but rather, by using 
equity. This is important, because shifting from a classical to an imputation tax 
system will increase capital investment; and under an imputation regime, taxes 
would increase the capital investment. This would contribute to economic 
development and growth in the future.  
1.3 Research objectives and research questions  
In the light of the two research problems identified in the previous section, there 
are two key objectives of the present study: (i) to determine whether changes in 
taxes will influence a firm’s capital structure and (or) capital investment, and, (ii) 
to understand whether a shift in the tax system will have an impact on capital 
structure and (or) capital investment. 
Because of the differences in the impacts of taxes and tax-system changes on 
corporate structure and corporate investment, two sub-objectives for each key 
objective have been developed:  
Objective 1.1: to conduct an analysis of the effects of taxes on capital 
structure in countries with a well-established imputation system. 
Objective 1.2: to conduct an analysis of the effects of a change in tax 
system from a classical to an imputation system—specifically, to 
determine whether the shift results in a change in a firm’s capital structure. 
Objective 2.1: to conduct an analysis of the impacts of taxes on capital 
investment in countries with a well-established imputation tax system. 
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Objective 2.2: to identify whether a change from a classical to an 
imputation tax system increases capital investment. 
The previous discussion and the objectives presented above lead to the following 
two central research questions, which guide the analysis in the present study:  
(i) Do taxes have an impact on capital structure?  
(ii) Do taxes have an impact on capital investment? 
In order to answer these research questions, the following sub-questions are 
addressed:  
Question 1.1: In what ways, if any, do taxes have an impact on capital 
structure in a well-established imputation tax system? 
Question 1.2: In what ways, if any, does a tax-system change (from a 
classical to an imputation tax system) have impacts on the capital structure 
of firms? 
Question 2.1: In what ways, if any, do taxes have impacts on a firm’s 
capital investment in a well-established imputation tax system? 
Question 2.2: In what ways, if any, does a tax-system change (from a 
classical to an imputation tax system) have impacts on a firm’s capital 
investment?  
To address these research questions, this study examines the issues in three 
countries, all of which moved from a classical to an imputation tax system. These 
are Canada, Australia, and Taiwan. Canada is a country that has had an imputation 
tax system for an extended period; Australia and Taiwan are countries that more 
recently shifted from classical to imputation systems. Canada and Australia are 
chosen because of their open economies and their similar socio-economic 
systems, although they operate in separate markets and are not economically 
integrated—their economies are similar but distinct. Taiwan, however, is a newly 
emerging economy. This study is not one which seeks to compare and explain 
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similarities or differences between countries. Instead, it is a study which seeks to 
use a multi-country approach to check results for consistency, and to assess 
whether the results accord with theory. Canada and Australia are used because 
they are similar but distinct, Taiwan is used because it is unique and emerging. 
Being similar but unconnected, and being unique and emerging will provide a 
good check on the consistency of the findings predicted by theory. 
Comparing two global free-market economic powerhouses and a vibrant emerging 
economy will be a significant step towards addressing the research questions. It is 
important to note that these three countries have all attempted to increase 
investment through their respective imputation tax systems (Chang, Chen & Chen 
2017). Therefore, there is an opportunity to determine whether the shift from a 
classical to an imputation system has had an impact on capital structure, and 
whether there were impacts on capital investment. There is the opportunity to 
assess whether, under an imputation system, taxes have an impact on capital 
structure and capital investment for a set of free-market economies which 
represent a broad economic spectrum. 
The first part of this thesis examines whether the shift from a classical to an 
imputation tax system has had an impact on capital structure—as predicted by 
theory—in Australia and Taiwan. It investigates the impact of taxes on capital 
structure in Canada, where the imputation system is well-established. The second 
part of the thesis considers whether the shift from a classical to an imputation tax 
system has resulted in an increase in capital investment in Australia and Taiwan. 
It studies the impact of taxes on capital investment in Canada. By examining the 
investment effects in a country that has used a well-established dividend 
imputation tax system, and in countries that have changed to imputation tax 
systems, this study has implications for understanding the potential effects of 
similar impacts on investment that may occur in other nations. 
A number of databases were used to acquire data for the sample countries over 
multiple sample periods. The sample periods used in this study are longer than 
those used in other research of this nature. The fixed-effects models are designed 
to study the causation between taxes, debt levels, and capital investment.  
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1.4 Research significance 
This research produces a number of important findings that lead to theoretical and 
practical contributions. It contributes to the existing tax literature that investigates 
the effects of imputation tax systems on firms’ capital structure (Schulman et al. 
1996; Twite 2001; Pattenden 2006) and capital investment (Black, Legoria & 
Sellers 2000; Chang, Chen & Chen 2017). These research findings confirm that 
the use of imputation tax regimes can reduce the debt level of firms and increase 
corporate investment. This means that a reduction in dividend imputation can help 
to stimulate investment in capital markets in countries under an imputation tax 
system. This implication is useful for policymakers wishing to promote economic 
growth and development.  
The first contribution that this thesis makes is that it clarifies the effects of taxes 
on leverage in multiple countries using imputation tax systems, and the 
investment impacts when changing to an imputation tax system. From a 
theoretical perspective, this analysis seeks to contribute to the Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) capital-structure theory by confirming that taxes have a significant 
impact on capital structure in a well-established tax system, and that debt-level 
financing significantly decreases.  
The second contribution that this thesis makes is that for countries that have 
changed to an imputation tax system, firms tend to use less debt. In other words, 
with the move to an imputation tax system, the overall levels of debt financing of 
firms will be reduced. From a practical point of view, this analysis has 
implications that—when imputation tax systems have been in operation for a 
significant period of time, and the capital structure has adapted to the tax 
environment—debt-level financing will decrease, and the weighted average cost 
of capital will move towards its optimal level. Moving to an imputation tax might 
reduce the potential for financial distress, and lessen the risks of bankruptcy. 
The third contribution of this study is that it seeks to confirm the theoretical 
effects of taxes on capital investment in a well-established imputation tax system. 
It gathers empirical evidence in order to establish the degree to which taxes have 
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an effect on capital investment in the well-established Canadian imputation tax 
system. This thesis contributes to current understanding about the effects on 
capital investment of a shift from a classical to an imputation tax system. From a 
practical perspective, once a classical tax system switches to an imputation tax 
system, the tax-saving efficiencies might help firms to lower the cost of financial 
capital, which should act to promote capital investment. 
The thesis is thus an extension of the work undertaken by Pattenden (2006) and 
Twite (2001), who focused on Australian firms and reported contradictory results. 
This study examines three countries under an imputation tax system, providing a 
range of countries with which to examine the effect of taxes on the financing 
decisions of firms, and on how the introduction of an imputation tax system 
affects leverage. This thesis is an extension of the work by Black, Legoria and 
Sellers (2000), and Jugurnath, Stewart and Brooks (2008) who investigated the 
effect of tax reform on capital investment in Australia. In contrast to these 
researchers, this thesis examines three countries’ use of an imputation tax system; 
it differs from prior research in that it investigates whether taxes affect capital 
investment in Canada. It is particularly interested in how the introduction of 
imputation tax systems has affected capital investment in Taiwan and Australia. 
By examining the investment effects in a country that has used dividend 
imputation for a long time, as well as in countries that have more recently changed 
to imputation tax systems, this thesis derives implications for the potential effects 
of similar impacts on capital structure and (or) capital investment occurring in 
other nations. This makes the work stand out from the earlier literature, because it 
examines the impact of regime shifts, as well as of taxes in place within a well-
established imputation tax system. 
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1.5 Definitions of key terms 
The following key terms used in this study are defined below. 
A classical tax system is one where dividend income is taxed at the shareholder 
level in the same way as other types of capital income. Shareholder income is 
double-taxed: once at the corporate level, and once at the personal level. 
An imputation tax system is one where shareholders receive a tax credit for 
corporate taxes paid at the firm level. 
A full-imputation tax system is one where there is a dividend tax credit at the 
shareholder level for underlying corporate profits tax. Under a full-imputation tax 
system, shareholders receive a credit equal to 100 per cent of corporate tax paid. 
A partial imputation tax system is one where there is a dividend tax credit at the 
shareholder level for part of the underlying corporate profits tax. Under a partial 
imputation tax system, shareholders receive a credit equal to a percentage of the 
corporate taxes paid. 
Corporate integration is a way of addressing the elimination of double taxation 
on corporate income. In order to address the issue of double taxation, one solution 
is to integrate the corporate and individual income tax systems to treat 
corporations and shareholders as a single entity for taxation purposes, instead of 
as two separate entities. The corporate integration is often called ‘an imputation 
tax system’. 
Adoption of integration occurs in a country where there is an introduction of an 
imputation tax system, or where there is a change of tax system from a classical to 
an imputation one. 
A well-established imputation tax system is one that  has been in place for more 
than 10 years (Pattenden 2006). 
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of six chapters, and is organised as follows. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter provides the background to the study and identifies the research 
motivation. It includes the research questions, research significance, definitions of 
key terms, and an outline of the chapters of this thesis. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The second chapter comprises a literature review of the tax system, the 
relationship between taxes and capital structure, and the association between taxes 
and capital investment. It explains why taxes and tax-system changes have 
important impacts on the capital structure of firms. The chapter argues that taxes 
and tax-system changes have important impacts on capital investment. It explains 
the reasons for a focus on taxes, capital structure, and capital investment. This is 
because the tax system is a tool for governments to use to generate government 
revenue and to stimulate economic growth. 
Chapter 3: Methodology and Data 
This chapter starts with the rationale for country selection, and provides a 
summary of the tax systems in Canada, Australia, and Taiwan as the studied 
countries. The presentation of the methodology of a fixed-effects model is used in 
the study follows. This methodology is designed to study the cause of changes 
between taxes and (or) tax-system changes and debt levels, as well as taxes and 
(or) tax-system changes and capital investment. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the data used for this research. 
Chapter 4: Does Tax Have an Impact on Capital Structure? 
This chapter presents the first empirical study to answer (i) Sub-research Question 
1.1: In what ways, if any, do taxes have an impact on capital structure under a 
well-established imputation tax system? and, (ii) Sub-research Question 1.2: In 
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what ways, if any, does tax-system change (from a classical to an imputation tax 
system) have impacts on capital structure? This chapter presents the hypothesis 
development, and variables, and discusses the empirical models and the 
estimation results from the empirical investigations of the relationship between 
taxes and capital structure in Canada, a country under a long-established 
imputation tax system. The chapter presents the empirical model and the results of 
the investigation of the relationship between the shift to an imputation tax system 
and capital structure in Australia and Taiwan. 
Chapter 5: Can Tax Drive Capital Investment?  
This chapter is the second empirical study and provides the answers to (i) Sub-
research Question 2.1: In what ways, if any, do taxes have an impact on capital 
investment? and, (ii) Sub-research Question 2.2: In what ways, if any, does tax-
system change (from a classical to an imputation tax system) have impacts on 
capital investment? The chapter presents the hypothesis development and the 
variables. It discusses the empirical models and the estimation results of the 
investigation of the relationship between taxes and capital investment in the 
Canadian well-established imputation tax system. Finally, this chapter presents 
the empirical model and analyses the results of the empirical investigations of the 
relationship between the change to an imputation tax system and capital 
investment in Australia and Taiwan. 
Chapter 6: Conclusions 
This chapter provides a summary of the issues covered in this thesis, as well as its 
academic contributions and contributions to policy and practice. In addition, the 
limitations of the study are discussed and areas for further research are suggested. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
After the global financial crisis, the world economic climate has been 
characterised by a decrease capital investment (Kahle & Stulz 2013). In this 
environment, the objectives of boosting economic growth do not appear to 
respond as they have in the past to government economic policy (Duchin, Ozbas 
& Sensoy 2010). As a result, governments are looking to consider other policies, 
such as tax policies, in order to drive economic growth.  
In general, governments use tax to fund public-sector development and to promote 
private-sector investment. The nature of the tax system and the tax rate are 
important factors for national economic development and growth. Some countries 
operate a classical tax system—such as the United States (pre-2003) and the 
Netherlands—while some use an imputation system—such as Australia and New 
Zealand. Imputation systems, like classical systems, generate revenue for 
governments and can be used to stimulate capital investment. It is theorised 
(Modigliani & Miller 1963) that when there is tax relief on debt, the cost of debt 
falls, which makes investment based on debt is more attractive. If corporate 
income is taxed less, there is likely to be more in retained earnings that can be 
invested. Tax will therefore have an impact on the capital structure of the firm and 
its capital investment. 
There are a number of reasons for some countries to move from the classical tax 
system to an imputation regime. As discussed in Chapter 1, the rationales for this 
shifting can be the benefits from reducing double taxation, increasing capital 
investment, and reducing the debt levels of firms. To encourage policymakers in 
other countries to create the chance for stimulating economic growth, it is 
important to provide them with an insight into the interrelationships among taxes, 
the tax system, capital structure, and capital investment. 
The impacts of taxes on the capital structure and on capital investment have been 
the focus of much theoretical and empirical research in financial economics and 
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public finance (Auerbach 2002; Graham 2003). As yet, the empirical evidence on 
the effects of taxes on capital structure and capital investment after the 
introduction of an imputation tax system remains inconclusive. In the same vein, 
existing studies related to taxes and capital structure and capital investment 
contradict one another.  
As a result, it is important to identify the gaps in understanding the relationship 
among taxes, capital structure, and capital investment in an imputation context. In 
particular, the following inquiries should be addressed: (i) the extent to which the 
taxes have an impact on capital structure that would result in a shift of capital 
structure towards equity; (ii) whether or not a move to an imputation tax system 
would result in a shift of capital structure towards equity; (iii) how taxes have an 
impact on capital investment in an imputation system; and (iv) the extent to which 
tax-system shifts to an imputation system have an impact on corporate capital 
investment.  
Given the current global economic climate characterized by deflation and 
economic contraction, this research is important for policy makers who are in 
need of policy options other than just monetary policy when designing their 
economic strategies for economic growth and for the investment opportunity set 
available for firms. It is not only of substantial theoretical interest, but it is of 
significant policy relevance for an imputation tax system. It offers insight into the 
significant impacts on policy when the tax-system changes from a classical to an 
imputation system. 
The arguments in this chapter are divided into two main groups and are organised 
as follows. The first argument is about the impact of taxes and tax-system changes 
on capital structure in Section 2.3; the second reviews the impacts of taxes and 
tax-system changes on capital investment in Section 2.4. However, before 
providing detailed discussion relevant to the imputation tax system, Section 2.2 
presents an overview of the main tax systems in the world economy, and justifies 
the reasons for choosing the imputation system as a focus. 
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2.2 Tax system overview and the focus on an imputation system 
The effects of taxes on corporate investment are reflected in economic 
development. In fact, tax systems are used for financing public expenditures, and 
for promoting capital expenditure and stimulating economic growth (Arnold et al. 
2011). The objective of governments is to balance the budget while creating 
efficiencies in the allocation of funds to promote effective public and private 
capital expenditure (Surrey 1970). Many countries have used the tax system to 
promote investment (Jorgenson & Yun 1990; Easterly & Rebelo 1993; Arnold et 
al. 2011). According to Zee, Stotsky and Ley (2002), the tax system needs to 
provide incentives for businesses to invest and for investors to provide capital. 
Since the economic effects of a tax on a company’s investment may depend on the 
corporate tax system employed, it is useful to identify the main corporate tax 
systems in order to have a better understanding of the effectiveness of the tax 
system as a tool attracting investment. Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) mention two 
tax-treatment types: a classical tax system and an imputation tax system.  
The classical tax system is a system in which shareholders pay personal taxes on 
distributed earnings as well as the corporate taxes paid on those earnings (Officer 
1982). In other words, there is double taxation in a classical tax system. 
According to the OECD, the classical tax system was used in Spain (pre-1994), 
Denmark (pre-2005), Switzerland (pre-2007), Ireland (post-1999), Japan (pre-
2003), Korea (pre-2001), the Slovak Republic (pre-2005), and the United States 
(pre-2003). Other countries that have recently applied this system are the 
Netherlands, Iceland, Sweden, Austria, Greece, the Czech Republic, Israel, 
Slovenia, and Belgium.  
The imputation tax system is different. Firms pay tax on their profits at the 
corporate tax rate, and any profits that are subsequently distributed to shareholders 
are regarded as income tax having already been paid. The imputation system gives 
shareholders tax credits for the tax paid by a company, and shareholders may use 
these credits to offset their income tax liabilities on dividends.  
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The imputation tax system can be divided into two types: partial imputation and 
full imputation. Under a full imputation tax system, “shareholders pay personal 
taxes on distributed earnings but receive full tax credit for the corporate taxes paid 
on these earnings” (Alzahrani & Lasfer 2012, p. 749). Full dividend imputation 
systems are in place in Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Taiwan (pre-2015) and 
New Zealand. Under a partial imputation tax system, “shareholders pay personal 
taxes on distributed earnings but receive tax credit for part of the corporate taxes 
paid on these earnings” (Alzahrani & Lasfer 2012, p. 749). In other countries, 
such as Taiwan (post-2015) and Korea, only part of the corporate tax credits is 
distributed. 
The United Kingdom has been considered as a partial imputation country in 
several studies, but there is much contention about this classification (Khan 2006; 
Castillo, Niño & Zurita 2017). There are debates about whether the UK tax system 
should be considered as a partial imputation system or not. On the one hand, the 
UK tax system has been classified as a partial imputation system post-1999, 
because the formula for calculating dividend taxes still bears the characteristics of 
a partial imputation (Mishra & Ratti 2014). On the other hand, some studies 
classify the United Kingdom as a dividend-relief tax system. Fan, Titman and 
Twite (2012) claim that dividend payments are taxed at a reduced rate at the 
personal level in this system. The reason why the United Kingdom has not had an 
effective imputation system since 1999 is because this country is based on a 
system of Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT), which is a disadvantage when a firm 
has paid more ACT than their final tax liability (Ashton & Acker 2003).  
The classical tax system may constrain capital investment because of double 
taxation (Handley & Maheswaran 2008). Classical systems, with a tax shield, 
promote debt over equity (MacKie‐Mason 1990; Graham 1996a). The tax shield 
may have an impact on the capital structure of firms, because the tax shield makes 
it more attractive to acquire debt over equity. This system may, as a result, 
inadvertently increase the potential for financial distress (Du & Dai 2005).  
In comparison with the traditional tax system, imputation tax systems remove 
double taxation and reduce the incentive for debt, and encourage firms to invest 
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with equity (Wilkinson & Fancher 2004; Hemmelgarn & Teichmann 2014). 
Recently, governments in many countries have implemented important tax 
reforms to eliminate double taxation (Jugurnath, Stewart & Brooks 2008). These 
governments are moving to imputation tax regimes because they are designed to 
promote investment (Zee, Stotsky & Ley 2002). Imputation systems encourage all 
members of society to participate in the equity market (Boyle 1996).  
In an imputation tax system, it is predicted that companies use less debt to finance 
their investment, and they rely more on private investment (Twite 2001). This 
would create greater liquidity for capital expenditure (Zee, Stotsky & Ley 2002). 
Further, small investors have opportunities in the economy through share markets 
to generate better returns (Benge 1997). Officer (1987) and Wilkinson and 
Fancher (2004) also mention that the elimination of the double taxation of 
dividends is likely to lead such companies to change their capital structures, so 
that a greater proportion of equity relative to debt will be used for financing. The 
change in the debt to equity ratios of companies will reduce the financial risk of 
such companies. This will, therefore, reduce the required rates of return for the 
debt and equity financing, other things being equal. This provides a greater 
opportunity for small investors to invest in security markets, which makes for 
broader community involvement in the economic growth of the nation. 
There are good reasons for why governments move to imputation tax systems: 
removing double taxation, promoting investment, stimulating equity investment, 
increasing liquidity, and providing the broader community with opportunities to 
invest in the share market. They are the reasons why governments have policy 
tools (that is, tax policy) that can have significant impacts on corporate investment 
decisions, as a way to increase their policy effectiveness.  
In conclusion, an important objective of taxation policy is economic development 
through capital expenditure. Governments have good reasons to move to an 
imputation tax system and may employ a better tax policy in a way that increases 
investment. As such, there is a need for a body of research that enables better 
insight into (i) the relationship between taxes and capital structure in an 
imputation tax system; and (ii) the relationship between tax-system change and 
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capital structure towards equity. In a similar way, it is important to have a better 
understanding of (iii) the impacts of taxes on capital investment in an imputation 
tax system; and (iv) the impacts on capital investment of a tax-system shift to an 
imputation system. 
The following section presents a review of a number of empirical studies on the 
effects of taxes on capital structure and on capital investment in a classical and in 
an imputation tax system. The literature reviewed in this chapter can be grouped 
into two key sections. The first examines the impact of taxes and tax-system 
changes on capital structure; the second considers the effects of taxes and tax-
system changes on capital investment. This is done to help to explain which taxes 
and tax-system changes have an impact on capital structure, as well as the 
directions that governments are taking to increase capital investment. 
2.3  The impacts of taxes and tax-system changes on capital structure  
“Understanding and explaining capital structure is one of the most challenging 
issues in modern financial economics” (Pattenden 2006, p. 68). Optimal capital 
structure is important, because it promotes efficient allocation of investment 
capital and, if distorted in favour of debt over equity, it can lead to an increased 
likelihood of financial distress (Du & Dai 2005). Capital structure is determined 
by a combination of factors that are related to the characteristics of the ﬁrm, as 
well as to tax variables (Ross 2008). Corporate tax is one of the most important 
determinants of the amount of debt within classical systems, because firms can 
deduct interest expenses from their taxable incomes (Miller 1977; DeAngelo & 
Masulis 1980; Rajan & Zingales 1995; Graham 2003). Debt comes with a tax 
shield; however, equity does not. Based on the theory of Modigliani and Miller 
(1963), such deductions allow firms to shield income from corporate taxation, 
increase firm value and maximise the value of shareholders’ returns. This 
promotes the use of debt over equity when making financing decisions in these 
systems. Understanding the influence of taxes on capital structure is an important 
research topic for a number of reasons. For example debt has an impact on the 
leverage of firms, which can either increase or decrease the potential for financial 
distress. This is important for firms. Providing a tax environment that promotes 
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efficient allocation of debt and equity is thus important for both government and 
businesses.  
Section 2.3.1 presents the impacts of taxes on capital structure; and Section 2.3.2 
is about the impacts of tax-system changes on capital structure. 
 The impacts of taxes on capital structure  2.3.1
2.3.1.1 The impacts of taxes on capital structure in a classical tax system 
The impact of taxation on financing decisions has long been a debated topic 
among scholars. There is strong evidence and theoretical explanations that tax 
should influence capital structure (Modigliani & Miller 1963; Miller 1977; 
DeAngelo & Masulis 1980). 
One of the criticisms of Modigliani and Miller (1958) is that the authors do not 
consider the likely impact of corporation tax on the firm's cash flows. Jensen 
(1986) argued that firms operating in economies with corporate tax codes would 
allow the deduction of interest payments for corporation tax purposes. The 
implication of such provisions is that after-tax cash flows to suppliers of capital 
will be higher for a firm that employs debt in its capital structure, when compared 
to one without such debt. It is from the strength of this argument that Modigliani 
and Miller (1963) wrote their later article as a correction to Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) to demonstrate the impact of corporate taxes on a firm's cash flows. 
Graham and Mills (2008) simulated marginal tax rates (MTR) based on financial-
statement information. By using a sample of firms from 1998 to 2000 in the 
United States, they demonstrated a positive relationship between the MTR and 
corporate debt levels, supporting the evidence that firms obtaining lower tax rates 
are likely to use less debt financing.  
In a study of the relationship between debt and the corporate marginal tax rate, 
Graham (1996a) performed regression analysis on 10,000 US firms from 1980 to 
1992. Graham simulates those firms’ marginal tax rates, which takes into 
consideration net operating losses, investment tax credits, and alternative 
minimum tax. The research by Graham (1996a) found evidence that firms with a 
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higher tax rate use more debt financing in their capital structure. Firms that have a 
marginal tax rate lower than the statutory rate are often considered as successful 
tax planners. 
Looking at the same time period, Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) 
studied debt and leases used by US firms between 1981 and 1992.They report that 
firms with a lower corporate tax rate have lower debt financing, thus supporting 
the positive relationship between corporate tax and corporate debt financing. 
Using corporate marginal tax rates, they document a positive, significant 
relationship between debt ratios and corporate tax rates. This is strong evidence 
supporting the idea that low-tax-rate firms have lower debt financing. Their study 
used marginal tax rates, and the results support a significantly positive 
relationship between corporate tax and corporate debt financing decisions. This 
result supports the evidence that corporate taxes have an impact on corporate 
decisions (MacKie‐Mason 1990; Scholes, Wilson & Wolfson 1990; Givoly et al. 
1992; Bartholdy & Mateus 2011; Barclay, Heitzman & Smith 2017).  
Following Stanley (2001), meta-regression analysis is an approach which is 
“useful in reviewing and evaluating empirical research results. If a number of 
independent studies have been conducted on a particular subject, using different 
data sets and methods, then combining their results can furnish more insight and 
greater explanatory power than the mere listing of the individual results” (Stanley 
2001, p. 131). With regard to 48 empirical studies of capital structure and the 
corporate tax rate over 25 years, Feld, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) conclude 
that marginal tax rates have a positive relationship with debt levels, with a 
marginal tax effect on the debt ratio of 0.27. They suggest that a reduction in a 
firm’s marginal tax rate lowers the debt level adopted for the firm’s capital 
structure. This meta-analysis study appears to conclude that higher taxes promote 
changes towards higher debt levels in firms.  
On the other hand, there are previous studies that have found that taxes are 
negatively associated with debt levels. Gordon and Lee (2007) examined US tax-
return data obtained for 51 years from 1950 to 2000. The dataset of US tax-return 
information comprises different firm sizes—including small private firms—to 
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examine the impacts of taxes on the debt financing of firms. Their results show 
that there is a strong and statistically significant negative impact on debt financing 
from corporate tax. With a reduction of 10 per cent in the corporate tax rate, there 
is an estimated decrease of 3.5 per cent in assets financed with debt (assuming that 
personal tax rates are fixed). These results suggest that corporate tax rates have a 
strong impact on debt levels for both small and large firms, but a small impact for 
firms of intermediate size.  
In summary, it can be seen from this discussion that a classical tax system may 
constrain corporate investment and is likely to encourage firms to use more debt 
financing. This could result in a negative impact on the economy when it comes to 
an economic downturn. To reduce this distortion in a firm’s financing, some 
countries have shifted their tax systems to an imputation system. To this end, it 
would be useful for policymakers—who are in need of policy tools—to 
understand the impact of taxes on capital structure in an imputation tax system. 
The following section provides a review of the relationship between taxes and 
capital structure in an imputation regime. 
2.3.1.2 The impacts of taxes on capital structure in an imputation tax system 
As discussed in the previous section, a classical tax system introduces a bias in 
favour of debt financing. Since the interest paid to a lender is an allowable 
deduction from a borrower’s taxable income, and dividend payments to 
shareholders are not deductible, tax systems tend to encourage firms to use debt 
financing rather than equity financing. This incentive grows when the corporate 
tax rate increases; therefore, higher corporate tax rates tend to result in higher 
corporate-debt levels for firms. However, this tends to occur in a classical tax 
system, while the story may be different in other tax systems. One of the benefits 
of the introduction of an imputation setting is to reverse the bias of debt financing 
(a reversal of debt-equity ratios). 
There is a range of unanswered contradictory findings in studies relating to taxes 
and capital structure in an imputation context. 
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On the one hand, existing studies indicate that tax is positively associated with 
debt levels in an imputation tax era. Lanis and Richardson (2012) studied tax 
incentives in Australia and found a positive relationship between leverage and 
effective tax rates. In particular, firms paying less tax have higher debt levels in 
their capital structure. These findings are supported by a later study by 
Richardson, Taylor and Lanis (2013), who found that leverage is positively related 
to their tax measure for an imputation regime. In the same vein, Lee and Kuo 
(2014) investigated the relationship between taxes and corporate decisions by 
using two-stage least squares regression. Their study indicates that the ownership 
structure and the corporate tax have impacts on the relationship between 
managerial ownership and debt levels. The aforementioned results once again are 
supported by Richardson, Taylor and Lanis (2015). In their study of 203 firms in 
Australia during the period from 2006 to 2010, a positive impact of leverage on 
the tax rate was found. This study used leverage as one of the control variables in 
the model and found that it has a positive significant impact on tax measures in an 
imputation regime. The main finding shows that tax incentive is positively 
associated with a firm’s financial distress. A possible explanation for this result—
taking into account the higher leverage characteristic of tax incentive firms—is 
that the high debt levels of firms have induced financial distress. It is important to 
note that the studies mentioned focus on leverage as one of control variables; 
therefore, understanding capital structure was not their key objective. However, 
the findings are significant in identifying the impacts of taxes on corporate 
leverage in an imputation regime.  
On the other hand, some studies suggest a negative relationship between taxes and 
capital structure in an imputation tax system. A quantitative study conducted by 
Richardson and Lanis (2007) examined the impact of the effective tax rates (ETR) 
on leverage in the context of the Ralph Review tax reform in Australia in 1999. 
The authors adopted an approach by Froot (1989) and Wooldridge (2003) using 
cross-sectional OLS and the White estimator of standard errors. They found that 
leverage is negatively related to effective tax rates; that is, debt levels decrease 
with an increase in the effective tax rate in the Australian imputation tax system. 
Further, following the Ralph tax reform, they argue that when there are lower 
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ETRs, firms will have higher debt levels in their capital structure (long-term debt 
divided by total assets). This is because there is a reduction in tax benefits from 
interest payments on debt financing. Twite (2001) used firm fixed-effects to 
examine the impact of the effective tax rate on the use of debt financing and found 
that, after the introduction of an imputation system, there is a negative association 
with leverage, which means that there is a decline in the corporate debt ratio. 
These findings are supported by Li and Stathis (2017), who found that tax 
incentives (by using investment tax credits) had a negative relationship with debt 
levels in Australia between 1986 and 2007. They conclude that firms with higher 
investment tax credits tend to have lower debt levels. 
However, there are studies showing insignificant coefficients between leverage 
and taxes in an imputation tax system. An important study by Pattenden (2006), 
employing Bayesian methods with company data for Australia from 1982 to 1998 
produces insignificant results for most of the tax incentives used. The findings 
reveal that the ratio of leverage (the first difference in book value of total debt 
standardised by the market value of the firm) is insignificantly related to the 
marginal tax rate employed in the imputation-period context. These results are 
intriguing, as there is no tax incentive to use debt over equity. The results indicate 
the isolation of the impact of corporate tax on leverage in an imputation tax 
setting. If firms are in a well-established imputation regime, it is expected that 
such firms would not have higher debt levels than equity levels because of their 
dependence on tax incentives. Using this argument, the expected result would be 
that tax has no significant association with leverage. These findings are supported 
by Brailsford, Oliver and Pua (2002) who demonstrate that the effect of taxes 
(non-debt tax shield and dividend yield) on capital structure was neutral in the 
Australian imputation tax regime during the period from 1989 to 1995. They 
conclude that tax rates do not play an important role in the choice of debt–equity 
financing under an imputation system. This is further evidenced by Lin and Hung 
(2012) who document an insignificant coefficient between tax incentive and 
capital structure for the imputation tax regime in Taiwan between 1995 and 1999. 
In the same vein, Yeh (2018) reports that tax is not an important factor as a 
determinant of capital structure in the Taiwanese imputation regime. 
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In summary, these contradictory results are worth highlighting. This is because 
the studies have been carried out in well-established imputation contexts. More 
importantly, the existing research on the association between taxes and leverage in 
an imputation tax system is inconclusive, and this needs to be addressed. The 
evidence presented in this section suggests that extant capital-structure theory 
addresses numerous issues affecting the capital structure of firms. However, it 
does not fully explain the influence of taxes on capital structure in countries with 
an imputation tax regime. The present research aims to clarify whether taxes do 
have an impact on corporate leverage in countries where an imputation tax system 
has been well-established.  
 The impacts of tax-system changes on capital structure  2.3.2
Taxation of dividends tends to affect the optimisation of capital structure. In 
classical tax systems, as mentioned earlier, corporate earnings are taxed twice—
once at the corporate level and once at the individual level. This may discourage 
and constrain the corporate equity-financing necessary for the economy, resulting 
in the inefficiency of the capital structure (Harberger 1962).  
The potential misallocation of resources and the subsequent inefficiency related to 
classical corporation tax have been the subjects of much research. For example 
Thomas and Sellers (1994) demonstrate that the traditional double tax on profits 
of firms causes tax bias in favour of corporate debt financing. Under the classical 
tax system, firms can deduct interest payment on debt financing, but they cannot 
deduct dividend payments from equity financing.  
In order to avoid these distortions, many countries have made major tax reforms 
concerning corporate taxation in which shareholders receive full or partial credits 
of the tax paid at the corporate level. The elimination of double taxation in an 
imputation context has impacts on reducing the tax incentive of debt financing. 
The following sections examine: (i) the impacts of tax reform on capital structure; 
and (ii) the effects of tax-system change (from classical to imputation) on capital 
structure. 
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2.3.2.1 The impacts of tax reform on capital structure in a classical tax 
system 
The main focus of this section is on reviewing the literature on tax reform and the 
possible impacts tax reforms may have on the corporate capital structure.  
Several studies indicate the relationship between TRA reform and corporate 
capital structure in a classical tax system. Givoly et al. (1992) examined the 
impacts of corporate taxes on the changes in corporate capital structure under the 
TRA. They suggest that both corporate tax and personal tax have the main 
influences on the corporate capital structure. Similarly, Graham (1996b) found 
deterioration in the relationship between debt and taxes in 1986 and 1987 in the 
United States, which he ascribed to the changes that came into effect with the 
introduction of the 1986 US tax reform. He found that tax rate changes have a 
significant impact on a firm’s corporate financing decisions. 
In the same vein, Dhaliwal, Krull and Li (2007) focused on the changes in 
personal taxes that came into effect with the US Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and 
the US Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. They found that 
those changes had a significant influence on corporate financing decisions. 
However, this study, as the authors acknowledge, suffered from methodological 
problems when using time dummy variables which might capture the effect of 
macroeconomic fluctuations as a proxy for the tax changes that came into effect. 
Similarly, Faccio and Xu (2015) and Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) document that 
firms adjust their leverage when there is an introduction of tax reforms both 
internationally and in the United States.  
The impacts of tax reforms on capital structure in a traditional tax system are 
found in several studies (MacKie‐Mason 1990; Rajan & Zingales 1995; Desai, 
Foley & Hines 2004; Gordon & Lee 2007). In more recent research, Faccio and 
Xu (2018) studied the impact of tax reforms on leverage within 20 OECD 
countries using time-series data. They conclude that the tax reforms have 
significant impacts on equity financing. The impact of tax reforms on leverage 
differs significantly across firms. For instance, higher corporate tax rates have 
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negative impacts on equity financing; whereas, this effect is reduced significantly 
for high levels of leverage. Interestingly, the impact of tax reforms has differed 
across many nations in several ways. Another example of this is that tax reforms 
produce a smaller effect in countries with higher levels of tax evasion. In those 
countries, the value of debt-tax savings is also lower.  
Bargeron, Denis and Lehn (2014) examined the introduction of corporate and 
individual taxes and their effects on capital structure in the United States and 
found little evidence to support an impact of taxes on corporate capital structure. 
On the other hand, Doidge and Dyck (2015) found a significant impact of taxes on 
corporate decisions. By employing an event study and time-series analysis based 
on data from 1996 to 2011, they found evidence supporting the view of taxes as 
one of the important determinants for corporate decisions in an imputation tax 
system. Further, firms can adjust corporate leverage in response to changing tax 
incentives. 
Overall, the studies presented thus far provide evidence that the impacts of tax 
reform on capital structure in the traditional tax system are contradictory. The next 
section presents the impacts of tax-system changes on capital structure. 
 
2.3.2.2 The impacts of tax-system changes to an imputation tax system on 
capital structure 
The previous section investigated the impact of tax reform on corporate leverage. 
This section specifically reviews existing research on the impacts of the shift in 
tax regime—from classical to imputation—on capital structure. In general, this 
change is supposed to encourage firms to use less debt financing and to use more 
equity financing for investment. 
The adoption of an imputation tax regime changes the incentive to use debt 
financing over equity financing, as well as resulting in a reduction of the tax bias. 
The first relevant study is Schulman et al. (1996), who examined the adoption of 
integration—the introduction of an imputation tax system, or the changes in a tax 
system from a classical to an imputation tax system)—in New Zealand from1982 
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to 1991, and for Canada from 1968 to 1977. By using pooled time-series, cross-
sectional regressions, they found that firms reduced debt levels in these countries. 
The results indicate that corporate debt levels decreased and equity financing 
levels increased in both countries after the introduction of dividend imputation. 
The key difference between the imputation systems in the two countries is that 
capital gains tax was introduced in Canada, but not in New Zealand. In Canada, 
dividends and capital gains rates were introduced during the period of imputation. 
While the introduction of integration should make firms use less debt financing, 
an increase in capital gains tax is likely to have an impact in the opposite 
direction. High-dividend firms tend to gain benefits from an integration regime 
(Amoako‐Adu 1983; Amoako-Adu, Rashid & Stebbins 1992). To isolate the 
relative impacts of both the changes of tax system and the taxes on capital gains in 
Canada, Schulman et al. (1996) divided firms into two categories: a high-dividend 
group and a high-growth group. In Canada, there was a negative impact of tax on 
leverage. This negative effect suggests that corporate tax had an important impact 
on reducing debt levels in the corporate capital structure in Canada.  
Most prior studies have investigated capital-structure choice around changes in 
tax rates which decrease the incentive to use debt financing. The implementation 
of an imputation tax regime in Australia not only changes the relative 
attractiveness of debt over equity financing, but perhaps it has resulted in a 
reversal of the tax bias. The benefits of an imputation regime are to lessen the 
preference for debt in financing decisions. One study that analysed the influence 
of taxes on corporate financing decisions in the Australian imputation integration 
context is Twite (2001). By using firm fixed-effects, he analysed the influence of 
the effective tax rate on corporate financing decisions when the tax system 
switched from a classical tax system to an imputation one. He ascribes a positive 
relationship between the effective tax rate and leverage. He focused on the tax 
implications of the changes of capital structure that came into effect with the 
introduction of the Australian dividend imputation regime in 1987. Within the 
period of study after the changes in the tax system (from 1983 to 1997), he 
provided the important findings that there is a significant reduction in debt levels; 
a decrease in the levels of capital raised by using retained earnings; and an 
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increase in the levels of capital raised by using new equity financing. Twite 
(2001) notes that the system is not fully integrated in the Australian context. The 
dividend imputation tax is only a partially integrated system which excludes 
certain types of investors in Australia. Non-resident foreign and tax-exempt 
investors are not included for imputation tax credits. Further, there is no carry 
forward of tax credits or cash refunds in this imputation tax system.  
In contrast, Pattenden (2006) focused on the influence of taxes on corporate 
financing decisions from an introduction of integrated imputation in Australia. 
This study investigated the influence of marginal tax rates using a Bayesian 
methodology. An important result of this study is that there was a significant tax 
influence before, but not after, the integration of the Australian dividend 
imputation system. In other words, under a fully integrated dividend imputation 
system, taxes paid at the corporate level do not have an influence on corporate 
financing decisions. Similarly, those findings are supported by the Akhtar (2005) 
study of the Australian imputation context from 1992 to 2001 using a Tobit 
regression model. Based on the assumption that the Australian dividend 
imputation system is fully integrated, this study, not surprisingly, did not find any 
significant evidence of an impact of non-debt tax shields on corporate financing 
decisions. 
The benefits of the introduction of imputation are confirmed by Li and Stathis 
(2017) throughout three periods in Australia. The debt levels fall significantly 
throughout these periods. By using multiple linear panel regressions, they 
analysed this relationship in the Australian dividend imputation context from 1986 
to 2007. Their data are divided into three groups (Period 1: 1984–1991, Period 2: 
1992–1999, and Period 3: 2000–2007) and are used to estimate the coefficient and 
report t-statistics for the three periods. The purpose of this is to identify the 
significance of this impact during the three periods. They found that the 
importance of tax on leverage (total debt to book value of assets) decreased from 
Period 1 to Period 3. This is when the tax system changed completely to an 
imputation one. This may have occurred in the early period because the statutory 
corporate tax rates were greater then. The Australian context is an important case 
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for examination because of the elimination of double taxation and the reduction in 
the tax incentive for using debt financing. Li and Stathis (2017) emphasise the 
importance of the impact of taxation on corporate leverage decisions when 
shifting to an imputation context. 
Extant capital-structure theory addresses numerous issues influencing the capital 
structure of firms, but it does not fully explain the impacts of tax on capital 
structure in countries under an imputation tax setting. There are many benefits of 
the introduction of an imputation tax system. These benefits include eliminating 
double taxation and decreasing the potential for financial distress (Handley & 
Maheswaran 2008). The benefit of an imputation tax system, as explained by 
Twite (2001), is that firms will favour debt over equity only when corporate tax 
rates decrease. However, there is an opposing argument that there will be no tax 
benefit when shifting to an imputation tax system (Pattenden 2006). Theory 
suggests that there exists a relationship between taxes and capital structure when 
there is an implementation of an imputation tax system, but the empirical findings 
often contradict one another. The present research attempts to clarify this 
contradiction in empirical results. This thesis aims to clarify whether in fact taxes 
have an impact on corporate leverage in countries where a dividend imputation 
tax system is introduced. 
In summary, the current literature on the effect of taxes on capital structure, shows 
that taxes play an important role for investment flows. The extant research, 
therefore, indicates that one single country that has changed to the imputation tax 
system experienced results of changes in capital structure. However, there are still 
contradictory and conflicting results. This thesis aims to clarify such results using 
an empirical approach. The fixed-effects model is used to test the impacts of taxes 
on capital structure. This model is used to investigate the impacts of tax-system 
changes on corporate capital structure. A further elaboration is provided in 
Chapter 3. This thesis focuses particularly on how the introduction of an 
imputation tax system affects leverage. The study looks at whether taxes have an 
impact on capital structure when the tax system shifts from a classical to an 
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imputation tax system. The selection of countries is discussed in detail in Chapter 
3. 
This section reviewed the theoretical and the empirical literature relating to how, 
and to what extent, taxes and the changes in the tax system affect corporate 
financing policies. The next section provides an overview of the literature which 
examines the impact of taxes and tax-system changes on capital investment and 
discusses the results from these studies. 
2.4 The impacts of taxes and tax-system changes on corporate investment 
The impact of taxes on corporate investment has been the focus of much research 
since Modigliani and Miller (1958). The impact of taxes on capital investment is 
an important issue for governments. These effects matter not only for designing 
tax policy to generate government revenue, but also for what impact such policy 
will have on economic development and growth. 
As mentioned in Section 2.3.2, the potential misallocation of resources and the 
subsequent inefficiency related to classical corporation tax has been the subject of 
much research. Under a classical tax system, firms can deduct interest payments 
on debt financing, but they cannot deduct dividend payments on equity financing. 
This bias reduces a firm’s capital investment, which in turn results in inefficient 
pricing and consumption of corporate products. Gravelle (1992) indicates that 
these distortions would to a large extent have impacts at macroeconomic levels if 
the economy is in an economic downturn. Such a tax system could discourage 
firms’ investment, restraining the equity finance necessary for the economy, 
which may cause inefficiency in the world economy. In order to eliminate these 
distortions, many countries have attempted to implement changes in their tax 
systems.  
This section reviews the literature on the impact of taxes on capital investment in 
a classical tax system and an imputation tax system. Section 2.4.1 presents a 
literature review related to the effects of taxes on investment. Section 2.4.2 
reviews the literature related to the effects of tax reform on investment. 
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 The impacts of taxes on corporate investment  2.4.1
2.4.1.1 The impacts of taxes on corporate investment in a classical tax 
system 
The relationship between investment and corporate financial decisions has been a 
controversial and much-disputed subject within the finance and economics 
literature. Traditionally, it has been argued that there is no relationship between 
dividends and corporate investment (Modigliani & Miller 1958). Based on the 
assumption of perfect capital markets, they demonstrated that a firm’s value 
depends on their investment policy and not on the ways they finance investments. 
Since the study of Modigliani and Miller (1958), much research has focused on 
the impact of taxes on investment decisions. A further study by Fama (1974) 
demonstrated that there is no relationship between dividends and corporate 
investment. He used US data from 298 firms from 1946 to 1968. By using time-
series data, he concluded that there is no evidence for this relationship; this 
supports the Modigliani and Miller (1958) findings. 
The evidence suggests that capital markets are always imperfect and that firms 
would be careful in choosing the ways to finance capital investment decisions. 
Based on the conditions of imperfect capital markets, Dhrymes and Kurz (1967) 
studied 181 US firms from 1947 to 1960. Using single equation and simultaneous 
equation models, they found a significant relationship between corporate 
investment and dividend decisions, with the implication that corporate investment 
tends to have a significant impact on dividend behaviour. In an analysis of this 
impact, Auerbach (1992) estimated models of investment behaviour in which tax 
changes directly affect investment, especially in machinery and equipment, within 
a classical tax system.  They explained that tax policy does influence corporate 
investment in both equipment and structures. However, this study did not include 
cash flow as influencing investment, and did not clarify the importance of cash 
flow in its impact on capital investment.  
Empirical evidence on the effect of statutory corporate tax rates on corporate 
investment suggests that there is a positive significant relationship between them. 
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Djankov et al. (2010) contribute to the literature on the impacts of firms’ fixed-
asset investment on corporate tax-rate changes by focusing on firm-level panel 
data in 14 OECD countries. Gary et al. (2016) analysed the impact of US tax-rate 
changes on capital investment (proxied by marketable equity securities) from 
1969 to 2008. They found a positive relationship between the changes in the tax 
rate and the change in capital investment—when there is a decrease in the 
corporate tax rate, there is an increase in corporate investment. 
To understand the impacts of tax incentives (taxable income) on corporate 
investment better, Edgerton (2010) provides an in-depth analysis of the work of 
Auerbach (1992) and shows the need for investment responses to tax by including 
cash flows in the model. His results suggest that cash flows have important effects 
on the impact of tax incentives. The declining trend in firms’ cash flows in 
Edgerton’s period of study would predict a decrease of 24 per cent in in the 
effectiveness of a firm’s bonus depreciation. His results are that corporate 
investment has been slightly affected by tax incentives when there is a reduction 
in a firm’s cash flow in an economic downturn. The evidence presented in the 
Edgerton study suggests that there is a negative relationship between capital 
investment and corporate tax asymmetries for taxable firms. This finding is 
supported by Niemann (2011), who analysed the effects of stochastic taxation on 
investment behaviour in a real-options model. This author found that low 
uncertainty in relation to tax leads to great uncertainty in cash flow, and to a 
strong relationship between cash flows and tax payments; increased uncertainty in 
tax tends towards increasing corporate investment. 
Similarly, Jacob, Wentland and Wentland (2018) highlight that increasing 
uncertainty about tax has the effect of decreasing corporate investment, especially 
in relation to decisions regarding significant investments. By using standard OLS 
and quantile regression models, their study uses a dataset from 1978 to 2012 as 
the long period for their study. They mention the situation that uncertainty in tax 
could lead to firms holding more cash. Important findings were: decreases in 
corporate investment levels; and, delays in corporate investments due to firms 
holding much more cash.  
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There are studies that support a negative relationship between corporate tax and 
capital investment. In particular, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is shown to be 
one of the important determinants of capital investment when examining the 
latter’s relationship with changes in the corporate tax rate. Djankov et al. (2010) 
investigated 85 countries with data for 2004. They found that when there was an 
increase in corporate tax rates, this led to a decrease in FDI. The subsequent 
findings of De Waegenaere, Sansing and Wielhouwer (2012) are similar to those 
of Djankov et al. (2010). Drebler (2012) found a negative association between tax 
rate and corporate investment. In the same vein, Brandstetter and Jacob (2013) 
obtained similar results—there was a relationship between corporate tax and 
corporate investment in Germany when there was a corporate tax rate reduction.  
Given these conflicting findings, the evidence that taxes are associated with 
corporate investment must be considered as inconclusive for a classical tax 
system. The next section presents a review of the literature related to the effects of 
taxes on corporate investment in an imputation tax system. 
2.4.1.2 The impacts of taxes on corporate investment in an imputation tax 
system 
A classical tax system would create an incentive for debt financing. The objective 
of an introduction of imputation is to reverse this bias. The imputation regime 
tends to have important advantages in reducing debt–equity biases and in 
increasing corporate investment in the economy (Howard & Brown 1992). 
However, the empirical results from existing studies on this tendency remain 
inconclusive. 
There is an increase in abnormal returns for companies with fully imputed high 
dividend yields in an imputation tax system. A full-imputation tax system can 
eliminate double taxation for domestic investors efficiently. Chay and Marsden 
(1996) used an event-study methodology to isolate the response of share-price 
changes to the introduction of the full-imputation regime in New Zealand. Their 
study focused only on 1993. The market reaction to the new integrated tax credit 
regime was based on the abnormal stock returns on the announcement day. Their 
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findings indicate that the capital market reacts positively to the introduction of a 
tax credit regime, and that payment of cash dividends will provide important 
evidence for the full-imputation setting. The authors provide substantial support 
for the full-imputation tax related to the tax advantage of debt.  
An imputation regime can diminish an increase in capital investment through the 
impacts of any capital gains present in the economy. An integration of the 
imputation tax regime and capital gains tax can have reverse impacts on 
investment decisions. By using Australia as a setting from 1985 to 1996, Benge 
(1997) indicates that by levying a tax on gains in shares, the government 
reintroduced a bias against corporate investment. Biases regarding whether 
investment is undertaken by firms would have been eliminated entirely if (as in 
New Zealand) the company tax rate and top personal marginal tax rate were 
aligned, and if there had not been a capital gains tax on shares. 
A decrease in corporate tax rates can lead to an increase in dividend payouts and 
foreign investment in an imputation tax system. Chang, Chen and Chen (2017) 
found a significant negative correlation between corporate tax and the dividend 
payout ratio in the context of Taiwan. There, the imputation system integrates 
both corporate and personal taxes to eliminate the distortions of double taxation. 
In their study, they used data for Taiwan over a four-year period (from 2008 to 
2011) and they used firm fixed-effects to conduct their empirical tests. They found 
evidence to support the view that the economy had sustained impacts from the 
reduction of the tax rate, and because foreign shareholders tended to gain benefits 
based on the reduction of the corporate tax under an imputation setting. They 
showed that decreasing the corporate tax rate is associated with an increase in the 
dividend payout ratio and foreign investment. 
However, an imputation tax system can cause a decrease in corporate capital 
investment. Boyle (1996) analysed the relationship between capital investment 
and dividend decisions under assumptions of the dividend taxation scheme. He 
found that, compared with the classical system, an imputation setting can 
contribute to a reduction in corporate capital investment.  
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Overall, the existing literature to some extent is relevant to the research inquiries 
in the present research; however, the literature does not particularly focus on the 
impacts of taxes on capital investment so the results are still inconclusive. 
Therefore, there is a need for research on the impacts of taxes on capital 
investment in the context of an imputation tax system. Further, the research 
reviewed has not taken account of those impacts over a long period in a well-
established tax system, nor tested them in different contexts. Both of these issues 
are central to the present research. It is important to undertake a further study on 
this matter for other countries where the dividend imputation system is well-
established.  
 The impacts of tax-system changes on corporate investment 2.4.2
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the impact of tax reform 
on corporate investment, with the focus on the classical tax system (Hamson & 
Ziegler 1990; Auerbach & Hassett 1991; Givoly et al. 1992; Cummins et al. 1994; 
Gupta & Newberry 1997). However, research on the impact of a tax-system 
change from a classical to a dividend imputation system on capital is limited. 
Heming (1994) used sample data from 145 Australian firms from 1983 to 1992 to 
investigate the impact of dividend imputation on corporate payouts with the 
implementation of the full dividend imputation. Using a univariate statistical 
approach, Heming found statistically higher payout ratios when the Australian 
imputation regime entered the imputation tax-system period. With the 
introduction of dividend imputation, firms tended to increase their dividend 
payout to maximise the return to shareholders and to take advantage of all 
available franking credits. Although the findings indicate the advantage of tax-
system change on dividend payouts, they do not directly implicate the impacts of 
this shift on corporate investment. Regarding the studied period, it only includes 
the five years after and the five years before the change of the tax system to an 
imputation one. This period, however, is only considered as an early integrated tax 
regime (Pattenden 2006). To yield a more accurate comparison and contrast, the 
research should cover a longer span of time incorporating the period of the 
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classical tax regime, the period of the early integrated tax regime, and the period 
after the tax system has been well established (Pattenden 2006). 
Black, Legoria and Sellers (2000) investigated the effect of tax-system changes—
from a classical to a full-imputation system—on capital investment in Australia 
(in 1987) and in New Zealand (in 1988). It is important to note that the imputation 
system employed in these two countries is different: one has the introduction of a 
capital gains tax (Australia), and the other is without it (New Zealand). The 
authors used a fixed-effects model to analyse the impacts of tax-system changes 
on corporate investment. The studied time period is from 1982 to 1991 for both 
countries; this is shorter than that in the Hemming (1994) study. What is 
surprising is that the results were not consistent across countries. After the post-
dividend imputation, the tax rates (corporate tax and personal tax rates) did not 
have a significant association with corporate investment. This did not support the 
expectation of an increase in investment after the introduction of the full-
imputation tax system in New Zealand. On the contrary, in response to Australia’s 
tax reform, there was a positive relationship between corporate capital investment 
and the corporate tax rate and the personal tax rate. Black, Legoria and Sellers 
(2000) found that dividend imputation encourages capital investment. Another 
important finding is related to capital gains tax: by separating the impacts of 
capital gains on capital investment, this study divided firms into two types. These 
were high-dividend paying and low-dividend paying. They document that 
dividend imputation had an impact on corporate capital investment for high-
dividend paying firms in both countries. However, it was found that capital gains 
had a significant impact on corporate investment for low-dividend paying firms in 
Australia, which was the country experiencing the introduction of imputation and 
along with a capital gains tax. 
A further study by Jugurnath, Stewart and Brooks (2008) examined the change in 
the tax system in Australia from classical to full imputation in 1987, undertaken to 
reduce the bias of double taxation. This study investigated the effects of corporate 
tax rates and personal tax rates on corporate capital investment, using firm-level 
panel data (fixed-effects model) for the period from 1982 to 1992. The results 
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indicate that dividend imputation stimulated corporate capital investment. This 
has an important implication. It is that the introduction of dividend imputation is 
an effective way to eliminate the distortions of the classical system. 
In summary, the aforementioned studies lend support to the notion that tax reform 
plays a role in encouraging investment; however, existing research indicates either 
conflicting results or a lack of relevance to corporate investment, and a limited 
period of study. Against this context, the present study aims to bridge those gaps 
by exploring how the introduction of an imputation tax system would affect 
corporate investment in different contexts; and, further examining the impacts of 
the implementation of the imputation tax system on corporate capital investment 
over a relatively long time span. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter presented a review of empirical studies about the effects of taxes and 
tax-system changes on capital structure and capital investment in different tax 
regimes, with a focus on an imputation system. Based on the nature of the present 
research inquiries, the chapter was divided into two main sections. The first 
examined the impact of taxes and tax-system changes on capital structure; and, the 
second considered the effects of taxes and tax-system changes on capital 
investment. 
The review of the literature on the research problems shows conflicting results 
among existing studies, suggesting that there is a need for further research on this 
matter. The literature review indicates that taxes may have negative, positive, or 
insignificant effects on capital structure. That is, there is mixed evidence on tax-
system changes and capital structure. Further, the impacts of taxes on capital 
investment, as well as the impacts of tax-system changes on capital investment, 
may differ greatly across different countries with different imputation tax regimes. 
What is not clear is whether the taxes have an impact on capital structure, and 
whether a move to an imputation tax system would result in a shift of capital 
structure to equity. What is not clear is whether taxes and tax-system shifts to an 
imputation system have an impact on firms’ capital investment.  
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Four critical research questions have emerged from the literature review carried 
out in this chapter. First, is it likely or not that taxes have a significant impact on 
capital structure under a well-established imputation tax system? Second, is it 
likely that tax-system changes have an impact on capital structure? More 
specifically, is a move to an imputation tax system likely to move the capital 
structure more towards equity? The third question is about whether or not taxes 
have a significant impact on capital investment in countries using a well-
established imputation tax system. Finally, there is the question of whether or not 
the changes in a tax system actually have any impact on capital investment.  
In order to address these questions, this research proposes a study on more 
diversified contexts, which allows us to examine the impacts of taxes on firms’ 
financing decisions, and on how the introduction of the imputation tax system 
affects leverage. The expansion of time period enables us to investigate the effects 
of taxes and of the introduction of an imputation tax system on corporate 
investment. That makes the present research stand out from the earlier literature—
it examines the impact of regime shifts, as well as of tax changes, with an 
imputation tax system. The research outcomes might help to explain how taxes 
and tax-system changes have had an impact on capital structure, as well as on the 
directions that governments are taking to increase capital investment. 
For this reason, there is a clear need to address the above-mentioned knowledge 
gaps and to extend this research topic to other countries in order to test the effects 
of tax-regime changes on capital structure and capital investment. The present 
research focuses on countries with well-established imputation to test the impact 
of the taxes on corporate capital structure and corporate capital investment.  
The selection of contexts and time periods for the study is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3. This gives the rationale for choosing the particular countries and the 
associated periods of time. It discusses the sample selected, the methodology, and 
the data used for testing the issues. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the extant literature on the relationship between 
taxes and tax-system changes and capital structure, as well as that between taxes 
and tax-system changes and capital investment. This chapter presents the 
methodology and data used to address the sets of research questions presented in 
Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Research questions 
Key question 1 Does tax have an impact on capital structure? 
 
Sub-questions 
 
In what ways, if any, do taxes have an impact on capital 
structure in a well-established imputation tax system? 
In what ways, if any, do tax-system changes have 
impacts on capital structure? 
Key question 2 Does tax have an impact on capital investment? 
Sub-questions 
In what ways, if any, do taxes have an impact on capital 
investment in a well-established imputation tax system? 
In what ways, if any, do tax-system changes have 
impacts on capital investment? 
To address these questions, this research is based on three countries that use 
imputation tax—Canada, Australia, and Taiwan. First, this study examines 
whether the shift from a classical to an imputation tax system has had an impact 
on capital structure in Australia and Taiwan. It investigates the impact of taxes on 
capital structure in Canada. Second, this study investigates whether the changes 
from a classical to an imputation tax system has had an impact on capital 
investment in Australia and Taiwan. The study examines the effects of taxes on 
capital investment in Canada, where the imputation system is well-established. 
This study focuses on two countries whose systems have shifted (Australia and 
Taiwan) and one country with a well-established imputation tax system (Canada) 
to examine these issues. Those countries provide us with a dataset which is 
broader than it would be for other countries. This study uses regression models 
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called ‘firm fixed-effect’ estimation, which can control time-invariant influences 
on leverage and (or) capital investment, and it can account for unobservable 
business-cycle and other macroeconomic effects.  
In undertaking this research, efforts have been made to collect data from a wide 
range of sources. These include the Datastream Database for Canada (1982–2015) 
and Taiwan (1989–2009; the Datastream and MorningStar Database for Australia 
(1990–1998), and data from companies’ annual reports for the period from 1982 
to 1987. Corporate tax and personal tax data were collected from the OECD Tax 
Database and the World Bank World Development Indicators. 
The following sections present the rationale for country selection and a brief 
review of the tax systems which were used in the selected countries. A proper 
empirical analysis needs a proper understanding of the details of the tax system. 
Without it, the analysis is likely to be compromised and ineffective. 
Section 3.2 provides rationales for country selection. Section 3.3 presents a 
summary of the Canadian, Australian, and Taiwanese tax systems. The study 
methodology is presented in Section 3.4. The data sources are presented in 
Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Rationale for country selection 
In order to address the research inquiries, it is important to choose countries that 
are the most relevant to the research questions. First, there is the need to include 
countries using an imputation tax system for a relatively long time (a well-
established system), as well as those having shifted to an imputation tax system 
from a classical system. Second, the selection must be based on the feasibility of 
the research, especially the availability of data throughout the studied period. 
Finally, selected countries ought to have similar, but distinct, economies for the 
purposes of comparing and contrasting their experiences. 
Based on these criteria, the researcher selected three countries using imputation 
tax systems to address the research questions. Canada and Australia were chosen 
because they are open economies and have similar socio-economic systems. 
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However, they operate in separate markets and are not economically integrated. 
The economies are similar but distinct. Taiwan, on the other hand, is a newly 
emerging economy that recently shifted to an imputation tax system. This 
researcher considers that the characteristics of the sample will enable the study to 
address the research questions effectively.  
Table 3.2 highlights the factors such as openness index, financial market 
development, financial integration and macro-economic conditions of Australia, 
Canada and Taiwan. These factors are defined as follows: openness index is 
measured as Trade (% of GDP) (Trade is measured as the total of exports and 
imports of goods and services divided by a share of gross domestic product); 
financial market development is measured as market capitalisation of listed 
companies (% of GDP), financial integration is captured as stocks traded, total 
value (% of GDP), macro-economic conditions is measured as Growth of GDP 
(annual %) and GDP per capita (current US$).  
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Table 3.2 Comparisons of the characteristics of Australia, Canada, and Taiwan 
Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Openness index  
Trade (% of GDP) 
Australia 32.4 32.6 32.5 37.7 40.9 38.8 39.8 40.8 
Canada 53.3 52.9 49.9 69.1 82.9 69.7 60.1 65.5 
Taiwan 0.88 14.86 7.55 4.99 4.43 9.11 7.77 14.8 
Financial market development  
Market capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) 
Australia 39.8 32.8 34.6 66.5 89.7 115.8 127.2 88.2 
Canada 104.3 80.2 77.2 111.2 103.8 126.7 134.6 102.2 
Taiwan 14.38 16.39 59.86 69.06 79.13 129.28 168.6 146.1 
Financial integration 
Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP) 
Australia 3.30 8.46 12.9 26.6 51.3 88.3 98.9 55.8 
Canada 9.91 10.69 11.5 30.4 84.6 79.7 87.1 70.3 
Taiwan 2.32 5.35 94.1 51.7 34.8 74.5 85.7 36.1 
Macroeconomic conditions 
GDP per capita (current $US) 
Australia 11844.6 11452.6 18249.2 20384.6 21690.9 34016.7 51817.1 56408.3 
Canada 12297.8 14060.5 21371.3 20577.5 24124.2 36189.6 47447.5 43525.4 
Taiwan 2389 3315 8216 13129 14941 16532 19278 22400 
Macroeconomic conditions 
Growth of GDP (annual %) 
Australia 3.052 5.249 3.531 3.889 3.868 3.204 2.006 2.422 
Canada 2.163 4.734 0.154 2.678 5.183 3.201 3.084 1.001 
Taiwan 8.039 4.807 5.646 6.501 6.421 5.416 10.631 0.806 
Notes:  The data sources for Australia and Canada are World Development Indicators and OECD 
National Accounts data. Data for Taiwan are from the CEIC database. 
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There are a number of other reasons why Canada, Australia, and Taiwan were 
chosen.  
First, according to the Classification by World Economic Outlook Groups, these 
countries are classified as advanced economies. This is based on GDP valued at 
purchasing power parity, total exports of goods and services, and population (IMF 
2014). According to the IMF, Canada and Australia are both major advanced 
economies within the group of the seven largest countries in the world in terms of 
GDP (based on market exchanges rates); Taiwan is a newly industrialised 
economy.  
Second, Canada has had the imputation tax regime for a long time; Australia and 
Taiwan changed their tax regimes to imputation from a classical system. Thus, 
these countries are useful for the study of the relationship between taxes and 
capital structure and (or) capital investment across countries. This is because they 
provide a sufficient degree of identification of the tax regimes across three 
countries, and within three countries across time.  
Third, these three economies have attempted to use an imputation tax system in 
order to reduce distortions in  their economy, as well as stimulating capital 
investment and economic development and growth (Cummins, Hassett & 
Hubbard 1996).  
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Table 3.3 Tax systems in Australia, Taiwan, and Canada: 1982–2015 
Year Australia Taiwan Canada 
1982 CL CL PI 
1983 CL CL PI 
1984 CL CL PI 
1985 CL CL PI 
1986 CL CL PI 
1987 FI CL PI 
1988 FI CL PI 
1989 FI CL PI 
1990 FI CL PI 
1991 FI CL PI 
1992 FI CL PI 
1993 FI CL PI 
1994 FI CL PI 
1995 FI CL PI 
1996 FI CL PI 
1997 FI CL PI 
1998 FI FI PI 
1999 FI FI PI 
2000 FI FI PI 
2001 FI FI PI 
2002 FI FI PI 
2003 FI FI PI 
2004 FI FI PI 
2005 FI FI PI 
2006 FI FI PI 
2007 FI FI PI 
2008 FI FI PI 
2009 FI FI FI 
2010 FI FI FI 
2011 FI FI FI 
2012 FI FI FI 
2013 FI FI FI 
2014 FI FI FI 
2015 FI FI FI 
Notes: CL, FI, and PI abbreviate classical corporate taxation system, full-imputation system, and 
partial imputation system, respectively.  
Table 3.3 illustrates the changes in tax systems over the last three decades in the 
three countries. In general, in the first half of the sample period, the classical 
corporate tax system dominated in Australia and Taiwan. From 1998, the 
imputation tax system has been widespread in the three countries. In particular, 
Australia changed to a full-imputation tax system in 1987, and Taiwan adopted a 
partial imputation tax system in 1998. Canada has been using an imputation tax 
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system for a long time, with a change from a partial to a full-imputation tax 
system in 2009.  
3.3 Country-specific tax systems  
This section presents a brief review of the tax systems in the three selected 
countries. It is not just a matter of having the labels of the tax system correct, but 
it is vital to understand the complexities of tax systems to be able to interpret the 
empirical findings clearly. The complexity of taxation makes multi-country 
studies particularly challenging, and therefore it is vital to concentrate on a careful 
analysis of individual countries.  
 Canada 3.3.1
Canada has been using an imputation tax system for a long time. During the 
studied period of 1982–2015, Canada taxed gains on the sales of stock holdings 
for investment. Fifty per cent of capital gains were taxed at the normal rate. 
Capital losses could be carried back for three years or carried forward indefinitely. 
These gains cannot be adjusted for inflation.  
Firms in Canada pay tax according to its three levels of government: federal, 
provincial, and municipal. Corporate taxes on income are levied separately at 
federal and provincial levels. Combined tax rates vary, depending on the province 
where the firms are located. Although the tax bases are mostly the same, there are 
minor differences. Many of the provinces imposed corporate and personal income 
taxes in addition to federal levies.  
Since 2000, the federal government has implemented a reduction in the general 
corporate income tax rate from 18 per cent in 2000 to 16.5 per cent in 2011, and to 
15 per cent in the following years. The federal government levied lower rates on 
income from manufacturing and processing (M&P), thereby eliminating the 
distinction between general and M&P income at the federal level. Since 2011, 
some provinces—such as Newfoundland and Labrador, and Yukon—continue to 
levy a lower tax rate on income from M&P—at 5 per cent and 2 per cent, 
respectively. The federal government and most provinces and territories have 
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reduced the corporate tax rate and eliminated corporate capital taxes to enhance 
Canadian investment. Table 3.4 presents a summary of the general and M&P 
corporate income tax rates in Canada on August 1, 2011. As can be seen from the 
table, the combined federal, provincial, and territorial general rate ranges from 27 
per cent 32.5 per cent, while the combined M&P rate ranges from 19 per cent to 
32.5 per cent. 
Table 3.4 Corporate federal and provincial income tax rates (per cent)  
Province Manufacturing and Processing General 
 
Combined (federal 
and provincial) 
Federal 
Provincial and 
territorial M&P 
 
Newfoundland and Labrador 21.5 16.5 5 30 
Prince Edward Island 32.5 16.5 16 32.5 
Nova Scotia 32.5 16.5 16 32.5 
New Brunswick 27 16.5 11/10 27 
Quebec 28.4 16.5 11.9 28.4 
Ontario 26.5 16.5 10 28.3 
Manitoba 28.5 16.5 12 28.5 
Saskatchewan 26.5 16.5 10 28.5 
Alberta 26.5 16.5 10 26.5 
British Columbia 26.5 16.5 10 26.5 
Northwest Territories 28 16.5 11.5 28 
Nunavut 28.5 16.5 12 28.5 
Yukon 19 16.5 2.5 31.5 
Notes:  The rates have been updated to August 1, 2011. 
Taxes of Canadian provincial and (or) territorial rates are levied for small 
businesses in Canada at lower rates than for other businesses. The general 
combined federal and provincial and territorial rates for small businesses range 
from zero to 8 per cent. The combined small businesses rates range from 11 per 
cent to 19 per cent. Small business rates are shown in Table 3.5. Most provinces 
(except Quebec) provide a lower corporate income tax for small Canadian-
controlled private corporations (CCPCs).  
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Table 3.5 Federal and provincial corporate income tax rates (per cent) 
Province Small business 
 
Combined (federal 
and provincial) 
Federal 
Provincial and 
territorial 
Newfoundland and Labrador 15 11 4 
Prince Edward Island 12 11 1 
Nova Scotia 15.5 11 4.5 
New Brunswick 16 11 5 
Quebec 19 11 8 
Ontario 15.5 11 4.5 
Manitoba 11 11 0.0 
Saskatchewan 14.2 11 4.5/2 
Alberta 14 11 3 
British Columbia 13.5 11 2.5 
Northwest Territories 15 11 4 
Nunavut 15 11 4 
Yukon 15 11 4 
 Notes:  The General and small business Federal and Provincial corporate income tax rates are 
updated to 20 July, 2012.  
 
Figure 3.1 Corporate tax and personal tax rates in Canada (1982–2015) (per cent) 
 
As well as Canada use of an imputation system for a long time, the government 
broadened its tax base and lowered the tax rate. Figure 3.1 gives a detailed 
summary of the changes in corporate tax rates and individual tax rates. As can be 
seen from the figure, the corporate tax rate was reduced between 1982 and 2015. 
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The personal tax rate remained the same from 1989 to 1999; it increased from 
2000 to 2015. The government reduced the corporate tax and increased the 
personal tax when the tax system changed from a partial to a full-imputation 
system in 2009. After 2012, however, Canada increased both provincial corporate 
income tax rates and provincial personal tax rates (Bird & Wilson 2016). 
The Canadian imputation regime has two main features. First, along with the use 
of an imputation tax system, the Canadian government applies the federal capital 
gains tax. Second, this country has witnessed one of the highest personal capital 
gains taxes among OECD countries (Clemens, Lammam & Lo 2014). High 
capital gains tax can cause economic costs that can reduce returns on investment 
and discourage a firm’s capital investment (Meade (1990, p. 406). High capital 
gains rates can also reduce the use of equity levels, as observed by Zodrow (1992, 
p. 482). In the Canadian imputation tax system, taxes influence leverage and (or) 
capital investment because of there being rates on dividends and on capital gains. 
When there is an increase in the tax on capital gains, firms would use more debt-
level financing or decrease their capital investment. By contrast, the imputation 
tax system would encourage firms to use more equity financing or increase their 
capital investment. Therefore, the impacts of dividend imputation and capital 
gains taxes on dividend-paying firms and firms that do not pay dividends are 
different (Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000).  
 Australia 3.3.2
Australia shifted from a classical to an imputation tax system in 1987. In the 
classical tax system, taxes on a firm’s corporate profits were double-taxed—once 
at the corporate level and once at investor level. The double taxation of corporate 
profits was eliminated when Australia implemented the new imputation regime 
applying to resident firms and resident shareholders. At the same time, corporate 
tax rates were decreased. With the introduction of dividend imputation, a firm’s 
net income is affected because it is only taxed at the investor level (Howard & 
Brown 1992). Under this new imputation taxation regime, shareholders receive 
dividend payments that are taxed on each dollar of the dividends that have already 
been taxed at the corporate level. 
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Table 3.6 Comparing classical and imputation tax systems in Australia 
Corporate level Classical tax regime Imputation tax regime 
Earning before corporation tax 200 200 
Corporate tax 80 80 
Earning after tax 120 120 
Shareholder level   
Dividend income 
plus corporation withholding tax 
120 
0 
120 
80 
Taxable income 
Personal income tax 
120 
40 
200 
60 
minus imputation tax credit 0 80 
Net personal income tax payable 40 -20 
Total taxes paid (including corporate 
tax and personal tax paid) 
Net distribution shareholder 
120 
 
80 
60 
 
140 
Table 3.6 explains the total after-tax income that a firm distributes to its 
shareholders, and the total amount of taxes paid at corporate and investor levels 
under classical and imputation taxation regimes. A corporate tax rate of 40 per 
cent and a personal income tax rate 30 per cent are assumed for both tax systems. 
Based on the assumption that a firm can distribute total after-tax income to a 
firm’s shareholders, it is further assumed that the profits of a firm before dividend 
distributions and corporation tax are $200, which is taxed at a rate of 40 per cent 
in both tax systems. Remaining profits of $120 are distributed in full and are taxed 
again at a firm’s shareholder level at 30 per cent (investor-level tax rate), resulting 
in income tax of $40 in a classical regime and $60 in an imputation regime. Total 
tax payments (including corporate tax and personal tax paid) are $120 and $60, 
respectively. Net income distributed to shareholders is $80 and $140, respectively. 
This indicates that firms in a classical tax system pay more tax than they would in 
an imputation tax system. 
In the Australian imputation tax system, shareholders are able to receive the tax 
credits in full. Resident firms pay dividends for resident individual shareholders. 
Therefore, groups of investors such as individual domestic investors and pension 
funds receive a full-imputation credit.  
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Other groups such as foreign firms cannot use the tax credits, or receive franked 
dividends. Further, Australian firms that gained income overseas that is taxed 
overseas cannot receive an imputation credit. The effect of this tax-credit system 
is to make Australian firms liable for Australian tax on all foreign-sourced income 
and capital profits. However, a credit against Australian corporate tax is aimed for 
foreign taxes that are paid. Foreign corporate taxes cannot cause franked 
dividends to increase. However, this income will allow unfranked dividends to 
increase.  
Along with this implementation, other changes in the Australian tax system during 
this period included the introduction of a capital gains tax in 1985 and pension 
funds in 1988. Capital gains and losses are taxed at the personal statutory tax rate. 
Overseas investors are not allowed capital gains taxes on gains and losses in 
Australia. The tax gain from leverage is zero under an Australia dividend 
imputation tax system (Fan, Titman & Twite 2012).  
As for interest payments under this tax regime, the interest from domestic and 
from foreign-sourced debt are tax deductible corporate expenses. At the personal 
level, income interest is taxed at the investor's statutory tax rate. 
The elimination of double taxation of corporate income with the implementation 
of an imputation regime in Australia offers an opportunity to analyse the impacts 
of a change in the tax regime on corporate financing and investment decisions. 
Over the years from 1982 to 1998, the Australian government significantly 
reduced the corporate and the individual tax rates from 1987, the year after the 
change of the tax system to an imputation one. The top personal tax rate was 
reduced from 60 per cent to 47 per cent, and the corporate tax rate was reduced 
from 46 per cent to 36 per cent. Figure 3.2 illustrates the statutory corporate tax 
rates and the personal income tax rates in Australia over the years from 1982 to 
1998. 
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Figure 3.2 Corporate tax and personal tax rates in Australia, 1982-1998 
 
Similarly to the Canadian tax regime, in Australia’s imputation tax system, taxes 
influence leverage and (or) capital investment because of the rates levied on 
dividends and on capital gains. When there is an increase in the tax on capital 
gains, firms would use more debt-level financing or decrease their capital 
investment. By contrast, the adoption of an imputation tax system would 
encourage firms to use more equity financing or to increase their capital 
investment. Therefore, the impacts of the integration of imputation and capital 
gains taxes on dividend-paying firms and firms not paying dividends are different 
(Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000).  
The Australian imputation regime is very similar to the imputation tax system in 
Canadian in two ways. First, along with the use of an imputation tax system, the 
Australian government applies a federal capital gains tax. Second, both countries 
have witnessed one of the highest personal capital-gains taxes among OECD 
countries (Clemens, Lammam & Lo 2014). High capital gains tax can cause 
economic costs that can diminish returns on investment and discourage capital 
investment (Mason & Harrison 2002, p. 278). High capital gains rates can reduce 
the use of firms’ equity (Jin 2006, p. 1402). 
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 Taiwan 3.3.3
Prior to 1998, Taiwan used a classical tax system with income being taxed 
twice—once at the corporate level and once at individual level. At the corporate 
level, business profits were taxed at the rate of 35 per cent in1980–1984, at 30 per 
cent in 1985, and at 25 per cent from 1986 to 1997. At the individual level, 
distributed after-tax profits were taxed at the top rate of 60 per cent from 1980 to 
1985, at 50 per cent from 1986 to 1989, and at 40 per cent from 1990 to 1997. 
This resulted in double taxation, with a heavier tax imposed on dividend income 
than on interest income. 
Under this classical system, because dividends paid cannot be deducted from 
corporate income, but debt interest can, firms prefer to use debt rather than equity 
financing for corporate capital investment. This bias more than likely had a 
negative impact on firms’ financial decisions, and subsequent negative impacts on 
economic growth and development. Because of distortions in the traditional tax 
system, Taiwan considered changing to a full-imputation tax regime. 
From 1998, the Taiwanese Ministry of Finance adopted the fully integrated 
imputation system. Individual shareholders are allowed to credit the corporate 
income tax they paid against the individual income tax liability imposed on the 
dividends they receive. The integrated system is intended to eliminate the double 
taxation of dividends. When receiving dividend income, individual shareholders 
are allowed a credit against their individual income tax that is equal to the income 
tax paid at the corporate level. Dividends received by corporate shareholders are 
exempt from the corporate income tax, and the imputation credit is then passed to 
individual shareholders. After 1998, if a firm cannot distribute retained earnings in 
the current year, a rate of 10 per cent of additional tax is levied on these 
undistributed earnings. 
While resident shareholders are eligible for the imputation credit, non-resident 
shareholders are not, and these non-resident shareholders’ dividends distributed 
were levied at 10 per cent surtax. The total amount of the imputation credit 
available cannot exceed the domestic corporate income tax paid. In other words, 
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the credit is granted only for corporate income tax paid in Taiwan. It is not 
available for foreign taxes paid. 
The Taiwanese imputation regime is very similar to the integrated regime in 
Australia in two ways. First, Taiwan operates the full-imputation regime. Second, 
overseas investors are not allowed to have tax credits. Domestic shareholders are 
levied at the top tax rate. Domestic shareholders are allowed to offset their 
personal income tax with tax credits. However, this system differs from that in 
Australia in that there is no tax on capital gains in Taiwan. 
In summary, there are four main features relevant to the imputation tax regime in 
Taiwan: (i) there are no capital gains; (ii) dividends paid in the year of 
implementation (1999) and post-1999 are subject to the full-imputation tax 
regime; (iii) corporate shareholders have an 80 per cent exclusion until 1998, or 
full exclusion forward from 1999 on the dividends received; and (iv) overseas 
investors cannot use tax credits.  
Figure 3.3 provides a summary of the changes in corporate tax rates and 
individual tax rates. As can be seen, the Taiwanese government did not reduce 
both the corporate tax rate and individual tax rate from 1998 after the year of 
implementation of the dividend imputation system. The personal tax rate fell from 
50 per cent in 1989 to 40 per cent in 1990, and then stayed unchanged. The 
corporate tax rate was constant at 25 per cent over the whole period of this study. 
As a result, it is impossible to observe the impacts of the changes of the corporate 
tax rate and the personal tax rate on leverage and (or) capital investment. Only the 
impacts of tax-system changes in 1998 on leverage and capital investment can be 
observed in Taiwan. 
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Figure 3.3 Statutory corporate tax and personal tax rate in Taiwan (1989–2009) 
 
3.4 Methodology 
The previous section presented a summary of the tax systems for the three 
countries (Canada, Australia, and Taiwan) adopted for investigating the research 
questions. This section presents the methodology and data used in the research, 
and discusses the research approach used in the empirical analysis to examine the 
association between taxes and tax-system changes and capital structure, as well as 
between taxes and tax-system changes and capital investment. It starts with the 
panel-data regressions, explaining that panel data are used to address the research 
objectives that are set out in Section 3.4.1. This is followed in Section 3.4.2 by a 
discussion of estimation problems and the robustness of the regressions.  
 Panel-data regression models 3.4.1
The present study employs a multivariate regression model which has been used 
in a number of empirical studies on capital structure (Titman & Wessels 1988; 
Rajan & Zingales 1995; De Jong, Kabir & Nguyen 2008), and a number of 
empirical studies on capital investment (Danis, Rettl & Whited 2014; Öztekin 
2015). 
The present study employs a panel-data model which is widely used by 
researchers when studying capital-structure determinants (Fan, Titman & Twite 
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2012; Faccio & Xu 2015) and capital-investment determinants (Becker, Jacob & 
Jacob 2013; Iyer, Feng & Rao 2016). Panel data are used for multiple firms in 
which outcomes and characteristics of each firm are observed at several points in 
time (Cummins, Hassett & Hubbard 1996; Edgerton 2010; Heider & Ljungqvist 
2015; Dobbins & Jacob 2016). Panel data present several advantages with respect 
to cross-sectional and time-series data when used to study the association between 
corporate tax and capital investment (Vogelvang 2005; Becker, Jacob & Jacob 
2013). 
There are several types of panel-data analytical models, but the major methods are 
a fixed-effects model and random-effects model. These models are discussed as 
follows. 
3.4.1.1 Fixed-effects model 
A fixed-effects model (FEM) is used in this present study to analyse: (i) the 
effects of taxes and (or) tax-system changes on leverage that vary over time; and 
(ii) the effects of taxes and (or) tax-system changes on capital investment. FEM is 
used to analyse the association between leverage, capital investment, and taxes 
within a company. Each company has individual characteristics, which may have 
impacts on the dependent variables (Twite 2001; Becker, Jacob & Jacob 2013). 
The first assumption of FEM is that something within the firm may bias the 
dependent variables and for which one would need to control. This is because of 
the correlation between the firm-specific error term and the dependent variables. 
FEM can ignore the effects of those time-invariant characteristics in order to 
assess the net effect of the dependent variable. The second assumption of FEM is 
that those time-invariant characteristics are unique to the firm, and they should not 
have any correlation with other firms’ characteristics. As Torres-Reyna (2007, p. 
9) indicated “Each firm is different, therefore the firm-specific error term and the 
constant (which captures firm characteristics) should not be correlated with the 
others”.  
Since the sample contains data across firms and over time, the fixed-effects model 
takes the following form: 
59 
 
 
where  
αi (i = 1….n) is the unknown intercept for each firm (n firm-specific 
intercepts); 
Yit is the dependent variable where i is the firm and t is the time (year);  
X1it….. Xnit represent independent variables affecting dependent variables of 
the firm i in period t; 
β is the coefficient for that independent variable; 
  uit is the error term. 
3.4.1.2 Random-effects model 
In contrast with the fixed-effects model is the random-effects model (REM). As 
Brooks (2008, p. 498) indicates, “the random effects technique proposes different 
intercept terms for each entity, and these intercepts are constant over time, with 
the relationships between the dependent and independent variables assumed to be 
the same both cross-sectionally and temporally”. 
REM can be used in the cases where the variation across firms is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the independent variables or control variables included in the 
model. An advantage of REM is the capacity to include time-invariant variables. 
In FEM, these variables are absorbed by the intercept. The assumption of REM is 
that the firm’s error term is not correlated with the dependent variables; this 
allows for time-invariant variables to play a role as independent variables. The 
next section discusses how to choose the FEM or REM. 
3.4.1.3 Fixed-effects versus random-effects models 
The previous sections presented the two major panel data regression models: FEM 
and REM. For this research, it is believed that argues that FEM is more 
appropriate than REM for two reasons: consistency and efficiency. There are two 
methods to help the researcher to select the most appropriate model for the present 
study.  
itinitnititit uXXXX   ...Y 332211it
60 
 
While REM is based on the assumption that there is an exogeneity of all the 
regressors and the random individual effects, FEM allows for endogeneity of all 
the regressors and the individual effects (Mundlak 1978; Brooks 2008). The 
potential for endogeneity and reverse causality problems have been considered 
carefully in this thesis. This study employs a fixed-effects model to eliminate 
unobservable time-variant characteristics, and to reduce the impact of the 
correlation between market leverage and tax variables, as well as capital 
investment and tax variables. The methodology includes firm-year fixed effects to 
control for unobserved shocks that might coincide with tax-system changes that 
similarly affect all firms at a given time (Faccio & Xu 2018, p. 2). 
Compared with FEM, the REM approach has different intercept terms for each 
firm and these intercepts do not change across time. The assumption is that 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables are the same 
across firms and over time (Brooks 2008, p. 498). The possible reasons for 
choosing REM are likely to be based on the assumption that the variation across 
firms is random and uncorrelated with the predictor variables. Green (2008) 
mentions that the main difference between FEM and REM is that the unobserved 
firm effect embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors, not on 
whether these effects are stochastic or not. 
This section argues that FEM is more appropriate than REM for reasons of 
consistency and efficiency (Baltagi, Bresson & Pirotte 2003). The first key 
consideration in choosing between them primarily focuses on the consistency of 
the model. Because FEM is consistent when ci and xit are correlated (but REM is 
not), a statistically significant difference is interpreted as evidence against the 
random-effects assumption of REM. The most common approach applied by 
economists since 1980 is the Hausman and Taylor test. They proposed a model 
based on the test of the difference between the REM and FEM estimates. If the 
null hypothesis is rejected, based on the standard Hausman test, FEM will be 
chosen. The second reason for choosing FEM over REM is the ability of the FEM 
panel-data regression model to generate consistent and efficient regression 
estimators. Choosing FEM is an effective way to identify estimators if unobserved 
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variables are correlated with some or all of the variables included in the regression 
model—endogeneity. Following that argument, FEM is used in the present 
research because it focuses on analysing the effects of variables that change over 
time. 
Using FEM for investigating the effects of taxes and tax-system changes on 
capital structure 
In the first part of this research, FEM is used to test whether the taxes and (or) tax-
system changes to an imputation system have an impact on capital structure. The 
corporate capital structure has been identified as a large time-invariant component 
(Lemmon, Roberts & Zender 2008) which, if not controlled for, leads to an 
omitted-variable bias. The corporate capital structure regression models have 
indicated that FEM is important to capture unobserved heterogeneity at firm level 
(Flannery & Rangan 2006; Lemmon, Roberts & Zender 2008; Gungoraydinoglu 
& Öztekin 2011; Faulkender & Petersen 2012; Öztekin & Flannery 2012; Warr et 
al. 2012; Öztekin 2015). The use of FEM as the empirical model incorporating 
several firm-level variables can control for non-tax determinants of corporate 
capital structure. It is exactly this outcome that Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
emphasised: “An important purpose in combining time-series and cross section 
data is to control for individual-specific unobservable effects which may be 
correlated with other explanatory variables” (Hausman & Taylor 1981, p. 1377). 
As corporate capital structure changes over time in response to macroeconomic 
determinants, characteristics at firm level also have impacts on a firm’s corporate-
financing decisions. FEM regression analysis will control for the independence of 
a firm’s corporate decisions, which is the suitable technique for the present 
study’s analysis (Schulman et al. 1996). Eliminating the possibility of impacts of 
the corporate tax rate on foreign investment could be influenced by unobservable 
characteristics at firm level, and the use of FEM can account for firm fixed-effects 
(Chan & Lin 2017). Faccio and Xu (2015) describe this technique as an approach 
to overcome estimation problems that have resulted from serially correlated error 
terms:  
62 
 
“While the changes in statutory tax rates employed in this research are 
exogenous in the sense that they do not reflect choices made at the firm 
level, we do recognize that the observed changes in tax rates could 
potentially be correlated with changes in other determinants of leverage. 
To mitigate this concern, the main technique of the research is firm and 
year fixed-effects to control for time-invariant determinants of leverage 
and macroeconomic factors” (Faccio & Xu 2015, p. 279).  
Using firm and year fixed-effect panel regressions, can provide time-series 
evidence that changes in taxation have impacts on the corporate capital structure 
over time. This is because a firm fixed-effects technique can remove the 
association between taxes and capital structure. Therefore, it can eliminate the 
spurious negative association of macro-economic determinants for both taxes and 
capital structure.  
Using FEM for investigating the effects of taxes and tax-system changes on 
capital investment 
The second part of this research again employs FEM to analyse the impact of 
taxes and tax-system changes on capital investment. FEM can capture time-
invariant firm-specific effects that have impacts on levels of corporate investment. 
The research includes year fixed-effects that control for the business cycle and 
other impacts of macroeconomic variables (Dobbins & Jacob 2016). The impact 
of taxes on corporate capital investment is identified by regressing capital 
investment on tax rates, together with control variables at the firm level. The 
present study includes fixed-effects for each firm to mitigate the cross-sectional 
correlation between taxes and corporate capital investment. It employs year fixed-
effects to remove spurious association of macroeconomic determinants for taxes 
and for corporate capital investment. 
Breusch and Pagan (1979) and White (1980) indicated that heteroskedasticity is 
present. Therefore, the heteroskedastic estimator of standard errors, which uses 
clustered standard errors that are adjusted to test for correlation within an 
individual firm, should be included for both the first part and the second part of 
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the present research (Froot 1989; Andrews 1991; Michaelas, Chittenden & 
Poutziouris 1999; Williams 2000; Campello 2003; Wooldridge 2003; Cebenoyan 
& Strahan 2004). The White test on heteroskedasticity is a robust estimator of 
standard errors and has become standard practice for identifying “potentially 
unknown variance and covariance properties of the errors and data” (Vogelsang 
2012, p. 303). This approach can handle two-way clustering by year and firm, 
resulting in even more efficient regression outcomes (Petersen 2009; Thompson 
2011). It should be noted that White’s procedure to correct for heteroskedasticity 
does not result in changing the values of the estimated parameters, but it may 
result in a change in their significance level (Jugurnath, Stewart & Brooks 2008). 
Consequently, the present study uses the White heteroskedasticity estimator, 
allowing for within-firm error clustering and within-period error clustering. 
In summary, in the main tests the first part of this research identifies the impact of 
taxes on corporate capital structure by regressing capital structure on tax rates, 
together with control variables at the firm level. It includes fixed-effects for each 
firm to mitigate the cross-sectional correlation between taxes and corporate capital 
structure. It employs year fixed-effects to remove spurious association of 
macroeconomic determinants for taxes and for corporate capital structure. The 
second part is to identify the impacts of taxes on capital investment by regressing 
corporate capital investment on tax rates, using control variables at firm levels. By 
using fixed-effects for each firm, the adopted methodological approach can 
potentially eliminate the cross-sectional association between taxes and corporate 
capital investment. The study uses year fixed-effects to remove possible spurious 
correlations relative to macroeconomic variables for both taxes and capital 
investment. The study uses FEM to identify the way in which the taxes and tax-
system changes affect leverage and (or) capital investment across the three 
countries. The dataset for the three countries is large enough to allow for two-way 
clustering. 
 Robustness tests 3.4.2
An important assumption of a regression model is that the structure of the dataset 
does not change during the period of data collection. Consequently, a single 
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regression model is suitable for data collection. The regression model in this study 
is based on a further assumption that the parameters do not change during the 
period of estimation. Once there is a change in the dataset, then using a single 
linear regression may be not suitable for testing. Therefore, there is a need for two 
or more regressions to be applied. The presence of change in the data is called 
‘structural change’ and can be categorised by the change in the parameters of the 
model. 
Test for structural change  
It is assumed that only one structural change can appear in the data of this study 
and that there are K observations. The data are divided into two observation 
periods—period K1 and period K2, where K1 + K2 is equal to K observations for 
the whole period. 
To test for structural change in the data, this research used the Chow test to see 
whether all the coefficients of models differed in subgroups of the dataset as the 
test requires. One dummy variable is determined for regressions. The unrestricted 
regression contains a dummy variable for the intercept and for all of the regression 
coefficients. The regression is as follows: 
                                  (3.1) 
If the K observations are split into two subgroups, the regression is as follows: 
       (3.2) 
Dt takes the value 1 for observations in the first subgroup, and 0 otherwise. The 
Chow test viewed in this way is a standard F-test of the joint restriction H0: β4= 0 
and β5= 0 and β6= 0, with (3.2) being the unrestricted and restricted regressions. If 
the intercept and coefficients of regressions do not differ for both of the subgroups 
(before and after the structural break), there is no structural change in this 
situation.  
tttt uXXy  33221 
ttttttttt vXDXDDXXy  3625433221 
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The advantage of the Chow test is that the dummy variables can give useful 
information about the significance of coefficients on the dummy variable. The 
null hypothesis is structural stability. If the null hypothesis is rejected, this means 
that the slope of the coefficients was significantly different across the two dataset 
subgroups. The Chow regression makes it easy to note the slope coefficient 
differences between the two subgroups of the dataset, or not to note any such 
differences. The structural break has been used in many previous studies (Dennis 
& İşcan 2011; Lucchese 2011; McMillan & Rodrik 2011; Mertens & Ravn 2013; 
Hori, Ikefuji & Mino 2015). In particular, Shakibaei and Ahmadinejad (2016) 
consider the use of structural breaks for a tax system as an important part of 
economic modelling. 
In the present study, given that the research questions are related to the impacts of 
tax-system changes on corporate capital structure and (or) capital investment, the 
tests for structural breaks is appropriate. The reason is that corporate leverage and 
corporate investment in Australia and Taiwan did not remain the same at the 
introduction of imputation that was in place in these countries in 1987 and 1998, 
respectively. In other words, a change in a firm’s capital structure and capital 
investment before and after the introduction of imputation is referred to as 
structural break or structural change in the data for Australia and Taiwan. 
Therefore, if a model is fitted, then the regression coefficients before and after the 
introduction of the imputation period will change. A better option in this case 
would be to fit two different linear regression models—one for the data before an 
imputation era and another for the data after adopting imputation. 
3.5 Data  
This section introduces the sources for collecting data for both dependent and 
control variables for testing the impact of taxes and tax-system changes on capital 
structure and capital investment. 
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 Data sources for tax rates 3.5.1
This study uses multiple sources to obtain and verify the corporate tax rate and 
personal tax rates in Canada, Australia, and Taiwan. The primary data are 
obtained from the OECD Tax Database (in the combined corporate tax rate 
income section, and the combined personal tax rate income section) and the World 
Bank World Development Indicators (highest marginal tax rate). The data for 
corporate tax and personal tax are supplemented by data from the University of 
Michigan World Tax Database. Alternative sources are used because all data 
cannot be collected from one source. The alternative sources used in this study are 
consistent with other research in this area of taxes and capital structure and (or) 
capital investment (Mintz & Weichenrieder 2010; Faccio & Xu 2015). A meta-
analytical study by Feld, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) argues that it is crucial 
to choose the appropriate tax-rate measure in capital-structure research.  
Statutory tax rates are used in the analysis for a number of reasons. Many authors 
use them as the main variable in order to analyse the impacts of taxes on capital 
structure (Li & Stathis 2017), as well as the impacts of taxes on capital investment 
(Alzahrani & Lasfer 2012; Chan & Lin 2017). Further, policymakers are more 
likely to wish to observe the relationship between changes to the statutory rate of 
taxes and consequent adjustments to a firm’s investment and capital-structure 
policies (Loretz 2008; Devereux & Loretz 2013). 
 Data sources for variables 3.5.2
This section presents the data sources for the dependent variables and the control 
variables for the purpose of testing the effects of taxes and tax-system changes on 
capital structure and capital investment. The data cover the period of 1982 to 2015 
for Canada, from 1982 to 1998 for Australia, and from 1989 to 2009 for Taiwan. 
The sample period (1982–2015) is longer than in other research in this area 
(Pattenden 2006; Chang, Chen & Chen 2017). 
The primary source of data for dependent and control variables is from the 
Datastream Database (for firm-level data), which contains financial data on listed 
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companies in Canada and Taiwan. For Australia, company data are collected from 
the Morningstar and Datastream Databases from 1990 to 1998. For the period 
from 1982 to 1987, data are collected from available company financial reports. 
Financial firms and utilities firms are excluded from the sample due to the marked 
differences in capital structure between those industries and other sectors of the 
economy (Coles, Daniel & Naveen 2006). This research winzorises the firm-level 
variables at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presented an outline of the rationale for country selection, a summary 
of the tax systems of the selected countries, methodology, and data sources for 
analysing the impacts of taxes and (or) tax-system changes on corporate leverage, 
as well as for investigating the impacts of taxes and (or) tax-system changes on 
corporate investment.  
First, the chapter presents the rationales for country selection, and discusses 
possible tax systems for the selection of the countries examined in the study. 
Second, the chapter describes the research methods, including the fixed-effects 
model, and explains the reasons for choosing these methods. Third, this chapter 
presents the data sources for the study. 
The critical question is whether taxes have an impact on capital structure under a 
well-established imputation tax system, and whether tax-system changes have an 
impact on capital structure. Chapter 4 discusses these issues in detail. Another 
critical question is whether taxes and tax-system changes influence capital 
investment. Chapter 5 discusses these issues. 
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CHAPTER 4.  DOES TAX HAVE AN IMPACT ON CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE? 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed country selection, country-specific tax systems, 
methodology, and data. Canada and Australia were chosen because they have 
similar economies, but they operate in different markets; Taiwan is a newly 
industrialised country. The integration of a global free-market powerhouse and a 
vibrant emerging economy will enable us to address the research questions most 
effectively. 
This chapter investigates: (i) the impact of taxes on corporate capital structure in 
Canada where an imputation tax system has been in place for 33 years. This 
country is thus considered as having a well-established imputation system 
(Pattenden 2006); and, (ii) the impact of tax-system changes on the corporate 
capital structure in Australia and Taiwan. In particular, this chapter aims to answer 
the following questions: 
(1) In what ways, if any, do taxes have an impact on a firm’s capital 
structure in a well-established imputation tax system? 
(2) In what ways, if any, do changes to a tax-system regime (a shift from 
classical to imputation) result in changes in capital structure? 
Understanding the impacts of taxes and tax-system change on capital structure in 
an imputation tax system is an important topic. Existing research has primarily 
focused on the effect of taxes on the leverage of firms operating in countries under 
the classical tax system (MacKie‐Mason 1990; Graham 2003; Graham et al. 
2017). Extant capital-structure theory addresses numerous issues affecting the 
capital structure, but it does not fully explain the influence of taxes on the capital 
structure in countries using an imputation tax system. The knowledge obtained 
from the literature (Modigliani & Miller 1963) would help firms in their financial 
decisions. A lower corporate tax rate could reduce the incentive to use debt 
financing for new investment.  
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In order to address the two research questions, the relationship between taxes and 
leverage as well as the relationship between tax-system changes and leverage are 
examined. The analysis is based on data collected for three different time periods: 
Canada (1982–2015), Australia (1982–1998), and Taiwan (1989–2009). The 
principal empirical-testing methodology for this analysis is fixed-effect panel 
regression models. This methodology is designed to study the cause of changes 
between taxes and debt levels (Faccio & Xu 2015). The dependent variable in this 
study is leverage. The independent variables comprise tax variables and non-tax 
variables. Tax variables consist of corporate tax, personal tax, a tax-reform 
variable, and tax-rate tax-reform interaction variable (the interaction between the 
changes of tax system and tax rates). Non-tax variables, or firm variables, 
comprise firm size, tangibility of assets, operating risk, dividend yield, risk of 
default, growth opportunities, and free cash flow. 
This chapter is in into three sections: (i) model development, (ii) statistical 
analysis, and (iii) discussion of findings. The first section discusses hypotheses to 
be tested (Section 4.2), a description of the variables (Section 4.3), model 
specification (Section 4.4), and data used in the study (Section 4.5). The second 
section provides a statistical summary of the data, which includes descriptive 
statistics, tests of means, and correlations between variables (Section 4.6). This is 
followed in Section 4.7 by the presentation of the estimation results between taxes 
and leverage, as well as between tax-system changes and leverage. The section 
concludes with robustness tests for structural breaks and portfolio groups. Section 
4.8 provides a discussion and the implications of the results. This chapter is 
concluded in Section 4.9. 
4.2 Hypothesis development 
 The impacts of taxes on capital structure in a well-established 4.2.1
imputation tax system 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1963), taxes will have an impact on the 
degree of leverage. It is important to investigate this trend in an imputation tax 
system, since this tax regime is designed to reduce debt-level financing (Becker, 
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Jacob & Jacob 2013). This section focuses on the impact of taxes on the leverage 
of firms in Canada, a country with a well-established imputation tax system. It is 
postulated that within such a tax system, there would be less debt used for 
financing in corporate capital structure. Thus, all else being equal, it is predicted 
that: 
Hypothesis 1: Taxes have an impact on the degree of debt to equity in the firms 
operating within the well-established Canadian imputation tax regime.  
The fact that Canada has used an imputation tax system and a capital gains tax 
provides the opportunity for examining these impacts of taxes on leverage. 
However, it is difficult to anticipate the effect of dividend imputation on leverage, 
as well as that of capital gains on leverage. This is because of the potential offset 
of these two effects—dividend imputation and capital gains (Jugurnath, Stewart & 
Brooks 2008). Therefore, two additional hypotheses are examined: 
Hypothesis 1.1. If the positive impacts of dividend imputation exceeded the 
negative impacts of the capital gains tax, debt levels would decrease in the well-
established Canadian imputation tax system.  
Hypothesis 1.2. If the negative effects of the capital gains tax exceeded the 
positive effects of dividend imputation, debt levels would increase in the well-
established Canadian imputation tax system. 
 The impacts of changes of tax regime on capital structure 4.2.2
This section discusses the impact of the changes in the tax regime on capital 
structure in the contexts of Australia and Taiwan.  
Australia and Taiwan were chosen to address and analyse the impacts of tax-
system changes on capital structure for the following reasons. Australia is an open 
economy which is a global free-market powerhouse. Taiwan, on the other hand, is 
a newly emerging economy. Both countries have shifted from a classical to a full-
imputation tax system, which allows us an opportunity to investigate the impact of 
a regime change on the capital structure of firms. This is important, because 
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changing to imputation can reduce the distortion in favour of debt over equity, 
promote efficient allocation of investment capital, and lead to a decrease in the 
likelihood of financial distress (Andrews 1991). 
Tax reform in Australia 
In Australia, the imputation tax system was designed to shift the capital structure 
towards equity financing (Wilkinson & Fancher 2004). Before applying the 
imputation tax system, Australia used a classical system, but without a capital 
gains tax (Wilkinson & Fancher 2004). After the integration of the imputation 
system, a capital gains tax was introduced. However, the tax gain from leverage is 
0 under a full-imputation tax system (Fan, Titman & Twite 2012). Therefore, the 
implementation of imputation in Australia provides a unique opportunity for 
examining the impacts of tax-system changes on capital structure. 
With the integration of imputation, firms have a tax incentive to decrease the debt 
levels in their capital structure. Therefore, there is a decrease in the proportion of 
debt financing in the corporate capital structure after the integration of imputation. 
The expectation thus, all else being equal, is that: 
Hypothesis 2: The introduction of an imputation tax system in Australia would 
decrease debt levels for all firms. 
Tax reform in Taiwan 
Similarly to Australia, prior to the introduction of an imputation system in 1998, 
Taiwan utilised a classical tax system. The Taiwanese tax reform is similar to that 
of Australia in that Taiwan introduced full imputation in 1998, but it did not 
impose a new tax on capital gains. Therefore, similarly to Australia, the 
hypothesis for Taiwan is, all else being equal, as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: The introduction of an imputation tax system in Taiwan would 
decrease debt levels for all firms. 
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4.3 Variables 
To test the effects of taxes and tax-system change on capital structure, fixed-
effects models are formulated in which the dependent variable, corporate 
leverage, is regressed on several tax variables and non-tax variables which are 
believed to have an impact on capital structure. 
Although the investigation presented in this chapter is about the impact of taxes 
and tax-system change on leverage, prior studies have shown that it is important 
to control for non-tax factors which potentially have effects on a firm’s leverage 
(Titman & Wessels 1988; Rajan & Zingales 1998; Frank & Goyal 2003; 
Pattenden 2006; Lemmon, Roberts & Zender 2008). As a result, the present study 
incorporates firm-specific variables in the model to control for the effects of both 
tax and non-tax factors on the behaviour of corporate leverage.  
Tax variables are corporate tax (CTR), personal tax (PTR), tax-reform variable 
(MTF), and a tax-rate tax-reform interaction variable between taxes and the 
changes of the tax system (Y_BREAK). Firm-specific variables are firm size 
(SIZE), asset tangibility (TAN), operating risk (BETA), dividend yield (DIV), risk 
of default (ZSCORE), growth opportunities (LAGGO), and free cash flow (FCF). 
The selection of those variables and their detailed descriptions are discussed in the 
following section. 
 Dependent variables 4.3.1
Leverage (LEV) 
In the literature, capital structure has been calculated using different proxies. 
These include the long-term debt ratio (Gilchrist & Himmelberg 1995; Black, 
Legoria & Sellers 2000; Faulkender & Petersen 2012); the short-term debt ratio 
(Titman & Wessels 1988; Voulgaris, Asteriou & Agiomirgianakis 2004); and the 
ratio of total debt to the book value of total assets (Fazzari et al. 1988; Baker, 
Stein & Wurgler 2003; Handley & Maheswaran 2008; Öztekin & Flannery 2012). 
Other proxies are used, such as the market value of equity ratio, convertible debt 
to market value of equity ratio, long-term debt ratio, short-term debt to book value 
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of the asset ratio, convertible debt to book value of equity ratio, long-term debt 
divided by book value of total assets ratio, and market value of equity plus book 
value of debt, and preferred stock ratio (Smith & Watts 1992); loans plus creditors 
plus long-term debt divided by book value of total assets is used as a proxy for 
corporate capital structure (Krämer 2015); and, market leverage (total debt 
divided by market value of assets) is defined as capital structure (Barclay, 
Heitzman & Smith 2017).  
The present research uses market leverage, which is consistent with the studies by 
Graham (1996a), MacKie‐Mason (1990), and Pattenden (2006). Market leverage 
is measured as total debt divided by market value (where market value is 
measured as book value of total debt plus market value of the firm). 
 Independent variables 4.3.2
The choice of independent variables here is based on the research inquiries, which 
are related to taxes and tax-system change. Further, earlier studies indicate the 
relevance of non-tax factors which potentially may have effects on a firm’s 
leverage (Titman & Wessels 1988; Rajan & Zingales 1998; Frank & Goyal 2003; 
Pattenden 2006; Lemmon, Roberts & Zender 2008). As a result, independent 
variables in this present research include both tax variables and firm-specific 
variables (non-tax variables). 
Tax variables are designed to capture the effects of the taxes in Canada under a 
well-established imputation regime, and the effects of the introduction of an 
imputation tax system in Australia and Taiwan. The potential firm-specific 
determinants, namely firm size (SIZE), asset tangibility (TAN), operating risk 
(BETA), dividend yield (DIV), risk of default (ZSCORE), growth opportunities 
(LAGGO), and free cash flow (FCF) which may have impacts on corporate 
leverage, are included in this study. 
The selection of tax variables and firm-specific variables and their detailed 
descriptions are now discussed. 
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4.3.2.1 Tax variables 
Tax variables in this study reflect and measure: (i) the effects of taxes on leverage 
in Canada, and (ii) the effects of tax-system change on leverage in Australia and 
Taiwan. Tax variables here comprise tax-rate variables, a tax-reform variable, and 
a tax-rate tax-reform interaction variable.  
Tax-rate variables (corporate and personal taxes) represent the variables of 
interest for Hypothesis 1. Recall that Hypothesis 1 proposes that taxes have an 
impact on the degree of debt to equity in firms operating within the Canadian 
imputation tax regime. According to Schulman et al. (1996) and Pattenden (2006), 
tax rates are designed to capture the effects of taxes on leverage. 
Tax rates (corporate and personal taxes), tax reform, and tax-rates tax-reform 
interaction variables are the variables of interest for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 
3. Recall that Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 propose that the implementation of 
an imputation tax system in Australia and Taiwan would decrease debt levels for 
all firms. According to Schulman et al. (1996) and Twite (2001), tax rates, tax 
reform, and tax-rate tax-reform variables are designed to capture the effects of 
tax-system changes on leverage.  
The variables used in this present study are now discussed. 
4.3.2.1.1 Tax rate variables 
Corporate tax rate (CTR): 
The corporate tax rate is a key factor which influences leverage. The higher the 
tax rate, the more debt financing is used by firms to take advantage of interest tax 
shields.  
The literature review suggests that the corporate tax rate is measureable using 
various proxies. They can be the marginal tax rate (MacKie‐Mason 1990; Graham 
1996a; Graham, Lemmon & Schallheim 1998; Graham 2000; Bartholdy & 
Mateus 2006; Gordon & Lee 2007; Binsbergen et al. 2010; Blouin, Core & Guay 
75 
 
2010; MacKinlay 2015), and the average tax rate (Desai & Goolsbee 2004; Mills 
& Newberry 2004; Moore & Ruane 2005).  
In the present study, none of these proxies is acceptable for the following reasons. 
Pattenden (2006) used the marginal tax rate as a proxy for Australia, based on  
Manzon (1994). However, Graham (1996b) finds that the Manzon (1994) tax rate 
is a poor variable for analysing the impacts of taxes on capital structure. In the 
same vein, Pattenden (2006, p. 76) argues that “the shortcoming of the Manzon 
tax rate is that it does not anticipate the probability of future losses that can be 
carried back to offset current period taxes”. This weakness is relevant to Canada, 
because Canadian firms are permitted to carry back losses (Deloitte 2017). 
Another reason why the marginal tax rate will not be used here is because of the 
impracticality of calculating marginal tax rates in the study countries. In fact, the 
net operating loss (NOL) reported in the available financial statements is a poor 
proxy for the presence of a tax return NOL. This view is supported by Graham 
and Mills (2008), who claim that “using the presence of a financial statement net 
operating loss carryforward to proxy for tax return tax status is relatively likely to 
be problematic for these firms”.  
Regarding average tax rates, this proxy is not relevant to the research interest of 
the present study, which is the impact of corporate tax on capital structure. 
Krämer (2015) points out that average tax rates are endogenous to the financial 
decisions, because “average tax rates largely depend on previous and current 
decisions, and are therefore subject to severe endogeneity problems, and in single 
country studies the low time variation of tax rates often complicates the analysis”. 
Further, Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) provide “evidence in the text 
implying that the failure to document tax effects in the past may have been due to 
inappropriate measurement of tax status, that is, the use of endogenously affected 
tax rates”. 
The present study uses the statutory corporate income tax to incorporate the 
impacts of taxes on leverage for the following reasons. First, this proxy has been 
widely used by firms to make capital-structure decisions (Overesch & Voeller 
2010; Faccio & Xu 2015). In a more recent study, statutory corporate tax rate is 
76 
 
considered as an important factor that influences capital structure (Li & Stathis 
2017). Second, statutory corporate tax rates can be collected from various data 
sources including the OECD’s tax database, the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, and the University of Michigan’s World Tax Database. 
Third, the statutory corporate tax rate is considered as the most effective 
determinant because policy makers prefer to observe the relationship between the 
statutory tax rate and capital-structure choices (Graham et al. 2017). These authors 
point out that “the vast majority of firms use statutory corporate tax rate as the tax 
rate input for decision making. This result is consistent with managers relying on 
simple heuristics that approximate theoretically correct constructs in their 
decision-making process” (Graham et al. 2017, p. 3168). Therefore, the 
application of a statutory corporate tax rate in the present study appears to be 
entirely appropriate, and thus it should be included as a key variable. 
Personal tax rate (PTR): 
Personal tax rate has potential impacts on corporate leverage (Givoly et al. 1992; 
Graham 1996a; Campello 2003). Since both individual and corporate tax rates 
theoretically have an impact on capital structure (Overesch & Voeller 2010), they 
should be included in the model to integrate their effects. It is predicted that 
individual and corporate tax rates have opposite effects on corporate leverage 
(Faccio & Xu 2018).  
Tax rates (CTRS): 
Tax rates (CTRS) in the present study are defined as the maximum federal 
corporate tax rate. If both corporate and personal tax rates exhibit a high 
(empirical) correlation over the period of the present study, these variables would 
introduce multicollinearity into the model. In this case, in line with the study of 
Schulman et al. (1996), the tax-rate variable (CTRS) in this present study is used 
to represent both the corporate tax variable (CTR) and the personal tax variable 
(PTR). Since CTRS proxies for both individual and corporate tax rates, the sign of 
its effects on corporate leverage is ambiguous. If the effects of corporate rates 
exceed those of personal rates, CTRS will have a positive effect, and vice versa. If 
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the effects of corporate and personal rates counteract each other, then CTRS 
should not influence corporate leverage. 
4.3.2.1.2 Tax-reform variables 
Tax reform (MTF) is a dummy variable indicating the effect of the tax-system 
changes on capital structure in Australia and Taiwan. MTF is coded 0 if the 
observations are for the pre-integration, and 1 otherwise. As a result, in Australia, 
MTF takes a value of 0 under a classical tax system (prior to 1987) and 1 for the 
years after 1987. In Taiwan, MTF is takes a value of 0 prior to 1998 and 1 for the 
years after 1998. 
It is important to note that Canada has been using an imputation tax system for a 
long time, with a change from a partial to full-imputation tax system in 2009. 
Although the focus of this study is on the effects of taxes, a shift from partial to 
full imputation during the study period has nevertheless been included in the 
model. The tax-reform variable in Canada (MTF) takes a value of 0 prior to 2009 
and 1 for the years after 2009. The focus on the effects of tax changes in Canada 
will be emphasised by eliminating the year 2009 (the pivotal year of shifting from 
a partial to a full-imputation system) in the additional test, as mentioned in 
Section 4.7.1. The additional test is conducted for the two periods of pre-2009 and 
post-2009 so that it will reflect the investigation’s focus on the impacts of taxes on 
capital investment in Canada. 
4.3.2.1.3 Tax-rate tax-reform interaction variables 
The tax-rate tax-reform interaction variable (Y_BREAK) is an interactive variable 
controlling for the effects of taxes on leverage due to the introduction of 
imputation in Australia and Taiwan. To account for the theoretical effect of the 
implementation of imputation on leverage decisions, an interaction effect between 
tax rates (CTRS) and tax reform (MTF) is included in the model, (CTRS*MTF) or 
(Y_BREAK). In the present research, CTRS is presented instead of CTR because 
PTR and CTR are highly correlated. Regarding the CTRS variable, the sign of the 
interaction term is ambiguous, since the effect of both corporate and personal rates 
could be influenced by the shift of the tax regime.  
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In Taiwan, Y_BREAK only reflects the effects of dividend imputation. In 
Australia, however, Y_BREAK reflects the impacts of both the introduction of 
dividend imputation and the adoption of a capital gains tax. 
The ‘true’ model of corporate leverage is as follows: 
it
t4t3t2t10it
εablesother vari
MTF*PTRαMTF*CTRα  PTRα  CTRα cLEV


 (4.1) 
where the dependent variable is leverage (LEVit); tax variables are corporate tax 
rate (CTRt) and personal tax rate (PTRt); the tax-rate tax-reform interaction 
variables are (CTRt*MTF) and (PTRt*MTF); and other variables refers to firm 
variables.  
As specified, Equation (4.1) allows for the possibility that the effects of both 
(CTR) and (PTR) are different before and after the change of tax system. If, as in 
the present sample, CTR and PTR exhibit a strong empirical correlation, the PTR 
will be substituted as aCTR (PTR=aCTR) (Schulman et al. 1996). Upon this 
substitution, Equation (4.1) can then be written as follows: 
it

ablesother variMTF*CTRSb  CTRSb c
εablesother variMTF*a)CTRα(α  a)CTRα  (α cLEV
t2t10
itt43t210it
  
(4.2) 
The measured effect of both corporate tax and personal tax (CTRSt) on corporate 
leverage, b1, may be positive, negative, or zero depending on the relative 
magnitudes and signs of α1 and α2a. Similarly, the measured effect of the tax-rate 
tax-reform interaction variable on corporate leverage (CTRSt*MTF), b2, may be 
positive, negative, or zero depending on the relative magnitudes and signs of α3 
and α4a. Note that within this framework, the individual effects of personal and 
corporate tax rates cannot be separated. This does not present a problem, because 
the primary variable of interest in the present study is MTF, and tax rates are 
included in the model as control variables. 
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4.3.2.2 Firm-specific variables 
The control factors for leverage have a relationship with the dependent variable 
(LEV). The control variables are size of firm (SIZE), asset tangibility (TAN), 
operating risk (BETA), dividend yield (DIV), risk of default (ZSCORE), growth 
opportunities (LAGGO), and free cash flow (FCF)
1
. This study expects a 
relationship for each of these factors with leverage, and discusses the reasons for 
including each in the study. 
Firm size (SIZE): This is one of the most significant determinants of leverage. 
According to trade-off theory, larger firms normally use higher debt financing, 
because these firms have greater opportunities than small firms do to obtain bank 
loans and to issue corporate bonds. It is expected that leverage has a positive 
relationship with firm size (Titman & Wessels 1988; Fama & French 2002; Brav 
2009; Goyal, Nova & Zanetti 2011). The present study measures the size of a firm 
by the logarithm of total capitalisation, which is consistent with the study by 
Pattenden (2006).  
Asset tangibility (TAN): This is a significant variable of leverage. Asset 
tangibility is measured by fixed assets divided by total assets. Some studies find 
that tangibility is negatively correlated with leverage in both public and private 
firms (Frank & Goyal 2003; Goyal, Nova & Zanetti 2011). Some others conclude 
that the tangibility of assets has a positive effect on leverage. When firms use 
more debt contracts provided by a specific fixed asset, they are likely to use more 
debt financing (Pattenden 2006). Further, agency theory predicts that firms with 
higher tangible fixed assets have higher leverage (Jensen 2005; Brav 2009; 
Lemmon, M & Roberts 2010; Rampini & Viswanathan 2013).  
Operating risk (BETA): This variable has a significant influence on leverage. 
Beta of assets is used to measure operating risk, calculated as the ratio of
, where equity beta is estimated using a slope function of 
                                                 
1
 The control for industry was initially included in the test. However, it was not statistically 
significant. Therefore, the final model does not include this variable. 
)
equity Total
debt Total
1/(equity 
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48 months for price of share for each firm, and 48 months of price index. Trade-
off theory predicts that firms tend to balance the tax benefits of debt against the 
costs of financial distress. Many studies find that firms with higher costs of 
financial distress use less debt financing (Titman & Wessels 1988; Cheng & 
Green 2008; De Jong, Kabir & Nguyen 2008; Fan, Titman & Twite 2012). Firms 
with higher operating risk have less debt financing. Thus, it is predicted that beta 
of assets has a negative effect on leverage. 
Dividend yield (DIV): Dividend yield influences leverage. In the early stage, 
Miller (1977) explored the impact of dividend on financing decisions and found 
that there is a positive relationship between them. Later, Howard and Brown 
(1992) found that the dividend decision has more effects on the financing decision 
in countries which use an imputation tax system than in countries under a classical 
tax system. The present study uses the dividend yield measured as dividend per 
share outstanding (Pattenden 2006).  
Risk of default (ZSCORE): This variable has an influence on leverage. Based on 
trade-off theory, firms with higher risk will have less debt-level financing. 
Pecking-order theory predicts that riskier firms tend to have higher leverage. The 
risk of a firm is usually proxied as the Altman Z-Score (Denis & Mihov 2003; 
Frank & Goyal 2003; Leary & Roberts 2005; Pattenden 2006; Byoun 2008; Kayo 
& Kimura 2011; MacKinlay 2015). Myers (1984) mentions that the incentive to 
underinvest can be mitigated by decreasing debt-level financing. This argument 
suggests that firms with more investment opportunities would have less debt 
financing.  
Growth opportunities (LAGGO): This variable has an impact on capital-
structure decisions. Firms with a high growth of investment opportunity tend to 
use more debt-level financing and have less equity (Brav 2009; Goyal, Nova & 
Zanetti 2011). However, according to agency theory, firms with a higher growth 
of opportunities tend to use riskier investment projects and their cost of debt 
financing, is therefore, likely to increase and these firms tend to use equity 
financing. In line with agency theory, Lemmon, M and Roberts (2010) and 
Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) also indicate a negative association between 
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corporate leverage and growth opportunities. The present study measures growth 
opportunities by the one-year lagged market value of equity over book value of 
equity capital, which is consistent with Pattenden (2006). This study expects that 
LAGGO has a negative effect on leverage. 
Free Cash Flow (FCF): In line with Pattenden (2006), this study measures free 
cash flow by the change in net income plus depreciation, standardised by total 
assets. Further, pecking-order theory predicts that when firms have low levels of 
FCF, they tend to use more debt financing in their capital structure (Myers & 
Majluf 1984; Myers & Shyam-Sunder 1992). This means that there is a predicted 
negative relationship between leverage and FCF.  
4.4 Regression models 
In the previous section, both dependent and independent variables were identified 
and explained. This section introduces models for testing Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, 
which involve the associations between dividend taxation and corporate leverage. 
Recall that Hypothesis 1 proposes that taxes have an impact on the degree of debt 
to equity in the firms operating within the Canadian imputation tax regime. 
Hypothesis 2 states that the implementation of an imputation tax system in 
Australia would decrease debt levels for all firms. Similarly, Hypothesis 3 asserts 
that the introduction of an imputation tax system in Taiwan would decrease debt 
levels for all firms. The following regression models are estimated to examine the 
relationship between taxes and corporate leverage in Canada, and the association 
between the tax-system change and corporate leverage in Australia and Taiwan. 
Model (4.3) tests Hypothesis 1, considering the likelihood of the impacts of taxes 
on corporate leverage in the Canadian imputation tax system. It is represented by 
Equation (4.3) as follows:  
  it




MTF FCF LAGGOZSCOREDIV
BETATAN  SIZE PTRCTR cLEV
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       (4.3) 
where the dependent variable is leverage (LEVit). The tax variables are corporate 
tax rate (CTRit), and personal tax rate (PTRit). The control variables are size of 
firm (SIZEit), asset tangibility (TANit), operating risk (BETAit), dividend yield 
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(DIVit), probability of default (ZSCOREit), growth opportunities (LAGGOit), and 
free cash flow (FCFit). Tax rate-tax reform variable is the changes in the tax-
system dummy (MTF) (year of the change from a partial to a full-imputation 
system in Canada). The detailed definitions for these variables are provided in 
Section 4.3. These variables are included to examine whether taxes have an impact 
on the degree of debt to equity in firms operating within a well-established 
imputation tax regime in Canada (Hypothesis 1). 
Model (4.4) tests Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, considering the likelihood of the 
impacts of tax-system changes on corporate leverage in Australia and Taiwan, 
respectively. It is represented by Equation (4.4) as follows: 
it



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     (4.4) 
where the dependent variable is leverage (LEVit). The tax variables are taxes 
(CTRSt) and the changes of tax-system dummy (from classical to full imputation) 
(Y_BREAKt). The control variables are size of firm (SIZEit), asset tangibility 
(TANit), operating risk (BETAit), dividend yield (DIVit), risk of default 
(ZSCOREit), growth opportunities (LAGGOit), and free cash flow (FCFit). The 
detailed definitions for these variables are provided in Section 4.3. These variables 
are included to examine whether the implementation of an imputation tax system 
in Australia and Taiwan would decrease debt levels for all firms. 
In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity across a firm and through time, 
this study includes firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in the regression. In 
particular, firm fixed effects are used to capture the impacts of time-invariant 
firm-specific variables on levels of corporate leverage; whereas, year fixed effects 
are used to control for the business cycle and other macroeconomic effects.  
Equation (4.3) aims to investigate the relationship between taxes and leverage in a 
well-established imputation system. Equation (4.4) examines whether the 
introduction of imputation has an impact on leverage. 
83 
 
4.5 Data 
The primary source of data for both dependent and control variables has been 
acquired from the Datastream. This data contains financial data on listed 
companies in Canada and Taiwan. Company data has been obtained from 
Morningstar and Datastream Databases for Australian firms from 1990 to 1998. 
Information for the period from 1982 to 1988 in Australia was collected from 
available company financial reports. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
the data for this early period are not collectable from Datastream or any other 
databases. Therefore, it has been collected from hard copies of financial reports. 
The annual cross-section data cover the period from 1989 to 2015 for Canada, 
from 1982 to 1998 for Australia, and from 1989 to 2009 for Taiwan. The rationale 
for choosing different periods for those countries is the year of transformation of 
the tax system. According to Schulman et al. (1996), Pattenden (2006), and Twite 
(2001), the studied period for each country should be balanced around the 
transitional point of the tax-system change. Based on this principle, and on the 
availability of data, this study adopts a similar approach to the time periods. 
In common with other studies, financial institutions are excluded in the sample 
because of the nature of their business—which is lending—that makes their 
balance sheet different from that of other corporate firms whose business is about 
selling products or services. Utilities firms are excluded from the sample because 
of the marked differences in capital structure between this industry and other 
sectors of the economy. This is consistent with the work of Fama and French 
(2001), and Dang et al. (2018) who excluded the financial and utilities firms from 
their data.  
The years 1987 and 1988 are omitted from the sample for Australia, because this 
is the period of shifting the tax system to an imputation one. Firms operating in 
these two years may have changed policies substantially in order to anticipate the 
adoption of the new tax regime. By dropping these years, the distortions created 
by such fluctuations are excluded from the empirical results (Jugurnath, Stewart & 
Brooks 2008). It eliminates the possible impacts of the October 1987 stock-market 
crash in Australia as well (Yang & Bessler 2008). This crash led to the major 
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stock-market collapse, and almost all stock markets fell simultaneously in 
Australia (Yang & Bessler 2008). This factor was quite likely to drive changes in 
a firm’s use of debt (Roll 1988; Allen 1991). Additionally—in accord with the 
study by Twite (2001)—the present study eliminates these two years to “allow for 
changeover effects to diminish and to allow the impact of pension fund taxation to 
take effect in Australia” (Twite 2001, p. 230). 
Data from 1998 to 1999 for Taiwan are dropped, as this is the time of the 
introduction of a dividend-imputation tax system in Taiwan. The exclusion of 
these two years reduces the impact of the financial crisis in Asia which took place 
in 1998 (Deesomsak, Paudyal & Pescetto 2004; Maroney, Naka & Wansi 2004). 
This is consistent with the study by Dang et al. (2017), who excluded these firm-
year observations during the period of financial crisis when they examined 
capital-structure choice in many countries, including Taiwan. This view is 
supported by Yeh (2018) who excluded the years of financial crisis when 
investigating the capital-structure determinants of firms in this country. 
The major advantage of the dataset is that only a few studies have had access to 
these data for Australia in the early period, and it allows the models to yield more 
efficient estimates. This permits adding more variables that can possibly have 
impacts on leverage. However, this method of sample selection has limitation. 
The data collection for the pre-imputation period in Australia (classical tax 
system) is that there is a relatively small sample (24 firms and 105 observations). 
The possible issues with the small sample size are the generalisability of the 
results. However, through reviewing the literature, this issue does not appear to 
have involved a statistical bias against the findings in existing studies. For 
example Schulman et al. (1996) analysed the impacts of the changes of tax system 
on leverage using panel data over the period 1982 to 1991 for New Zealand, and 
over the period 1968 to 1977 for Canada. The number of observations in their 
research was relatively small, with only 12 firms (120 observations) for New 
Zealand, and with 162 firms (1620 observations) for Canada.  
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4.6 Statistical analysis 
This section consists of two subsections, where Section 4.6.1 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the variables, and Section 4.6.2 presents the tests of mean. 
Section 4.6.3 presents the correlation between variables. 
 Descriptive statistics 4.6.1
4.6.1.1 Sample distribution by countries 
The sample distribution is described for the three countries, including number of 
years of data and period of study. As shown in Table 4.1, Canada has data for the 
33 years from 1982 to 2015. Taiwan has 20 years of data (1989–2009) and 
Australia has 16 years of data (1982–1998) from which to analyse the changes of 
leverage when the imputation tax system was introduced. 
Table 4.1 Sample distribution by countries 
 
Country Number of years Period 
Canada 33 1982–2015 
Taiwan 20 1989–2009 
Australia 16 1982–1998 
The median values of market leverage for Canada, Taiwan, and Australia are set 
out in Table 4.2. For Canada, there was a downward trend in median market 
leverage during the whole period of study. For Taiwan, after the introduction of an 
imputation tax system in 1998, median market leverage increased in the following 
year. This figure reached its peak in the year after, before gradually decreasing for 
rest of the study period (under a full-imputation tax system). For Australia, the 
median value experienced a downward trend throughout the period. This figure 
increased in 1986 with the implementation of a capital gains tax, consistent with 
debt becoming a tax-preferred choice. Australian market leverage continues to 
vary after the adoption of an imputation tax system in 1987. In brief, the overall 
trend of market leverage in Australia decreased post-1988, which is consistent 
with a reduction in preferences for debt-level financing.  
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Table 4.2 Median values of leverage for Canada, Australia and Taiwan 
Country Australia Taiwan Canada 
1982 0.504  0.409 
1983 0.598  0.315 
1984 0.512  0.282 
1985 0.380  0.270 
1986 0.326  0.257 
1987 0.304  0.260 
1988 0.294  0.292 
1989 0.252 0.028 0.302 
1990 0.445 0.029 0.356 
1991 0.361 0.093 0.339 
1992 0.317 0.155 0.317 
1993 0.299 0.194 0.249 
1994 0.233 0.089 0.273 
1995 0.213 0.139 0.244 
1996 0.186 0.130 0.189 
1997 0.151 0.123 0.199 
1998 0.258 0.187 0.219 
1999  0.199 0.186 
2000  0.347 0.126 
2001  0.299 0.141 
2002  0.243 0.120 
2003  0.220 0.083 
2004  0.255 0.063 
2005  0.226 0.010 
2006  0.173 0.007 
2007  0.148 0.001 
2008  0.291 0.0007 
2009  0.125 0.0006 
2010   0.0005 
2011 
2012 
  0.003 
0.004 
2013   0.005 
2014   0.022 
2015   0.021 
Notes: Numbers in bold are associated with the years of tax-system change in Australia and 
Taiwan.  
 
 
87 
 
4.6.1.2 Summary statistics 
As an initial step in the research, the descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables were computed. Univariate statistics were calculated for the 
entire sample period, as shown in Table 4.3, Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. Next, a 
matched-pair test was conducted to compare the differences between the average 
value of the dependent and independent variables before and after the change in 
the tax law, as reported in the Table 4.6. The t-test results indicate whether the 
average values for the two periods were significantly different. 
These three tables (Table 4.3, Table 4.4, and Table 4.5) show the descriptive 
statistics of the dependent and independent variables, including the observations 
for the mean, standard deviation, median, and minimum and maximum of each 
variable. The tables provide information for Canada, Australia, and Taiwan, 
respectively. 
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics of variables for Canada, 1982–2015 
Canada Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
LEV 30,323 0.162 0.228 0.033 0 0.903 
CTR 130,016 0.322 0.109 0.38 0.15 0.46 
PTR 130,016 0.391 0.086 0.464 0.29 0.503 
SIZE 31,880 10.399 2.438 10.30 5.262 16.21 
TAN 32,741 0.445 0.328 0.428 0 0.989 
BETA  30,324 0.592 0.913 0.470 -2.159 3.373 
DIV 54,869 0.423 1.545 0.052 0 10.19 
ZSCORE  1,488 1.274 0.941 1.050 0.001 5.400 
LAGGO 28,480 0.002 0.006 0.001 -0.029 0.039 
FCF 25,208 0.023 0.202 0.007 -0.842 1.066 
MTF 130,016 0.176 0.381 0 0 1 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for all variables. The dependent variable is market 
leverage (LEV). Tax variables include corporate tax (CTR) and personal tax (PTR). Firm control 
variables include firm size (SIZE), asset tangibility (TAN), operating risk (BETA), dividend yield 
(DIV), risk of default (ZSCORE), growth opportunities (LAGGO), free cash flow (FCF), and the 
effects of tax-system changes from a partial to an imputation system (MTF). 
Table 4.3 sets out the descriptive statistics of regression variables for Canada. It 
can be seen that the imputation tax system has been used in this country over a 
long period. The results in Table 4.3 indicate that the dependent variable 
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measuring leverage (LEV) has a mean value of 0.162 and a median of 0.033; 
whereas, the independent variable related to corporate tax (CTR) has a mean value 
of 0.322 and a median of 0.38. Personal tax (PTR) has a mean of 0.391 and a 
median of 0.464. The rest of the independent variables, SIZE, TAN, BETA, DIV, 
ZSCORE, LAGGO, FCF, and MTF have a reasonable level of consistency, which 
is observed between the mean and median for all variables.  
Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics of variables for Australia, 1982–1998 
Australia Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
LEV 774 0.269 0.226 0.231 0 0.859 
CTRS 27,530 0.403 0.051 0.29 0.33 0.49 
SIZE 762 12.17 2.047 12.365 6.475 16.06 
TAN 893 0.418 0.237 0.402 0 0.972 
BETA  799 0.301 0.534 0.251 -2.925 3.738 
DIV 910 0.115 0.175 0.054 0 0.797 
ZSCORE  625 1.042 0.906 0.855 -0.007 4.411 
LAGGO 689 0.004 0.011 0.001 -0.017 0.045 
FCF 737 0.035 0.228 0.016 1.006 1.839 
Y_BREAK 27,530 0.228 0.178 0 0 0.39 
MTF 27,530 0.622 0.484 1 0 1 
Notes: The dependent variable is market leverage (LEV). Tax variable includes the variable that 
captures the effects of both personal and corporate tax rates (CTRS). Tax-reform variable is the 
effects of tax-system changes from a classical to an imputation system (MTF). Tax-rate tax-reform 
is an interactive variable controlling for the effects of taxes on leverage due to the introduction of 
imputation (Y_BREAK). Firm control variables are firm size (SIZE), asset tangibility (TAN), 
operating risk (BETA), dividend yield (DIV), risk of default (ZSCORE), growth opportunities 
(LAGGO), and free cash flow (FCF). 
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Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics of variables for Taiwan, 1989–2009 
Taiwan Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
LEV 10,891 0.250 0.220 0.200 0 0.827 
CTRS 52,171 0.25 0.000 0.25 0.25 0.25 
SIZE 11,146 4.619 1.516 4.511 -0.072 10.872 
TAN 12,775 0.328 0.192 0.312 0.005 0.811 
BETA  10,888 0.547 0.452 0.502 -0.622 1.980 
DIV 12,416 0.020 0.035 0.006 0 0.238 
ZSCORE  6,602 0.981 0.608 0.842 0.083 3.455 
LAGGO 8,542 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.006 
FCF 11,113 0.014 0.077 0.011 -0.226 0.280 
Y_BREAK 52,171 0.094 0.121 0.25 0 0.25 
MTF 52,171 0.379 0.485 1 0 1 
Notes: The dependent variable is market leverage (LEV). Tax variable includes the variable that 
captures the effects of both personal and corporate tax rates (CTRS). Tax-reform variable is the 
effects of tax-system changes from a classical to an imputation system (MTF). Tax-rate tax-reform 
is an interactive variable controlling for the effects of taxes on leverage due to the introduction of 
imputation (Y_BREAK). Firm control variables are firm size (SIZE), asset tangibility (TAN), 
operating risk (BETA), dividend yield (DIV), risk of default (ZSCORE), growth opportunities 
(LAGGO), and free cash flow (FCF). 
As can be seen from Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, regarding the dependent variable, 
the mean of leverage (LEV) in Taiwan (0.250) is lower than that in Australia 
(0.269). For tax variable, mean of tax rates (CTRS) is 0.403, and the standard 
deviation is only 0.051. This indicates that the tax rate has a marginal change 
during the period of 18 years in Australia. By contrast, Taiwan witnesses an 
average tax rate of 0.25 and its standard deviation is 0. This result is expected, 
since there is no change in CTRS in Taiwan during the period of study.  
For independent variables, asset tangibility (TAN) in Australia (0.418) is higher 
than in Taiwan (0.328). This indicates that net property, plant, and equipment in 
Australia are larger than those in Taiwan. A possible reason for this may be that 
Australian firms hold more tangible assets, which influences the mean tangibility 
ratio. The other variables—SIZE, DIV, LAGGO and FCF—in Australia (12.17, 
0.115, 0.004 and 0.035, respectively) are consistently higher than in Taiwan 
(4.619, 0.020, 0.001, and 0.014, respectively). This can be explained by the fact 
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that Australian firms have higher growth rates and asset base than those of 
Taiwanese firms. ZSCORE in Australia (1.042) is higher than that in Taiwan 
(0.981), which indicates that Australian firms may use less debt than Taiwanese 
firms do. However, BETA (0.301) in Australia is lower than that in Taiwan 
(0.547); this means that Taiwanese firms are likely to have higher operating risk 
than Australian firms.  
Overall, the observations indicate a reasonable level of consistency between the 
mean and median for all variables. In the next section, a more in-depth analysis of 
the means is conducted to measure the impact of the tax-system changes.  
 Test of mean 4.6.2
This section aims to analyse (i) the impact of the taxes on leverage in Canada, and 
(ii) the impact of tax reform on leverage in Australia and Taiwan. This is done by 
comparing the means over relevant periods. Since Canada changed from a partial 
to full-imputation tax system in 2009, the comparison is tested over the two 
periods of 1989–2009 and 2010–2015. Similarly, the tests are conducted over two 
periods of pre- and post-tax reform in Australia (1982–1987 and 1989–1998) and 
in Taiwan (1989–1998 and 2000–2009).  
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Table 4.6 Changes in mean ratios in Canada, Australia, and Taiwan 
 Means (Medians) Means (Medians) t-test difference in mean (p-value) Wilcoxon Rank–Sum test (p-value) 
 CA AUS TWN CA AUS TWN 
CA AUS TWN CA AUS TWN 
 1989-2009 1982-1987 1989-1997 2010-2015 1989-1998 2000-2009 
 Partial  
Imputation 
Classical 
Tax System 
Classical 
Tax System 
Full 
Imputation 
Full 
Imputation 
Full 
Imputation 
LEV 
0.1734 
(0.289) 
0.3895 
(0.3179) 
0.1516 
(0.2008) 
0.1168 
(0.2501) 
0.2444 
(0.2040) 
0.2578 
(0.1608) 
17.859*** 
(0.000) 
6.803*** 
(0.000) 
-11.52*** 
(0.000) 
23.357*** 
(0.000) 
6.428*** 
(0.000) 
-9.223*** 
(0.000) 
SIZE 
10.703 
(12.094) 
12.336 
(12.517) 
5.7757 
(4.5158) 
10.272 
(12.214) 
12.124 
(12.318) 
4.3719 
(0.17) 
13.140*** 
(0.000) 
1.0328 
(0.302) 
36.16*** 
(0.000) 
14.965*** 
(0.000) 
0.735 
(0.462) 
36.58*** 
(0.000) 
TAN 
0.4243 
(0.454) 
0.4154 
(0.393) 
0.3898 
(0.3121) 
0.4572 
(0.4420) 
0.4181 
(0.4136) 
0.3230 
(4.4298) 
-7.365*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1282** 
(0.898) 
8.514*** 
(0.000) 
-6.039*** 
(0.000) 
-0.249 
(0.803) 
8.665*** 
(0.000) 
BETA  
0.543 
(0.403) 
0.3468 
(0.344) 
0.4906 
(0.480) 
0.669 
(0.590) 
0.2978 
(0.238) 
0.5542 
(0.522) 
45.872*** 
(0.000) 
-26.635*** 
(0.000) 
13.90*** 
(0.000) 
24.796*** 
(0.000) 
-36.583*** 
(0.000) 
12.61*** 
(0.000) 
DIV 
0.4126 
(0.66) 
0.1437 
(0.085) 
0.0074 
(0.006) 
0.3455 
(0) 
0.1085 
(0.05) 
0.0221 
(0.016) 
3.7634*** 
(0.000) 
2.275*** 
(0.023) 
-10.88*** 
(0.000) 
5.886 
(0.000) 
3.212*** 
(0.0013) 
-11.44*** 
(0.000) 
ZSCORE  
1.2492 
(1.183) 
1.1155 
(0.980) 
0.7897 
(0.8425) 
0.9817 
(1.0526) 
1.0182 
(0.8299) 
0.9864 
(0.8414) 
2.5698** 
(0.010) 
1.0983 
(0.2725) 
-3.013*** 
(0.002) 
2.176*** 
(0.029) 
0.885 
(0.3736) 
-3.586*** 
(0.000) 
LAGGO 
0.0022 
(0.0009) 
1.1155 
(0.001) 
0.0022 
(0.0013) 
0.0019 
(0.0012) 
1.0182 
(0.0014) 
0.0015 
(0.0012) 
3.6340*** 
(0.000) 
1.0983 
(2.2725) 
12.22*** 
(0.000) 
14.755*** 
(0.000) 
0.885 
(0.3762) 
17.05*** 
(0.000) 
FCF 
0.0205 
(0.018) 
0.0149 
(0.027) 
0.0082 
(0.0114) 
0.0230 
(0.0138) 
0.0019 
(0.0098) 
0.0153 
(0.0139) 
-0.8574 
(0.3912) 
13.132*** 
(0.000) 
-1.8871* 
(0.059) 
2.985** 
(0.002) 
-1.258 
(0.2086) 
-2.063* 
(0.039) 
Notes: This table shows mean ratios in Canada (CA), Australia (AUS), and Taiwan (TWN. Dependent variable is market leverage (LEV). Firm control variables are firm size (SIZE), 
asset tangibility (TAN), operating risk (BETA), dividend yield (DIV), risk of default (ZSCORE), growth opportunities (LAGGO) and free cash flow (FCF), as defined in Section 4.3. 
Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The t-tests for difference in mean provide test statistics to use for paired data samples for 
either the pre- and post-tax-reform periods (in Australia and Taiwan) or partial- and full-imputation periods (in Canada). The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests provide test statistics to 
triangulate the results of two sample t-tests, just in case the variance of the two populations being compared is too different.
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As shown in Table 4.6, in Canada, seven of the variables (LEV, SIZE, BETA, DIV, 
ZSCORE, LAGGO, and FCF) increase after the tax-system change (from partial to 
full imputation). It should be noted that LEV, SIZE, BETA, DIV, ZSCORE, and 
LAGGO are significant at the 1% level, whereas FCF is significant at the 5% 
level. The remaining variable (TAN) decreases and is significant at the 1% level.  
In Australia, of the eight variables analysed, three (LEV, DIV and FCF) increase 
in the tax-integration period. They are all significant at the 1% level. Conversely, 
TAN and BETA show a decrease after the changes of tax system at the 5% and 1 % 
significance levels, respectively. It can be seen that SIZE, ZSCORE, and LAGGO 
are not statistically significant.  
In the Taiwanese context, of eight variables, four (SIZE, TAN, BETA and LAGGO) 
increase throughout the tax-reform period at the 1% significant level. The 
remaining four variables (LEV, DIV, ZSCORE and FCF) show a decrease after the 
introduction of dividend imputation.  
 Correlation between variables 4.6.3
Since it is possible that the selected explanatory variables are correlated, the issue 
of multicollinarity was investigated with a correlation matrix. As Zurigat (2009, p. 
62) indicates, “a high correlation between two of the independent variables may 
indicate the presence of collinearity”. 
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Table 4.7 Pairwise correlation analysis, 1982–2015 
Canada LEV CTR PTR SIZE TAN BETA DIV ZSCORE LAGGO FCF MTF 
LEV 1.0000           
CTR 0.2150* 1.0000          
PTR -0.1898* -0.6610* 1.0000         
SIZE 0.1052* 0.2750* -0.2737* 1.0000        
TAN 0.0720* -0.0249* -0.0041 0.0585* 1.0000       
BETA  -0.2170* -0.1527* 0.1070* 0.0005* 0.0588* 1.0000      
DIV 0.1792* 0.0275* -0.0138* 0.3272* 0.0099 -0.0918* 1.0000     
ZSCORE  -0.0449 0.1428* -0.0797* -0.3001* -0.2968* -0.1686* 0.1199* 1.0000    
LAGGO -0.1080* -0.0076 0.0146* 0.0174* -0.0232* 0.0433 -0.0256* -0.0786* 1.0000   
FCF -0.0235* -0.0071 0.0058 0.0101 -0.0195* 0.0041 -0.0131 0.0395 0.0198* 1.0000  
MTF -0.0967* -0.6928* 0.4863* -0.1778* 0.0740* 0.0673* -0.0259* -0.0887* -0.0269* 0.0131* 1.0000 
Notes: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables for Canada. Dependent variable is market leverage (LEV). Tax variables are corporate tax (CTR) and 
personal tax (PTR). Firm control variables are firm size (SIZE), asset tangibility (TAN), operating risk (BETA), dividend yield (DIV), risk of default (ZSCORE), growth 
opportunities (LAGGO), and free cash flow (FCF). The tax-rate tax-reform interactive variable controls for the effect of the changes of tax system (from partial to full 
imputation) on leverage in Canada is MTF. All variables are defined in Section 4.3.  Symbol * denotes significant p-value < 0.05. 
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Table 4.8 Pairwise correlation analysis. 1982–1998 
Australia LEV CTRS SIZE TAN BETA DIV ZSCORE LAGGO FCF Y_BREAK 
LEV 1.0000          
CTRS 0.2405* 1.0000         
SIZE -0.1552* 0.0447 1.0000        
TAN 0.0192 0.0006 0.2725* 1.0000       
BETA  -0.1257* 0.0024 0.1479* -0.0373 1.0000      
DIV 0.0274 0.0974* 0.3135* 0.0161 0.0402 1.0000     
ZSCORE  0.1916* 0.0334 -0.1764* -0.1369* -0.1040* 0.0544 1.0000    
LAGGO 0.1380* 0.4011* -0.0938* -0.1284* -0.0943* -0.0496 0.0383 1.0000   
FCF 0.0003 0.2001* -0.0660 -0.0673 -0.0031 0.0533 -0.1011* 0.2051* 1.0000  
Y_BREAK -0.2166* -0.8910* -0.0490 -0.0059 -0.0158* -0.0743* -0.0491 -0.4479* -0.2059* 1.0000 
Notes: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables for Australia. Dependent variable is market leverage (LEV). Tax variable is CTRS which captures the 
effects of both personal and corporate tax rates. Tax-rate tax-reform interaction variable is an interactive variable controlling for the effects of taxes on leverage due to the 
introduction of imputation (Y_BREAK). Firm control variables are firm size (SIZE), asset tangibility (TAN), operating risk (BETA), dividend yield (DIV), risk of default 
(ZSCORE), growth opportunities (LAGGO), and free cash flow (FCF). All variables are defined in Section 4.3. Symbol * denotes significant p-value < 0.05. 
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Table 4.9 Pairwise correlation analysis, 1989–2009 
Taiwan LEV SIZE TAN BETA DIV ZSCORE LAGGO FCF Y_BREAK 
LEV 1.0000         
SIZE -0.1449* 1.0000        
TAN 0.2644* 0.0941* 1.0000       
BETA  -0.3554* 0.0976* -0.1449* 1.0000      
DIV -0.3359* 0.2981* -0.1595* 0.1392* 1.0000     
ZSCORE  -0.0978* -0.0290* -0.4413* 0.0263* 0.1608* 1.0000    
LAGGO -0.3004* 0.2741* -0.1508* 0.1775* 0.2528* 0.0863* 1.0000   
FCF -0.1492* 0.0932* -0.0793* -0.0463** 0.1698* 0.1163* 0.0048 1.0000  
Y_BREAK 0.1057* -0.3257* -0.0788* 0.0333* 0.1090* 0.0386* -0.1486* 0.0335* 1.0000 
Notes: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables in Taiwan. Dependent variable is market leverage (LEV). Tax-rate tax-reform interaction variable is 
an interactive variable controlling for the effects of taxes on leverage due to the introduction of imputation (Y_BREAK). Firm control variables are: firm size (SIZE), asset 
tangibility (TAN), operating risk (BETA), dividend yield (DIV), risk of default (ZSCORE), growth opportunities (LAGGO), and free cash flow (FCF). All variables are defined 
in Section 4.3. Symbol * denotes significant p-value < 0.05. 
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Table 4.7, Table 4.8, and Table 4.9 provide the results of a pairwise analysis of 
the variables used in the regression model to check the correlations that might 
affect the efficient estimation of the standard errors in Equation (4.3) for Canada, 
and in Equation (4.4) for Australia and Taiwan. As can be seen from Table 4.8, it 
is unlikely that multicollinearity is an issue for the econometric analysis, except 
that CTRS has high positive correlation with Y-BREAK (-0.8910) in Australia. 
This high collinearity makes it harder to find results on the important variable of 
interest, Y_BREAK which measures the effect of the tax-reform in the studied 
countries. However, tax-rate variables cannot be excluded from the model, 
because this omission would eliminate the possibility of separating between the 
impacts of the structural tax reforms (dividend imputation in Taiwan and dividend 
imputation with capital gains in Australia) and the impacts of the tax-rate changes. 
Fortunately, previous studies show that if only a few of the mentioned variables 
show “a high level of correlation, it is not necessary to exclude them from the 
estimation because such correlation does not disrupt any regression assumptions” 
(Achen 1982; Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000; Graham 2003; Zhang 2011). Thus, 
the presence of multicollinearity in the present study does not bias the 
coefficients, but does make it less likely to reject the null hypothesis of no 
significant relationship with corporate leverage. According to Black, Legoria and 
Sellers (2000), high correlation has meaningful statistical information where the 
imputation tax system is in place in the absence of capital-gains taxes. In 
Australia, where the capital gains taxes are introduced, no direction is 
hypothesised for the effects of tax-system changes. This is because of the possible 
offsetting effects of dividend imputation and capital-gains taxes. CTR and PTR 
were not included in these models for Taiwan; their values did not change during 
the period of study (1989-2009). The variable for tax integration MTF is not 
included in the models for Australia and Taiwan due to them not being 
statistically significant. Further, the MTF variable alone does not capture the 
entire effect of the introduction of an imputation-tax system due to a change in tax 
rates. This is in line with Schulman et al. (1996) who argue that this variable 
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cannot capture the integration. Therefore, the (Y_BREAK) variable is incorporated 
in the model to evaluate the full effect of the integration. 
4.7 Regression results 
This section presents the results of the regression models for the relationship 
between taxes and corporate leverage, and of the relationship between the shift in 
tax system and corporate leverage by employing fixed-effects model. The 
estimation results between taxes and leverage as well as between tax-system 
changes to an imputation and leverage are presented in Section 4.7.1 and Section 
4.7.2. Section 4.7.3 shows the robustness test for the structural breaks and the 
portfolio groups.  
 The effects of taxes on leverage 4.7.1
Based on Equation (4.3), presented in Section 4.4, the impacts of taxes on 
corporate leverage in Canada were examined. This section presents the regression 
results which examine Hypotheses 1 that addresses the research questions on 
whether the taxes have an impact on a firm’s leverage in Canada where an 
imputation tax system is well-established. Table 4.10 presents the effects of taxes 
on leverage in Canada, over the period from 1982 to 2015. 
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Table 4.10 Effects of taxes on leverage in Canada, 1982–2015 
Variable  LEV 
C 
1.6225*** 
(6.7957) 
CTR 
-0.4398***  
(-4.1463) 
PTR 
0.0403  
(0.5014) 
SIZE 
-0.0804**  
(-5.5911) 
TAN 
0.1492* 
(1.6912) 
BETA 
-0.1081***  
(-4.9990) 
DIV 
-0.0003  
(-0.0608) 
ZSCORE 
-0.0918***  
(-3.8185) 
LAGGO 
3.1836  
(1.1717) 
FCF 
0.0038  
(0.1156) 
MTF 
-0.0091  
(-0.3711) 
Firm Fixed effects Yes 
Year Fixed effects Yes 
No. of Obs 1,397 
R
2 0.309 
Adj. R-sq
 0.304 
Notes: This table presents the impacts of taxes on leverage in Canada. Dependent variable is 
market leverage (LEV). Tax variables are corporate tax (CTR) and personal tax (PTR). Firm 
control variables are: firm size (SIZE), asset tangibility (TAN), operating risk (BETA), dividend 
yield (DIV), risk of default (ZSCORE), growth opportunities (LAGGO), free cash flow (FCF), and 
the variable control for the effect of the changes of tax system (from partial to full imputation) on 
leverage in Canada (MTF). This table reports the adjusted R2 and number of firm-year 
observations. t-statistics are given in parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors in parentheses after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.10 presents the regression results for Equation (4.3) for the impacts of 
taxes on corporate leverage in Canada. The primary variables are corporate tax 
(CTR) and personal tax (PTR). 
The estimated effect of corporate tax rate on leverage (LEV) is captured by the 
variable CTR. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant (-0.4398) at the 
1% level. This study obtains a negative and significant coefficient for CTR. The 
estimated effect of personal tax rate on leverage (LEV) is captured by the variable 
PTR. The estimated coefficient is not statistically significant.  
As for the tax-reform variable (MTF), it is important to note that although MTF is 
included in the model, the impact is not the main focus for the context of Canada. 
MTF represents the effects of the changes of tax system (from partial to full 
imputation) on leverage (LEV). The results show that the coefficient of MTF is 
insignificant. This indicates that the changes of tax regime do not have an impact 
on leverage. 
As for the control variables, the results are mostly consistent with existing 
research and theory (Baker & Wurgler 2002; Frank & Goyal 2003; Huang & 
Ritter 2009). The coefficient estimate of SIZE is negatively significant at the 5% 
level. It could be inferred that larger firms can issue equity more easily. This 
finding is in line with pecking-order theory which predicts a negative relationship 
between size and leverage. TAN is positively significant at the 10% level. BETA 
and ZSCORE are negatively significant at the 1% level. The result of BETA and 
ZSCORE indicates that firms with higher risk use less debt-level financing. 
Overall, these results show that CTR is negatively correlated with corporate 
leverage, whereas PTR and MTF are not significantly correlated with corporate 
leverage. The outcomes indicate that corporate tax in Canada may cause a 
decrease in leverage. These findings support Hypothesis 1.1 stating that, when the 
positive impacts of dividend imputation exceed the negative impacts of the capital 
gains tax, debt-level financing will decrease in the well-established Canadian 
imputation tax system. These results are consistent with the study by Schulman et 
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al. (1996) who suggest that corporate debt levels fall significantly in an 
imputation tax system.  
The focus on the effects of taxes in Canada is emphasised by eliminating the year 
2009 in the additional test. There are valid reasons for additional tests conducted 
over the two separate periods of pre-2009 and post-2009 in Canada. First, 2009 is 
the year of changing from a partial to a full-imputation regime and for which this 
present study would expect different impacts on leverage. When the tax system is 
a fully integrated dividend-imputation one, “shareholders would receive a tax 
credit equivalent to the corporation paying dividends out of pre-tax income” 
(Pattenden 2006, p. 70). Therefore, in this period, there is no tax incentive to 
finance with debt (Pattenden 2006). Second, following Canada’s shift to a full-
imputation system, there was a coincident increase in leverage, which was 
expected as the consequence of the global financial crisis (Dang et al. 2017). 
Therefore, the year 2009 is eliminated from the data to diminish the effects that 
this financial crises that may have had on corporate leverage in Canada. 
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Table 4.11 The impacts of taxes on leverage in Canada before and after 2009 
 
Variable  Pre-2009 Post-2009 
C 
1.9118*** 
(8.490) 
2.602*** 
(5.04) 
CTR 
-0.5328***  
(-4.2304) 
-0.9472 
(-1.2742) 
PTR 
0.0338 
(0.4217) 
0.4143 
(0.5344) 
SIZE 
-0.096*** 
(-7.27) 
-0.1516*** 
(-4.550) 
TAN 
0.1031 
(1.160) 
0.1640 
(0.910) 
BETA 
-0.1041*** 
(-4.980) 
-0.0747 
(-2.000) 
DIV 
-0.0023 
(-0.430) 
-0.0092 
(-1.240) 
ZSCORE 
-0.1072*** 
(-4.520) 
-0.135 
(-1.240) 
LAGGO 
2.5863 
(1.190) 
-1.425 
(-0.410) 
FCF 
-0.0028 
(-0.080) 
0.0700 
(1.390) 
MTF 
-0.0006 
(-0.0334) 
0.0094 
(0.1170) 
Firm Fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 1,253 120 
Adj. R-sq 0.337 0.455 
Notes: Dependent variable is market leverage (LEV). Tax variables are corporate tax (CTR) and 
personal tax (PTR). Firm control variables are: firm size (SIZE), asset tangibility (TAN), operating 
risk (BETA), dividend yield (DIV), risk of default (ZSCORE), growth opportunities (LAGGO), free 
cash flow (FCF), and the variable control for the effect of the changes of tax system (from partial 
to full imputation) on leverage in Canada (MTF). The study period is from 1982 to 2015. This 
table reports the adjusted R
2
 and number of firm-year observations. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses 
after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
Results shown in Table 4.11 provide evidence that taxes had different impacts on 
Canadian firms in the two periods. For pre-2009, the coefficient of CTR is 
negatively significant. From the table, it can be seen that PTR is not significantly 
correlated to LEV. These outcomes are consistent with the expectation that the 
corporate debt levels will decrease in a well-established imputation tax system. 
The results are consistent with the study by Becker, Jacob and Jacob (2013) who 
suggest that corporate tax has a negative impact on leverage. For post-2009, as 
expected, it is evidenced that Canada has no significant relationship between CTR 
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and leverage. PTR is insignificantly correlated with LEV. A possible explanation 
for these results might lie in the fact that the credits for the corporate tax rate 
reduce the tax incentive to use debt financing for firms, and the full-imputation 
systems have been well-established for a long period and firms have adjusted the 
capital structure. The results show that the effects of the corporate tax rate on the 
capital structure are totally insignificant in the countries where a full tax system is 
in place. The imputation tax systems eliminate the benefits of debt financing. 
Therefore, firms in countries under a full-imputation tax do not favour debt 
financing over equity financing. These results for Canada post-2009 are supported 
by the literature in prior research by Faccio and Xu (2015) and Pattenden (2006). 
This supports the view that the corporate tax rate has no significant effects on 
capital structure in an imputation tax system. 
Overall, the results are interpreted as evidence of a relationship between taxes and 
leverage in Canada. The findings demonstrate that taxes are one of the important 
driving forces of corporate leverage in the Canadian imputation regime. These 
findings support Hypothesis 1 which is that taxes have an impact on the degree of 
debt to equity in firms operating within the well-established Canadian imputation 
tax regime.  
 The effects of tax-regime changes on leverage  4.7.2
This section presents the relationship between the tax-system changes and 
leverage in Australia. It then shows the relationship between the tax-system 
changes on leverage in Taiwan.  
Based on Equation (4.4) in Section 4.4, the effects of a tax-system change on a 
firm’s leverage in the context of Australia and Taiwan are investigated. This 
section presents the effects of tax-system changes on leverage in Australia over 
the period from 1982 to 1998. It examines Hypotheses 2 that addresses the 
research question of whether the introduction of an imputation tax system in 
Australia would decrease debt levels for all firms. It presents the effects of tax-
system changes on capital investment in Taiwan over the period from 1989 to 
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2009. It examines Hypotheses 3 that addresses the research question of whether 
the introduction of an imputation tax system in Taiwan would decrease debt levels 
for all firms.  
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Table 4.12 Effects of tax-system changes on leverage in Australia and Taiwan 
Variable  
Australia Taiwan 
LEV LEV 
(1) (2) 
C 
0.9107*** 
(-3.0158) 
0.1376***  
(4.0278) 
CTRS 
0.4650**  
(-2.1649) 
-- 
SIZE 
-0.0720*** 
(-3.6393) 
0.0117** 
(2.5137) 
TAN 
0.1548  
(-1.1685) 
0.1840*** 
(4.6693) 
BETA 
-0.0384  
(-1.5332) 
-0.1600***  
(-19.7435) 
DIV 
-0.0687  
(-0.6693) 
-1.0582***  
(-10.4794) 
ZSCORE 
-0.0337  
(-0.7396) 
-0.0220**  
(-2.0494) 
LAGGO 
0.8294 
( -0.5357) 
-3.6133  
(-1.3516) 
FCF 
-0.0643  
(-1.0002) 
-0.1500**  
(-5.9887) 
Y_BREAK 
0.2758*** 
(-2.792) 
0.6997*** 
(8.0885) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 531 6,092 
R-sq 0.198 0.267 
Adj. R-sq 0.184 0.266 
Notes: The dependent variable is market leverage (LEV). Tax variables are the variable which 
captures the effects of both personal and corporate tax rates (CTRS). Tax-rate tax-reform 
interaction variable is an interactive variable controlling for the effects of taxes on leverage due to 
the introduction of imputation (Y_BREAK). Firm control variables are firm size (SIZE), asset 
tangibility (TAN), operating risk (BETA), dividend yield (DIV), risk of default (ZSCORE), growth 
opportunities (LAGGO), and free cash flow (FCF). The data for Australia are from 1982 to 1998. 
The data for Taiwan are from 1989 to 2009. This table reports the adjusted R
2
 and the number of 
firm-year observations. t-statistics are given in parentheses, and are based on White’s 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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In Table 4.12, the variables of primary interest are CTRS (taxes) and Y_BREAK 
(the interaction between taxes and the changes of tax system). The relationships 
between these variables and LEV for Australia are presented in column (1) and for 
Taiwan are shown in column (2). 
4.7.2.1 The effects of tax regime changes on leverage in Australia 
The estimated effect of taxes on leverage (LEV) prior to integration is captured by 
the variable CTRS. As mentioned earlier, CTRS captures the effects of personal 
and of corporate tax rates, which should be opposite in their effects on corporate 
financing decisions. If the effects of corporate rates exceed those of personal rates, 
CTRS will have a positive effect, and vice versa. If the effects of corporate and 
personal rates counteract each other, then CTRS should not influence corporate 
leverage. As can be seen from column (1) in Table 4.12, the coefficient estimate 
of CTRS is 0.4650 (t-stat = -2.1649) is significant at the conventional 5% level. 
The positive and significant coefficient suggests that changes in corporate tax 
rates have a dominant influence on corporate leverage.  
The Y_BREAK variable is measured by the interaction between CTRS and MTP, 
and represents the effects of the adoption of an imputation tax system on leverage 
(LEV). The coefficient estimate of Y_BREAK, shown in column (1), is 0.2758 (t-
stat = (-2.792). The coefficient of Y_BREAK is positive and statistically significant 
at the 1% level, which indicates that the introduction of an imputation tax system 
shifts the influence of tax rates towards the corporate rate in Australia. 
For the impacts of control variables on leverage, SIZE is negatively significant at 
the 1% level. It could be inferred that larger firms can issue equity more easily. 
This accords with pecking-order theory, which predicts a negative relationship 
between size and leverage. The other variables (DIV, TAN, BETA, ZSCORE, 
LAGGO and FCF) have no significant effect on leverage. 
Overall, leverage (LEV) is positively and significantly correlated with CTRS and 
Y_BREAK. The same signs of CTRS and Y_BREAK for Australia indicate that the 
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changes of tax system to an imputation one would decrease corporate debt level 
financing. These findings support Hypothesis 2, which states that the introduction 
of an imputation tax system in Australia would decrease the debt level for all 
firms. The results are in line with the study by Schulman et al. (1996) who support 
the view that when the tax system changes, the debt financing levels decrease and 
the equity financing levels increase. This supports “the evidence that Australia, 
with an imputation tax system which favours dividends over capital gains” (Ho 
2003, p. 91), has significantly lower debt financing of firms. 
These findings are consistent with Twite (2001) and Pattenden (2006) who, in 
early research in Australia, found a significant reduction in corporate debt-level 
financing when the tax regime changed from a classical to an imputation system. 
4.7.2.2 The effects of tax regime changes on leverage in Taiwan 
The estimated effect of taxes on leverage (LEV) is captured by the variable CTRS. 
However, it is important to note that CTR and PTR were not included in these 
models. This is because their values did not change from 1989 to 2009. The 
Y_BREAK variable, measured by the interaction between CTRS and MTP, 
represents the effects of the adoption of an imputation tax system on leverage 
(LEV). The coefficient estimate of Y_BREAK in column (2) for Taiwan is 0.6997 
(t-stat = 8.0885). The coefficients of Y_BREAK are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that in Taiwan the implementation of 
imputation switches the influence of tax rates towards the corporate rate. 
Corporate leverage (LEV) is positively associated with the change of tax system 
(Y_BREAK). The positive sign of this variable for Taiwan indicates that the tax-
system shift to the corporate tax rate had a dominant influence on leverage. The 
debt-level financing fell when Taiwan entered the imputation tax system. These 
findings support Hypothesis 3 that the introduction of an imputation tax system in 
Taiwan would decrease debt levels for all firms. The results are in line with Twite 
(2001) who supports the view that the change of tax system significantly reduces 
corporate leverage. 
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The results for the impacts of control variables on leverage are mostly consistent 
with existing research (Baker & Wurgler 2002; Frank & Goyal 2003; Huang & 
Ritter 2009). SIZE and TAN are positively significant at the 5% level and at the 
1% level, respectively, shown in column (2). This indicates that large Taiwanese 
firms which have more tangible assets tend to have higher leverage. DIV, BETA 
and ZSCORE are negatively significant at the 1% level, but LAGGO is not 
significantly associated with corporate leverage. The results of BETA and 
ZSCORE indicate that firms with higher risk use less debt-level financing. FCF is 
negatively significant at 5% level in explaining corporate leverage within a firm.  
 Robustness tests 4.7.3
This section provides three robustness evaluations to assess the reliability of the 
results. First, the structural break is tested. Second, firms with payment dividend 
and firms without payment dividend (portfolio regressions) are partitioned.  
4.7.3.1 Structural changes 
Since this research examines the impacts of the shift of tax system on corporate 
leverage, tests for structural breaks are appropriate. In particular, the effects of 
tax-system change on leverage between the periods before and after the 
introduction of imputation in Australia and Taiwan were tested.  
The presence of change in the data is called ‘structural change’ and can be 
categorised by the change in the parameters of the model. The present research 
used the Chow test to examine whether the structural break is significant or not. 
The results showed that the test for a structural break is significant at the 1% level 
for both Australia and Taiwan. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis 
that ‘there’s no break point’. This means that the change in the tax system had a 
significant impact on corporate leverage in both Australia and Taiwan. The details 
of the results are presented in the Appendix 4.1. 
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4.7.3.2 Portfolio groups 
Taxes that influence leverage would include the rates on dividends and on capital 
gains. In Canada, the two rates are different during the period of study. When 
there is an increase in the tax on capital gains, firms use more debt-level 
financing. By contrast, the adoption of an imputation tax system would encourage 
firms to use more equity financing. To isolate the impacts of the introduction of 
imputation and capital gains taxes, the firms in the model should be divided into 
two groups: dividend-paying firms and firms not paying dividends (Black, 
Legoria & Sellers 2000). The present study examines the relationship between 
dividend imputation and capital gains by dividing the samples into these two 
portfolios. This allows us to test Hypothesis 1.1 which proposes that, if the 
positive impacts of dividend imputation exceeded the negative impacts of the 
capital gains tax, debt-level financing would decrease in the well-established 
Canadian imputation tax system. This allow us to test Hypothesis 1.2 which states 
that, if the negative effects of the capital gains tax exceeded the positive effects of 
dividend imputation, debt-level financing would increase in that system. This 
additional test provides clarification on the separate impacts of dividend 
imputation and capital gains tax on leverage in Canada. This robustness test does 
not include Australia and Taiwan for the following reasons. In Australia, the tax 
gain from leverage is 0 under a full dividend-imputation tax system (Fan, Titman 
& Twite 2012). In Taiwan, the implementation of imputation was not 
accompanied by the introduction of tax on capital gains. Besides this, corporate 
tax (CTR) and personal tax (PTR) are constant within the period of study, leaving 
no possibility to observe the signs of corporate tax (CTR) and personal tax (PTR) 
in Taiwan. 
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Table 4.13 Samples of firms paying and not paying dividends pre- and post-
2009 in Canada 
 
Variable  
Paying 
Dividend 
Not Paying 
Dividend 
C 
1.8157*** 
(8.930) 
1.8939*** 
(3.89) 
CTR 
-0.5248***  
(-5.1284) 
-0.3099  
(-1.1524) 
PTR 
0.0650 
(0.7608) 
0.0391 
(0.2582) 
SIZE 
-0.0922*** 
(-7.940) 
-0.0823*** 
(-3.16) 
TAN 
0.1489 
(1.450) 
-0.1833 
(-1.41) 
BETA 
-0.0831 
(-3.770) 
-0.2144*** 
(-4.81) 
DIV 
-0.0004 
(-0.080) 
-0.0049 
(-1.20) 
ZSCORE 
-0.1003*** 
(-4.550) 
-0.0188 
(-2.20) 
LAGGO 
1.0200 
(0.330) 
3.1728*** 
(3.60) 
FCF 
0.0059 
(0.140) 
-0.2497 
(-2.43) 
MTF 
-0.0006 
(-0.0334) 
0.0094 
(0.12) 
Firm Fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 1,061 179 
Adj. R-sq 0.311 0.492 
Notes: Dependent variable is market leverage (LEV). Tax variables are corporate tax (CTR) and 
personal tax (PTR). Firm control variables are: firm size (SIZE), asset tangibility (TAN), operating 
risk (BETA), dividend yield (DIV), risk of default (ZSCORE), growth opportunities (LAGGO), free 
cash flow (FCF), and the variable control for the effect of the changes of tax system (from partial 
to full imputation) on leverage in Canada (MTF). The study period is from 1982 to 2015. This 
table reports the adjusted R
2
 and number of firm-year observations. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses 
after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
Results from Table 4.13 show that tax dividend imputation influenced Canadian 
firms differently. For firms paying dividends, the coefficient of CTR is negative 
and significant at the 1% level. As predicted, for the firms paying dividends, there 
should be stronger impacts from dividend imputation in Canada. These findings 
are consistent with the expectations that dividend imputation will make more 
equity and more attractive sources of corporate financing. For firms not paying 
dividends, as predicted, there is evidence that Canada's firms not paying dividends 
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have an insignificant relationship between CTR and LEV. This means that for 
these firms, the impact of the capital gains tax should be stronger, and dividend 
imputation effects should be weaker in Canada. 
 
4.8 Discussion of findings 
This study investigates the effects of taxes on leverage in Canada (a well-
established imputation context) and the impact of tax-system change (from a 
classical to an imputation regime) on leverage in Australia and Taiwan. Fixed-
effect models were used, as they have the advantage of controlling for business 
cycle and macroeconomic effects. Data were collected for different time periods: 
Canada (1982–2015), Australia (1982–1998), and Taiwan (1989–2009).  
In Canada, corporate tax, personal tax, and capital gains tax are instituted in a 
well-established imputation tax system. Firms in this context are believed to be 
affected by these tax rates. The present study shows that debt-level financing fell 
significantly in this country. In Australia and Taiwan, the results indicate that the 
adoption of imputation significantly reduced debt-level financing. This finding 
supports theoretical arguments that the imputation credit method of imputation 
can reverse debt-equity levels.  
The results of this study have several practical implications for a firm’s capital-
structure decision. By determining the effects of the adoption of imputation on 
leverage, policymakers in the countries using an imputation system can make 
well-informed decisions regarding tax policy. First, the results from the present 
study raise the possibility that taxes might decrease corporate leverage in 
countries under a well-established imputation tax system. Second, the research 
results suggest that tax-system changes may help to reduce corporate leverage 
when there is a change in the tax system. This would alter a firm’s capital 
structure towards equity. Therefore, dividend imputation continues to provide 
benefits for firms, such as by decreasing the choice of debt financing and 
increasing the choice of equity financing for capital investment.  
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4.9 Chapter summary 
In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of what drives corporate 
leverage, this chapter investigated the impacts of taxes on leverage in countries 
with well-established imputation tax systems, and the effects of tax-system 
changes on leverage in the countries with tax-system change from a classical to an 
imputation tax. The results were compared and contrasted, where relevant, to shed 
light on the similarities and differences in effects of imputation tax systems on 
leverage in various contexts. The study employed a fixed-effects model to identify 
and examine the research problems across these three countries. Control factors 
under examination were firm size (SIZE), asset tangibility (TAN), operating risk 
(BETA), dividend yield (DIV), risk of default (ZSCORE), growth opportunities 
(LAGGO), and free cash flow (FCF). 
The regression analysis indicates that there are strong relationships between taxes 
and leverage, as well as between tax-system changes and corporate leverage. As 
for the effects of taxes on leverage, the findings imply that firms are likely to use 
less debt and more equity in Canada. As for the effects of a change to an 
imputation system, the results are the same for both sample tax periods in 
Australia and Taiwan. This study suggests that, when a country shifts to an 
imputation system and firms are carrying significant debt, the switch will result in 
a shift away from debt to equity. These results are in line with those reported by 
Pattenden (2006) and Twite (2001). They support arguments that the imputation 
credit method of introduction of an imputation system can reverse debt-equity 
levels.  
Based on the results, the present study has important implications for corporate 
capital-structure decisions. A country profits only if these benefits translate into 
an improved economy. Proponents of the introduction of an imputation regime 
believe that removing tax distortions will diminish economic costs, which leads to 
increased capital and savings for the economy (Schulman et al. 1996). The 
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reduction in corporate leverage caused by the dividend-imputation system is only 
the first link in this chain of events. Another consideration is whether taxes have 
an effect on capital investment, and whether the shifts in the tax system have an 
effect on capital investment; the latter is important for economic growth. These 
questions are explored in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5. CAN TAX DRIVE CAPITAL INVESTMENT? 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the impact of taxes on capital structure in Canada 
and the impact of a tax-system change from a classical to an imputation system on 
capital structure in Australia and Taiwan. First, this chapter examines the impact 
of taxes on capital investment in Canada. Second, it examines the impact of tax-
system changes on capital investment in Australia and Taiwan. Australia is a 
developed economy, whereas Taiwan is a newly industrialised country. The 
integration of a global free-market powerhouse and a vibrant emerging economy 
enable us to address the research questions effectively. 
Recall from Chapter 4 that the following issues are investigated: 
(i)  possible tax impacts on a firm’s capital investment in a well-
established imputation tax system. 
(ii) possible impacts on capital investment from a shift from a classical to 
an imputation tax system. 
To address these issues, the relationship between taxes and capital investment and 
the connection between tax-system changes and capital investment are analysed 
for Canada, Australia, and Taiwan. The principal empirical testing methodology 
for this analysis is based on panel data and a fixed-effects model. The dependent 
variable in this study is capital investment. The independent variables comprise 
tax variables and non-tax variables. Tax variables consist of corporate tax, 
personal tax, net operating loss, a tax-reform variable and a tax-rate tax-reform 
interaction variable (the interaction between net operating loss firms and tax-
system changes, as well as the interaction between the changes of tax system and 
the corporate rate tax). Non-tax variables or firm variables are one-year lagged 
corporate investment, operating cash flow, growth opportunities, change in firm 
size, and change in debt.  
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This chapter has three main sections: (i) model development, (ii) statistical 
analysis, and (iii) discussion of results. The first section presents hypotheses to be 
tested (Section 5.2), a description of the variables (Section 5.3), model 
specification (Section 5.4), and data used in the study (Section 5.5). The second 
section provides a statistical summary of the data, which includes descriptive 
statistics, tests of means, and correlations between variables (Section 5.6). This is 
followed by the estimation results for taxes and corporate investment, as well as 
for tax-system changes and corporate investment (Section 5.7). This section ends 
with robustness tests of the additional tests for a structural break, and portfolio 
groups, and tests of the model over an extended period of time. The third section 
provides discussion and implications of the results (Section 5.8), and the chapter 
concludes with Section 5.9. 
5.2 Hypothesis development 
 The impacts of taxes on capital investment in a well-established 5.2.1
imputation tax system 
This part of the study specifically focuses on the impact of taxes on investment in 
Canada, where dividend imputation has been used for more than 10 years—a 
well-established imputation tax system (Pattenden 2006). Taxes have an impact 
on the dynamics of corporate investment and growth (Zee, Stotsky & Ley 2002; 
Djankov et al. 2010; Becker, Jacob & Jacob 2013); an imputation tax system is 
designed to stimulate corporate investment (Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000). As a 
result, it is predicted that, under a well-established imputation tax system, there 
should be an increase in capital investment. Thus, all else being equal, it is 
predicted that: 
Hypothesis 4: Taxes have an impact on corporate capital investment in Canadian 
firms under a well-established imputation tax system. 
However, dividend imputation and capital gains have counteracting effects on 
capital investment. As such, it is challenging to predict the direction of their 
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impact on corporate investment. Therefore, two additional hypotheses are tested 
under Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 4.1: If the positive impacts of dividend imputation exceeded the 
negative impacts of the capital gains tax, corporate capital investment would 
increase in Canadian firms under its well-established imputation tax system.  
Hypothesis 4.2: If the negative effects of the capital gains tax exceeded the 
positive effects of dividend imputation, corporate capital investment would 
decrease in Canadian firms under its well-established imputation tax system. 
 The impacts of changes of tax regime on corporate capital investment 5.2.2
Tax reform in Australia 
This part of the study focuses on the impact of a tax-system switch—from a 
classical system to an imputation system—on investment in Australian firms. The 
introduction of an imputation tax system in Australia included other tax changes 
and the introduction of a capital gains tax on the sale of corporate stock. It is 
expected that these changes would have an impact on corporate investment. The 
introduction of an imputation tax system is designed to stimulate capital 
investment (Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000). The adoption of imputation and a 
capital gains tax in Australia provide an opportunity to examine the impacts of 
tax-system changes on capital investment. The expectation, all else being equal, is 
that: 
Hypothesis 5: The implementation of an imputation tax system integrated with a 
capital gains tax would have an impact on corporate capital investment in 
Australian firms. 
However, the counteracting effects of dividend imputation and capital gains tax 
create a difficulty in predicting the direction of their impact on corporate 
investment. Therefore, two further hypotheses are developed. 
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Hypothesis 5.1: If the positive impacts of dividend imputation exceeded the 
negative impacts of the capital gains tax, corporate capital investment would 
increase in Australian firms after the implementation of an imputation tax system.  
Hypothesis 5.2: If the negative effects of the capital gains tax exceeded the 
positive effects of dividend imputation, corporate capital investment would 
decrease in Australian firms after the implementation of an imputation tax system.  
Tax reform in Taiwan 
This part of the study focuses on the impact on investment in Taiwanese firms of 
a tax-system switch from a classical system to an imputation system. Similar to 
Australia prior to the introduction of imputation in 1998, Taiwan had a traditional 
tax system. However, Taiwanese tax reform differed from that in Australia. 
Taiwan introduced a full-imputation system, and it did not impose a new tax on 
capital gains. Therefore, the hypothesis for Taiwan is as follows. 
Hypothesis 6: The implementation of an imputation tax system in Taiwan would 
have a positive impact on corporate capital investment. 
5.3 Variables 
To test the effects of taxes and tax-system change on capital investment, fixed-
effects models are formulated in which the dependent variable, corporate 
investment, is regressed on several tax variables and non-tax variables which are 
believed to have an impact on capital investment. 
Although the investigation presented in this chapter is about the impact of taxes 
and tax-system change on leverage, prior studies have shown that it is important 
to control for non-tax factors which potentially have effects on a firm’s corporate 
investment (Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000; Becker, Jacob & Jacob 2013). As a 
result, the present study incorporates firm-specific variables in the model to 
control for the effects of tax and non-tax factors on the behaviour of corporate 
investment.  
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The tax variables are corporate tax (CTR) and personal tax (PTR), tax reform 
variable (MTF), and the tax-rates tax-reform interaction variables. Firm-specific 
variables are one-year lagged capital investment (LINVP and LINV), operating 
cash flow (OPR), growth opportunities (SalesGrowth), change in firm size 
(ΔSize), and change in debt (ΔDebt). The selection of those variables and their 
detailed descriptions are now discussed. 
 Dependent variables 5.3.1
Capital investment (INVP, INV): A review of the literature reveals that capital 
investment can be measured by many proxies. These include: (i) the ratio of 
growth in plant, property, and equipment divided by total assets (Becker, Jacob & 
Jacob 2013); (ii) the ratio of growth in total assets normalised by total assets 
(Becker, Jacob & Jacob 2013); capital expenditure including additions to 
property, plant, and equipment, normalised by total assets (Becker, Jacob & Jacob 
2013); (iii) the change in fixed assets plus depreciation divided by prior-year fixed 
assets (Alstadsæter, Jacob & Michaely 2017); and (iv) the changes of plant, 
property, and equipment divided by sales (Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000).  
Following the study by Becker, Jacob and Jacob (2013), the proxy for firm 
investment (INV) in the present study is defined as the changes in capital 
expenditure divided by total assets. Investment (INVP) is defined as capital 
expenditure, including additions to property, plant, and equipment (PPE), and 
investment in machinery and equipment. Before computing investment, capital 
investment is expressed in real US dollars, by applying the US gross national 
product (GNP) deflator World Development Indicators (WDI 2015). The base 
year is in the middle of the study period for each country. It is 1990 for Australia, 
and 2000 for Taiwan and Canada. Investment is translated into real terms, 
consistent with Becker, Jacob and Jacob (2013), to obtain a measure of investment 
that controls for inflation and growth.  
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 Independent variables 5.3.2
The choice of independent variables in this study is based on research inquiries 
which relate to taxes and tax-system change. Further, former studies indicate the 
relevance of non-tax factors which potentially have effects on capital investment 
(Altshuler & Auerbach 1990; Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000 ; Jugurnath, Stewart 
& Brooks 2008 ). As a result, independent variables in this chapter include tax 
variables and firm-specific non-tax variables. The potential firm-specific variables 
are one-year lagged capital investment (LINVP and LINV), operating cash flow 
(OPR), growth opportunities (SalesGrowth), change in firm size (ΔSize), the 
change in debt (ΔDebt)2, all of which can have an impact on corporate investment 
and are therefore included in the present study.  
The selection of tax variables and firm-specific variables and their detailed 
descriptions are discussed next. 
5.3.2.1 Tax variables 
Tax variables in this study reflect and measure (i) the effects of taxes on capital 
investment in Canada; and (ii) the effects of the changes of tax system on capital 
investment in Australia and Taiwan. Based on the study by Black, Legoria & 
Sellers (2000), the relevant variables in this study are discussed. Tax variables 
here comprise tax-rate variables, a tax-reform variable, and a tax-rate tax-reform 
interaction variable.  
Tax-rate variables represent the variables of interest for Hypothesis 4. Recall that 
it proposes that taxes have an impact on corporate capital investment in Canadian 
firms under a well-established imputation tax system. According to Black, 
Legoria and Sellers (2000) and Jugurnath, Stewart and Brooks (2008), tax rates 
are designed to capture the effects of taxes on capital investment. 
                                                 
2
 The control for industry was initially included in the test. However, it is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, the final model does not include this variable. 
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Tax rates, tax reform, and tax-rate tax-reform interaction variables are the 
variables of interest for Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6. Recall that Hypothesis 5 
proposes that the implementation of an imputation tax system integrated with a 
capital gains tax would have an impact on corporate capital investment in 
Australian firms. Hypothesis 6 proposes that the implementation of an imputation 
tax system in Taiwan would have a positive impact on corporate capital 
investment. According to Black, Legoria and Sellers (2000) and Jugurnath, 
Stewart and Brooks (2008), tax rates, tax reform, and tax-rate tax-reform variables 
are designed to capture the effects of tax-system changes on capital investment. 
The variables used in the present study are now discussed. 
5.3.2.1.1 Tax-rate variables 
Corporate tax rate (CTR): The present study uses the statutory corporate income 
tax to capture the impacts of taxes on capital investment for the following reasons. 
First, this proxy has been widely used by firms to make capital investment 
decisions (Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000; Handley & Maheswaran 2008). 
Second, statutory corporate tax rates can be collected from three data sources—
the OECD tax database, the World Bank World Development Indicators, and the 
University of Michigan World Tax Database. Third, statutory corporate tax rate is 
considered the most effective determinant, because policymakers prefer to 
observe the relationship between the statutory tax rate and decision making 
(Graham et al. 2017). They highlight that “the vast majority of firms use statutory 
corporate tax rate as the tax rate input for decision making. This result is 
consistent with managers relying on simple heuristics that approximate 
theoretically correct constructs in their decision-making process” (Graham et al. 
2017, p. 3168). Therefore, the use of a statutory corporate tax rate in the present 
study is entirely appropriate and it should be included as a main variable. 
Personal tax rate (PTR): Personal tax rates have indirect impacts on the 
corporate cost of capital. According to Black, Legoria and Sellers (2000) and 
Jugurnath, Stewart and Brooks (2008), PTR influences corporate investment 
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decisions through its impact on required pre-tax rates of return. Therefore, PTR 
should be included in the model. 
Net operating loss (NOL): Firms with and without operating loss respond 
differently to the change of tax system to an imputation tax system. In fact, a firm 
with an increase in operating loss (NOL) may not have to pay corporate tax, which 
results in a lower projected marginal tax rate. In this case, a firm may not receive 
any imputation credits and therefore does not benefit from such a tax system. To 
capture these effects, firms in the present study are divided into those having a 
NOL and those with a net operating profit. 
This study uses a dummy variable which is set to 1 if the firm is a NOL firm, and 
0 otherwise. Like Black, Legoria and Sellers (2000) and Jugurnath, Stewart and 
Brooks (2008), the present research classifies a firm as NOL if it reported an NOL 
during the previous year, the current year, or the following year. Black, Legoria 
and Sellers (2000) and Jugurnath, Stewart and Brooks (2008) indicate that this is 
the best proxy measure for low marginal tax rates, because firms with recent NOL 
are likely to have a NOL in future years' profits to reduce their tax liability and 
track profits accurately. 
5.3.2.1.2 Tax reform variables 
Australia and Taiwan contexts 
 
Tax reform (MTF): This is a dummy variable indicating the effect of the tax 
reform on corporate investment in Australia and Taiwan. MTF is set to 0 for the 
period before the commencement of an imputation tax system, and 1 afterwards. 
The tax-reform dummy is set to 0 prior to 1987 in Australia, the year of the 
adoption of imputation, and 1 for years thereafter; whereas MTF is set 0 prior to 
1997 in Taiwan, the year when the changes of tax system came into effect, and 1 
for period thereafter. 
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Canada context 
 
Tax reform (CPMTF): This interactive variable controls for the effect of the 
changes of tax system (from partial to full imputation) on capital investment in 
Canada. To capture the effect of these changes on corporate investment decisions, 
the CPMTF variable should be included in the model. The tax reform variable 
(CPMTF) takes the value of 0 prior to 2009, and 1 for years thereafter. The focus 
on the effects of taxes in Canada will be emphasised by eliminating the year 
2009—the pivotal year of shifting from partial to full-imputation system—in the 
additional test, mentioned in Section 5.7.1. The additional test is conducted for the 
two periods of pre-2009 and post-2009, which reflects the investigation’s focus on 
the impacts of taxes on capital investment in Canada. 
5.3.2.1.3 Tax-rate tax-reform interaction variables 
Australia and Taiwan contexts 
Tax-rate tax-reform interaction variable (CTRMTF): The interactive variable 
controls for the effect of corporate tax on capital investment due to the changes of 
the tax system to an imputation one in Australia and Taiwan. To account for the 
theoretical effect of the implementation of an imputation tax system on corporate 
investment decisions, an interaction effect between corporate tax (CTR) and MTF 
(the changes of tax system from classical to imputation) variables is included in 
the model. In Taiwan, CTRMTF reflects only the effects of dividend imputation. 
In Australia, CTRMTF reflects the effects of the introduction of dividend 
imputation and of the adoption of a capital gains tax. 
Net operating loss tax-reform interaction variables (NOLMTF): This variable 
reflects interactive variable controls for the two groups: firms having NOL and 
firms without NOL. The shifts of the tax system to imputation in Australia and 
Taiwan have different impacts on these two groups. NOLMTF should be included 
to capture the effects of the changes of tax system on firms having NOL in a 
particular year. Therefore, an interaction effect between the NOL and MTF 
variables is added to the model. 
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Canadian context 
Canada has been using an imputation tax system for a long time with a change 
from a partial to a full-imputation tax system in 2009. Although the focus of this 
study is on the effects of taxes, a shift from partial to full imputation during the 
study period has nevertheless been included in the model. The tax-rate tax-reform 
interaction variables in Canada are now described. 
NOLPMTF: This interactive variable controls for the two groups (NOL and non-
NOL firms) which are influenced differently in an imputation tax system in 
Canada. As such, this variable is used to capture the effects of the taxes on NOL 
firms. 
5.3.2.2 Firm-specific variables 
Lagged Investment (LINV and LINVP): Black, Legoria and Sellers (2000, p. 45) 
indicate that “the level of investment should tend to correlate with certain industry 
characteristics. Also, firms in various life stages may be experiencing relatively 
higher or lower levels of capital investment”. Therefore, corporate investment 
might be correlated with investment over previous years. It is thought that a firm’s 
current dividend is determined largely by lagged dividends, because firms may be 
experiencing relatively different levels of capital investment at various life stages 
(Jugurnath, Stewart & Brooks 2008). There is some evidence supporting the view 
that lagged dividends can be considered a proxy for other lagged variables (Black, 
Legoria & Sellers 2000; Jugurnath, Stewart & Brooks 2008). As such, the lagged 
terms of LINV and LINVP are included in the present research as a measure of 
capital investment for the previous year. 
Operating Cash Flow (OPR): Operating Cash flow is one of the significant 
factors influencing capital investment and is related to the expected return from 
new investment (Myers 1984; Myers & Majluf 1984). A firm with fewer 
internally funded investment opportunities tends to decrease corporate investment 
(Gilchrist & Himmelberg 1995). By contrast, firms with a higher operating cash 
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flow tend to have more corporate investment (Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000). 
Operating Cash Flow (OPR) in the present research is defined with three 
alternative variables: Cash flow (CF), Cash (Cash), and Earnings before interest, 
tax, and depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). This is in line with study of 
(Becker, Jacob & Jacob 2013). CF is the funds from operations of the company 
measured as the ratio of cash flow relative to total assets. Cash is defined as cash 
holdings divided by total assets. EBITDA is used for measuring earnings before 
interest, tax, and depreciation divided by of total assets. Unlike cash flow, 
EBITDA includes neither tax payments nor increases in working capital. It can be 
hypothesised that Operating Cash Flow (OPR) has significant positive 
correlations with capital investment.
 
Growth Opportunity (SalesGrowth): Growth opportunity is an important 
determinant of capital expenditure. A higher ratio of growth opportunities 
indicates greater investment opportunities (Collins & Kothari 1989). Growth 
opportunities are proxied by a book to market equity ratio (Collins & Kothari 
1989), and an earnings to price ratio (Smith & Watts 1992). Here, SalesGrowth is 
the logarithm of the growth rate of sales from t-2 to t (Fazzari et al. 1988; Lamont 
1997; Faulkender & Petersen 2012). It could be argued that firms with more 
profits will invest more because of a greater availability of internal funds for 
investment. 
Change in Debt (ΔDebt): This variable is included in the model because leverage 
may have impacts on corporate investment. In an efficient financial environment, 
it is assumed that capital is to provide companies with investment opportunities 
(Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000). However, each of the direct proxies measuring 
investment opportunities is sensitive to the capital structure of firms. Therefore, 
Δdebt is included to control for the effects of financial leverage. The change in 
debt is defined as the change in debt from year t to t-1 total debt to one-year 
lagged total assets.  
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Change in Firm Size (ΔSize): Firm size traditionally has an impact on capital 
investment. Firm size affects a firm’s ability to finance investment; therefore, it is 
used as a control variable (Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000). In the present study, 
firm size is defined as the logarithm of the growth rate of total assets (Black, 
Legoria & Sellers 2000).  
5.4 Regression models 
In Section 5.3, both dependent and independent variables were identified and 
explained. This section introduces models for testing Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6, 
which involve the associations between dividends taxation and corporate 
investment. Recall that Hypothesis 4 proposes that taxes have an impact on 
corporate investment within the Canadian imputation tax regime. Hypothesis 5 
states that the implementation of an imputation tax system integrated with a 
capital gains tax would have an impact on corporate capital investment in 
Australian firms. Hypothesis 6 asserts that the introduction of an imputation tax 
system in Taiwan would increase capital investment. The following regression 
models are estimated for examining the relationship between taxes and corporate 
investment in Canada, and the association between the tax-system change and 
corporate investment in Australia and Taiwan. 
Model (5.1) tests Hypothesis 4, which considers the likelihood of the impacts of 
taxes on corporate investment in the Canadian imputation tax system. It is 
represented by Equation (5.1) as follows: 
(5.1)      CPMTF NOLPMTFDEBTSIZEhSalesGrowt
OPR  PTR CTRInvestment cInvestment
t9t8it7it6it5
it4t3t21-it1it
it



 
where Investmentit 
denotes capital investment of firm i at time t, which is 
measured by both capital expenditure divided by total assets (INVP); and capital 
expenditure, including additions to property, plant, and equipment normalised by 
total assets (INV). Investmentit-1 
is capital investment of firm i at time t-1. CTRt 
is 
corporate tax rate at time t. PTRt 
is personal tax rate at time t. Firm-level control 
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variables are operating cash flow (OPRit), growth opportunities (SalesGrowthit), 
change in firm size (ΔSizeit), and change in debt (Δdebtit). The tax-rate tax-reform 
interaction variables include the interaction between NOL for firm i, at the time t 
and the changes of the tax system dummy (from partial to full imputation) at time 
t (NOLPMTFit), and the interaction between corporate rate tax at the time t and the 
changes of tax system dummy (from partial to full imputation) (CPMTFt). These 
variables are included to examine whether taxes have an impact on corporate 
capital investment in Canadian firms under a well-established imputation tax 
system (Hypothesis 4). The detailed descriptions of these variables were provided 
in Section 5.3. 
Model (5.2) tests Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6, that consider the likelihood of 
the impacts of tax-system changes on corporate investment in Australia and 
Taiwan, respectively. It is represented by Equation (5.2) as follows: 
(5.2)      CTRMTF NOLMTFDEBTSIZEhSalesGrowt
OPR  PTR CTRInvestment cInvestment
t9t8it7it6it5
it4t3t21-it1it
it



 
where Investmentit 
denotes capital investment of firm i at time t, which is 
measured by both capital expenditure divided by total assets (INVP); and capital 
expenditure including additions to property, plant, and equipment normalised by 
total assets (INV). Investmentit-1 
is capital investment of firm i at time t-1. CTRt 
is 
corporate tax rate at time t. PTRt 
is personal tax rate at time t. Firm-level control 
variables are: operating cash flow (OPRit), growth opportunities (SalesGrowthit), 
change in firm size (ΔSizeit), and change in debt (Δdebtit). The interaction terms 
comprise the interaction between NOL for firm i, at the time t and the changes of a 
tax-system dummy (from partial to full imputation) at time t (NOLMTFt), and the 
interaction between corporate rate-tax at time t and the tax-system changes (from 
a classical to an imputation system) dummy at time t (CTRMTFt). The detailed 
definitions for these variables were provided in Section 5.3. These variables are 
included to examine whether the implementation of an imputation tax system in 
Australia and Taiwan would have an impact on corporate capital investment 
(Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6). 
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In order to account for unobserved heterogeneity across a firm and across time, 
this study includes firm fixed-effects and year fixed-effects within the model. In 
particular, firm fixed-effects are used to capture the impacts of time-invariant, 
firm-specific effects on levels of corporate investment; whereas, a year fixed-
effects model is used to control for the business cycle and other macroeconomic 
effects. All determinants are in real terms. 
Equation (5.1) aims to investigate the relationship between taxes and corporate 
investment in a well-established imputation system. Equation (5.2) examines 
whether an introduction of imputation has an impact on corporate investment. 
5.5 Data  
As mentioned in Section 4.5, the primary source of data for both dependent and 
control variables is Datastream Database for firm-level data, which contains 
financial data on listed companies in Canada and Taiwan. Company data are 
obtained from the Morningstar and Datastream Databases for Australian firms 
from 1990 to 1998. Information for the period from 1982 to 1989 in Australia was 
obtained by collecting data from available company financial reports. To the best 
of the researcher’s knowledge, the data for this early period are not collectable 
from Datastream or any other databases. The annual cross-section data cover the 
period from 1989 to 2015 for Canada, from 1982 to 1998 for Australia, and from 
1989 to 2009 for Taiwan. The main reason for selecting different data periods for 
those countries is discrepancies in the year of introduction of a dividend-
imputation tax system. In the research of Schulman et al. (1996), Pattenden 
(2006), and Twite (2001), the studied period for each selected country is balanced 
around the transition point of tax-system change. Based on this principle, and on 
the availability of data, the study adopts the same approach with given time 
periods. 
Financial firms are excluded from the sample due to the nature of their business, 
which is lending, which makes their balance sheet different from that of other 
corporate firms whose business is about product or service selling. Utilities firms 
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are excluded from the sample due to the marked differences in capital structure 
between this industry and other sectors of the economy. This is consistent with 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) who exclude the financial and utilities firms 
from their data.  
The years 1987 and 1988 are omitted from the sample for Australia, because this 
is the period when the tax system shifted from classical to imputation. Firms 
operating during these two years would be expected to make substantial changes 
in their internal polices in order adapt to a new tax regime. By omitting these 
years, distortions created by these fluctuations are excluded from the empirical 
results (Jugurnath, Stewart & Brooks 2008). It eliminates the possible impacts of 
the October 1987 stock market crash in Australia (Yang & Bessler 2008). This 
crash made the major stock market collapse, and almost all of the Australian stock 
markets fell simultaneously (Yang & Bessler 2008). This factor was quite likely 
to have driven changes in firms’ use of debt (Roll 1988; Allen 1991). Further, 
following the study by Twite (2001), the present study excludes these two years to 
“allow for changeover effects to diminish and to allow the impact of pension fund 
taxation to take effect in Australia” (Twite 2001, p. 230). 
Data from 1998 and 1999 for Taiwan are also omitted, as this is the time when 
dividend imputation in Taiwan was introduced. The exclusion of these two years 
diminishes the impacts of the financial crisis in Asia in 1998. This omission of 
data is consistent with Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004) and with Yeh 
(2018) who excluded the year of the financial crisis when investigating the 
context of Taiwan. 
The major advantage of the dataset is that few studies have had access to these 
data for Australia in the early period, which allows the models to have more 
efficient estimates. It permits adding more variables that may possibly have 
impacts on capital investment. A concern with this data collection for the pre-
imputation period in Australia is that there is a relatively small sample size of 41 
firms and 166 observations. A possible issue with this is the generalisability of the 
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results. However, through reviewing the literature, this issue does not appear to 
have had a statistical bias against findings in existing studies. For example Black, 
Legoria and Sellers (2000) analysed the impacts of dividend imputation on capital 
investment using panel data over the period 1982 to 1999. The number of 
observations for the whole period in their research was relatively small, with only 
158 for New Zealand and with 1000 for Australia. In another study, Jugurnath, 
Stewart and Brooks (2008) analysed the impacts of tax reform on capital 
investment in Australia and the United States with small sample sizes of 28 firms 
and 308 observations for Australia, and 35 firms and 374 observations for the 
United States. 
5.6 Statistical analysis 
This section presents the details of the statistical analyses and comprises three 
subsections. Subsection 5.6.1 presents descriptive statistics of variables. 
Subsection 5.6.2 presents the test of means. Subsection 5.6.3 presents the 
correlations between the variables.  
 Descriptive statistics  5.6.1
5.6.1.1 Sample distribution by countries 
The sample distribution is described by number of years and period of study. This 
is seen in Table 5.1. As shown, for Canada there are 26 years of data from 1989 to 
2015. For Taiwan there are 20 years of data for the period from 1989 to 2009,, 
and for Australia, 16 years from1982 to 1998.  
Table 5.1 Sample distribution by country 
Country 
Number of 
years of data 
 
Period 
Canada  26 1989–2015 
Taiwan 20 1989–2009 
Australia 16 1982–1998 
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5.6.1.2 Summary statistics 
As an initial step, descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables were calculated. Univariate statistics are provided for the entire sample 
period, as shown in Table 5.2, Table 5.3 and Table 5.4. Next, a matched-pair test 
was conducted to compare the difference between the average value of the 
dependent and independent variables before and after the change in the tax law. 
This is reported in Table 5.5. The t-test results explain whether the average values 
for the two periods were significantly different or not. 
The following tables (Table 5.2, Table 5.3, and Table 5.4) show the descriptive 
statistics of the dependent and independent variables in the study, including the 
mean, standard deviation, median, and minimum and maximum for each variable.  
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics of variables for Canada, 1989 to 2015 
Variables Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
INV  31,593 0.038 0.114 0.018 -0.562 0.457 
INVP 31,593 0.327 1.185 0.463 -7.293 1.396 
CTR 103,248 0.364 0.064 0.380 0.263 0.455 
PTR 103,248 0.397 0.089 0.464 0.29 0.4953 
CF 29,441 0.069 0.460 -0.002 -0.880 3.438 
Cash 17,817 0.096 0.603 0 -4.251 1.718 
EBITDA 26,053 -0.003 0.486 0.0002 -2.770 2.400 
SalesGrowth 15,681 -0.131 0.643 -0.104 -2.593 2.741 
ΔSize 29,099 0.087 0.513 -0.104 -2.052 2.215 
ΔDebt 32,764 0.037 0.417 0 -1.584 1.610 
NOL 103,248 0.204 0.403 0 0 1 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics of all variables for Canada. Dependent variables are: 
Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are corporate tax (CTR), personal tax (PTR) and net 
operating loss (NOL). Firm-control variables are operating cash flow (CF, Cash and EBITDA), 
growth opportunities (SalesGrowth), change in firm size (ΔSize), and change in debt (ΔDebt).  
The results for Canada in Table 5.2 indicate that the dependent variables 
measuring corporate investment INV and INVP have mean values of 0.038 and 
0.327, respectively. For tax variables, the mean of corporate tax rate (CTR) is 
0.364 and the standard deviation is only 0.064. The mean of personal tax rate 
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(PTR) is 0.397 and the standard deviation is 0.089. The mean of net operating loss 
(NOL) is 0.204 and the standard deviation is 0.403. Independent variables related 
to operating cash flow—namely CF, Cash, and EBITDA—have mean values of -
0.069, 0.096, and -0.003, respectively. Other independent variables, growth 
opportunity (SalesGrowth), change in firm size (ΔSize), and change in debt 
(Δdebt), have mean values of -0.131, 0.087, and 0.037, respectively.  
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Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of variables for Australia, 1982 to 1998 
Australia Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
INV  4,257 0.228 0.438 0.059 -1.801 1.999 
INVP 4,257 0.295 0.837 0.065 -2.652 5.029 
CTR 20,306 0.366 0.022 0.36 0.33 0.39 
PTR 20,306 0.473 0.006 0.47 0.47 0.49 
CF 4,312 -0.156 1.219 0.017 -14.17 3.419 
Cash 4,499 0.446 1.046 0.108 -0.002 7.267 
EBITDA 4,475 -0.036 0.931 0.052 -6.382 9.938 
SalesGrowth 2,446 -0.182 1.191 -0.113 -7.842 7.369 
ΔSize 4,489 0.125 0.753 0.035 -3.907 5.300 
Δdebt 4,395 0.015 0.282 0.000 -1.020 1.211 
NOL 20,306 0.025 0.157 0 0 1 
Notes: Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are corporate tax 
(CTR), personal tax (PTR) and net operating loss (NOL). Firm-control variables are operating cash 
flow (CF, Cash and EBITDA), growth opportunities (SalesGrowth), change in firm size (ΔSize), 
and change in debt (ΔDebt).  
Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics of variables for Taiwan, 1989 to 2009 
Taiwan Obs Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Median Min Max 
INV  12,363 0.129 0.550 -0.001 -0.052 3.348 
INVP 12,363 3.408 11.325 -0.064 -0.375 43.948 
CTR 34,333 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 
PTR 34,333 0.405 0.022 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Cash 5,080 0.070 0.282 -0.003 -0.140 1.533 
CF 10,953 0.063 0.335 -0.002 -0.133 2.180 
EBITDA 10,744 0.142 1.063 -0.005 -6.971 33.522 
SalesGrowth 9,532 -0.015 0.320 0.023 -1.868 0.684 
ΔSize 10,992 -0.017 0.214 -0.007 -1.321 0.567 
Δdebt 10,688 -0.017 0.296 -0.001 -1.712 1.126 
NOL 34,333 0.130 0.336 0 0 1 
Notes: Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are corporate tax 
(CTR), personal tax (PTR) and net operating loss (NOL). Firm-control variables are operating cash 
flow (CF, Cash and EBITDA), growth opportunities (SalesGrowth), change in firm size (ΔSize), 
and change in debt (ΔDebt).  
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Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 provide the descriptive statistics of the mean, standard 
deviation, median, and minimum and maximum for the dependent and 
independent variables for Australia and Taiwan. Regarding the means of the 
dependent variables, corporate investment (INV) in Taiwan (0.129) is lower than 
that in Australia (0.228); whereas corporate investment (INPV) in Taiwan (3.408) 
is higher than that in Australia (0.295). The possible reason for corporate 
investment (INVP) in Taiwan being higher than in Australia is that INVP is 
translated in real terms with the high gap of inflation rates between the year of 
2002 (-0.005) and the year of 2001 (-0.203) in Taiwan. For the tax variable, the 
mean of the corporate tax rate (CTR) is 0.366 and the standard deviation is only 
0.022, indicating that the tax rate has a marginal change during the period of 16 
years in Australia. By contrast, Taiwan has an average tax rate of 0.25 and its 
standard deviation is 0. This result is expected, since there is no change in CTR in 
Taiwan during the period of study. Mean of personal tax rate (PTR) is 0.473 in 
Australia and 0.405 in Taiwan. Mean of net operating loss (NOL) is 0.025 in 
Australia and 0.130 in Taiwan.  
For firm-specific variables, the operating cash flow ratios (Cash, CF and 
EBITDA) in Taiwan (0.07, 0.063, and 0.142, respectively) are consistently higher 
than those in Australia (-0.156, 0.446, and -0.036, respectively). Although ΔSize (-
0.017) and ΔDebt (-0.017) in Taiwan are lower than those in Australia (0.125 and 
0.015 respectively), SalesGrowth in Taiwan (-0.015) is higher than that in 
Australia (-0.182). As can be seen from the table, variable INVP for Taiwan has 
the highest standard deviation (11.325). The reason for this is that INVP is in real 
terms with the high gap of inflation rates between 2002 (-0.005) and 2001 (-
0.203) in Taiwan. In the next section, a more in-depth analysis of the means is 
conducted to measure the impact of the tax reform.  
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 Test of means 5.6.2
The purpose of this section is to analyse: (i) the impact of the taxes on capital 
investment in Canada; and (ii) the impact of tax reform on capital investment in 
Australia and Taiwan; initially, this is done by comparing the means over relevant 
periods. Since Canada changed from a partial to full-imputation tax system in 
2009, the comparison is performed over the two periods of 1989–2009 and 2010–
2015. Similarly, the tests are conducted for Australia and Taiwan over two periods 
of pre- and post-tax reform, 1982–1987 and 1989–1998 in Australia, and 1989–
1998 and 2000–2009 in Taiwan.  
Table 5.5 shows bivariate statistical tests to compare the means on a variable-by-
variable basis over two periods. The t-tests were conducted on paired data 
samples either for the pre- and post-tax reform periods in Australia and Taiwan or 
for partial- and full-imputation periods in Canada. The non-parametric Wilcoxon 
rank–sum tests were conducted to triangulate the results of the two sample t-tests, 
in case the variances of the two populations being compared are too different.  
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Table 5.5 Changes in mean ratios in Canada, Australia, and Taiwan 
 Means (Medians) Means (Medians) t-test difference in mean (p-value) Wilcoxon Rank–Sum test (p-value) 
 CA AUS TWN CA AUS TWN 
CA AUS TWN CA AUS TWN 
 1989–2009 1982–1987 1989–1997 2010–2015 1989–1998 2000–2009 
 Partial 
Imputation 
Classical 
Tax System 
Classical Tax 
System 
Full 
Imputation 
Full 
Imputation 
Full 
Imputation 
INVP 
0.1833 
(0.4104) 
1.6242 
(1.4872) 
-0.1102 
(-0.067) 
0.5684 
(0.714) 
0.2311 
(0.058) 
3.5946 
(-0.062) 
-28.27*** 
(0.000) 
23.44*** 
(0.000) 
-7.958*** 
(0.000) 
-63.649*** 
(0.000) 
20.766*** 
(0.000) 
-6.684*** 
(0.000) 
INV 
0.0286 
(0.0169) 
1.4989 
(1.4872) 
-0.0068 
(-0.003) 
0.0553 
(0.020) 
0.1653 
(0.0534) 
0.1370 
(-0.001) 
-20.157*** 
(0.000) 
52.462*** 
(0.000) 
-6.3574*** 
(0.000) 
-12.592*** 
(0.000) 
21.974*** 
(0.000) 
-15.80*** 
(0.000) 
CF 
-0.0658 
(0.0042) 
0.0392 
(0.0263) 
-0.0081 
(-0.005) 
-0.1330 
(-0.019) 
-0.1657 
(-0.011) 
0.0667 
(-0.003) 
9.524*** 
(0.000) 
2.149** 
(0.031) 
-4.546*** 
(0.000) 
21.774*** 
(0.000) 
1.296 
(0.194) 
-6.966*** 
(0.000) 
Cash 
0.0614 
(0.000) 
0.0836 
(0.0318) 
-0.0065 
(-0.002) 
0.0790 
(0.000) 
0.4649 
(0.1195) 
0.0777 
(-0.002) 
-2.544** 
(0.011) 
-4.853*** 
(0.000) 
-6.050*** 
(0.000) 
5.899*** 
(0.000) 
-9.362*** 
(0.000) 
-4.317*** 
(0.000) 
EBITDA 
-0.0107 
(0.0027) 
0.3286 
(0.1008) 
-0.015 
(-0.009) 
0.0063 
(0.002) 
-0.0542 
(0.0433) 
0.1497 
(-0.005) 
-2.798*** 
(0.005) 
5.504*** 
(0.000) 
-3.255*** 
(0.001) 
0.632 
(0.527) 
5.191*** 
(0.000) 
-10.198*** 
(0.000) 
Sales 
Growth 
-0.1266 
(-0.106) 
-0.0520 
(-0.029) 
0.0185 
(0.010) 
-0.1417 
(-0.099) 
-0.1931 
(-0.135) 
-0.0163 
(0.024) 
1.394 
(0.163) 
1.479 
(0.139) 
1.926* 
(0.054) 
-2.133** 
(0.032) 
5.693*** 
(0.000) 
-4.508*** 
(0.000) 
ΔSize 
0.1158 
(0.0712) 
0.0474 
(0.0210) 
-0.0207 
(-0.008) 
0.0458 
(0.0354) 
0.1288 
(0.0385) 
-0.0172 
(-0.007) 
11.480*** 
(0.000) 
-1.404 
(0.160) 
-0.344 
(0.730) 
19.030*** 
(0.000) 
-0.584 
(0.559) 
-4.031*** 
(0.000) 
ΔDebt 
0.0246 
(0.0000) 
0.0218 
(0.0037) 
-0.0070 
(-0.001) 
0.0553 
(0.0000) 
0.0151 
(0.0000) 
-0.0183 
(-0.001) 
-6.5816*** 
(0.000) 
0.3050 
(0.760) 
0.8072 
(0.419) 
-1.483 
(0.138) 
1.904* 
(0.056) 
-0.418 
(0.675) 
Notes: This table presents means ratio the three countries, abbreviated to CA, AUS, and TWN. Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Firm-control variables are: operating 
cash flow (CF, Cash and EBITDA), growth opportunities (SalesGrowth), change in firm size (ΔSize) and change in debt (Δdebt). Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. The t-tests difference in mean provides test statistics to conduct on paired data samples of either the pre- and post-tax reform periods (in Australia and Taiwan) or 
partial- and full-imputation periods (in Canada).  
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In Canada, six of the variables (INVP, INV, Cash, EBITDA, SalesGrowth and 
ΔDebt) decrease after the tax-system change. While INVP, INV, EBIDTA, and 
ΔDebt are significant at the 1% level, Cash and SalesGrowth are significant at the 
5% level. The remaining variables, namely CF and ΔSize, increase, and are 
significant at the 1% level. 
In the Australian context, of eight variables, four (INVP, INV, EBITDA and 
SalesGrowth) experience an increase throughout the tax-reform period, at the 1% 
significance level. CF and ΔDebt have an increase at the 5% significance level 
and at the 10% significance level, respectively. The remaining variable (Cash) 
shows a decrease after the introduction of dividend imputation; ΔSize is not 
statistically significant. 
For Taiwan, of the eight variables analysed six experience a decrease in the tax 
integration period, namely INVP, INV, CF, Cash, EBITDA, and ΔSize. They are 
all significant at the 1% level; however, SalesGrowth shows an increase after the 
changes of tax system at the 10% significance level; ΔDebt is not statistically 
significant.  
 Correlation between variables 5.6.3
Since it is possible that the selected explanatory variables may be correlated, the 
issue of multicollinearity is investigated using a correlation matrix. As Zurigat 
(2009, p. 62) indicates, “a high correlation between two of the independent 
variables may indicate the presence of collinearity”.
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Table 5.6 Pairwise Correlation Analysis for Canada, 1989-2015 
 
Canada INV INVP LINV LINVP CRT CF Cash EBITDA Sales 
Growth 
ΔSize ΔDebt PTR NOL 
MTF 
CTR 
MTF 
INV  1.0000              
INVP 0.6727* 1.0000             
CTR -0.0987* -0.1746* 1.0000            
LINV 0.1279* -0.0464* -0.1361* 1.0000           
LINVP -0.0255* -0.0742* -0.2460* 0.6630* 1.0000          
CF  0.0103 0.0001 -0.0066 0.0020 -0.0092 1.0000         
Cash -0.0087 0.0134* 0.0299* 0.0053 -0.0172* -0.3146* 1.0000        
EBITDA  0.0010 0.0486* 0.0130* 0.0169* -0.0074 -0.1215* 0.1588* 1.0000       
SalesGrowth  -0.2934* -0.2719* 0.0480* -0.0475* 0.0081 -0.0454* -0.1596* -0.0397* 1.0000      
ΔSize 0.0454* -0.0041 0.0306* 0.0034 -0.0277* 0.3101* -0.1795* -0.0732* -0.3791* 1.0000     
ΔDebt 0.1357* 0.0872* -0.0445* 0.0383* 0.0083 -0.0259* -0.0108 -0.0055 -0.1890* 0.1447* 1.0000    
PTR 0.1450* 0.2641* -0.8223* 0.2200* 0.3822* 0.0119 -0.0127* -0.0144* -0.0776* -0.0002 0.0321* 1.0000   
NOLPMTF 0.0083 0.0214* -0.4503* 0.0368* 0.0544* 0.0239* -0.0238* -0.0093 0.0310* -0.0424* 0.0391* 0.2999* 1.0000  
CPMTF -0.0307* 0.0171* -0.7991* -0.0007 0.0676* 0.0042 0.0108 -0.0002 0.0306* -0.0506* 0.0330* 0.5333* 0.5619* 1.0000 
Notes: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables. Dependent variables are Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are corporate tax (CTR) and 
personal tax (PTR). Firm-control variables are lagged investment (LINV and LINVP), operating cash flow (CF, Cash and EBITDA), growth opportunities (SalesGrowth), change 
in firm size (ΔSize), and change in debt (Δdebt). The interaction terms are the variable to capture the effects of the taxes on NOL firms (NOLPMTF), and the interactive variable 
controls for the effect of the changes of tax system on capital investment in Canada (CPMTF). Symbol * denotes significant p-value < 0.05. 
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Table 5.7 Pairwise Correlation Analysis in Australia, 1982-1998 
Australia INV INVP CRT LINV LINVP Cash CF EBITDA Sales 
Growth 
ΔSize ΔDebt PTR NOL 
MTF 
CTR 
MTF 
INV  1.0000              
INVP 0.6383* 1.0000             
CRT 0.0849* -0.0023 1.0000            
LINV 0.6202* 0.3207* 0.1685* 1.0000           
LINVP 0.3160* 0.1856* 0.0655* 0.6368* 1.0000          
Cash  0.2671* 0.3336* -0.2247* -0.0164 -0.0520* 1.0000         
CF -0.1346* -0.2393* 0.0469* -0.0129 0.0306 -0.3520* 1.0000        
EBITDA  -0.0705* -0.0170 0.0471* -0.0098 0.0435* -0.2262* 0.5044* 1.0000       
SalesGrowth  -0.0770* -0.1323* 0.0563* -0.0621* -0.1861* -0.0797* -0.1170* -0.1567* 1.0000      
ΔSize 0.3732* 0.7006* -0.1588* 0.0375* 0.0144 0.5898* -0.2546* -0.0626* -0.2700* 1.0000     
ΔDebt 0.1191* 0.2369* 0.0219 0.0508* 0.0485* 0.0217 -0.0105 0.0034 -0.1549* -0.2575* 1.0000    
PTR 0.5073* 0.2691* 0.5102* 0.5654* 0.2987* -0.1031* 0.0743* 0.0811* 0.0432* -0.0322* 0.0011 1.0000   
NOLMTF -0.0465* -0.0297 -0.0297* -0.0452* -0.0260 0.0261 0.0182 0.0058 0.0300 -0.0139 0.0078 -0.0489* 1.0000  
CTRMTF -0.4657* -0.2823* 0.9098* -0.4018* -0.2200* -0.1342* 0.0138 -0.0312* 0.0148 -0.1224* 0.0168 0.3711* -0.0211* 1.0000 
 
Notes: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables. Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are: corporate tax (CTR) 
and personal tax (PTR). Firm-control variables are: lagged investment (LINV and LINVP), operating cash flow (CF, Cash and EBITDA), growth opportunities 
(SalesGrowth), change in firm size (ΔSize) and change in debt (Δdebt). The interaction terms are: the variable to capture the effects of the taxes on net operating loss 
firms (NOLMTF), and the interactive variable controls for the effect of the changes of tax system (from partial to full imputation) on capital investment in Canada 
(CTRMTF). Symbol * denotes significant p-value < 0.05. 
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Table 5.8 Pairwise Correlation Analysis in Taiwan, 1989-2009 
Notes: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for all variables. Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are: corporate tax (CTR) 
and personal tax (PTR). Firm-control variables are: lagged investment (LINV and LINVP), operating cash flow (CF, Cash and EBITDA), growth opportunities 
(SalesGrowth), change in firm size (ΔSize) and change in debt (Δdebt). The interaction terms are: the variable to capture the effects of the taxes on net operating loss 
firms (NOLMTF), and the interactive variable controls for the effect of the changes of tax system (from partial to full imputation) on capital investment in Taiwan 
(CTRMTF). Symbol * denotes significant p-value < 0.05. 
Taiwan INV INVP LINV LINVP Cash CF EBITDA ΔSize Sales 
Growth 
ΔDebt NOL 
MTF 
CTR 
MTF 
INV  1.0000            
INVP 0.8018* 1.0000           
LINV 0.0005 -0.0233* 1.0000          
LINVP -0.0143 -0.0287* 0.8000* 1.0000         
Cash  0.7063* 0.8239* 0.0059 0.0006 1.0000        
CF 0.7211* 0.8455* 0.0102 0.0072 0.7827* 1.0000       
EBITDA  0.5989* 0.6295* -0.0059 -0.0102 0.6393* 0.6844* 1.0000      
ΔSize -0.1839* -0.4052* 0.0831 0.0624* -0.1785* -0.2835* 0.0603* 1.0000     
SalesGrowth -0.5106* -0.5082* -0.0277 0.0082 -0.5149* -0.5237* -0.5452* -0.1014* 1.0000    
ΔDebt -0.0709* -0.2409* 0.0455* 0.0292* -0.1691* -0.3032* -0.1180* 0.4785* 0.0200 1.0000   
NOLMTF -0.0142* -0.0078 -0.0015 0.0038 0.0038* -0.0332* -0.0626* -0.0862* 0.0422* -0.0044 1.0000  
CTRMTF 0.0571* 0.0714* 0.0547* 0.0692* 0.0846* 0.0434* 0.0314* 0.0033 -0.0197 -0.0078 0.3592* 1.0000 
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Table 5.6, Table 5.7, and Table 5.8 show the results of a pairwise correlation 
analysis of the variables being used in the regression model. The purpose is to 
detect multicollinearity which could affect the results of the present study 
(Gujarati 2008). As can be seen from the tables, only LINV has a high negative 
correlation with CPMTF (-0.7991) in Canada (Table 5.6); only CTR has a high 
positive correlation with CTRMTF (0.9098) in Australia (Table 5.7); and only 
INPV is strongly correlated with Cash (0.8239) and CF (0.8455) in Taiwan (Table 
5.8). This suggests that the possible multicollinearity problem could affect the 
efficient estimation of the standard errors in the model. However, if only a few of 
the mentioned variables in the model indicate a high level of correlation, it is not 
necessary to eliminate them from the estimation, because such correlation does 
not disrupt any regression assumptions (Achen 1982). Furthermore, Jugurnath, 
Stewart and Brooks (2008, p. 166) indicate that “the presence of multicollinearity 
does not bias results”, or the multicollinarity does not affect the fitness of the 
model.  
Although high statistical correlations are observed between LINV and CPMTF 
(Canada), as well as between CTR and CTRMTF (Australia), no direction is 
hypothesised for the effects of tax-system changes in the countries where the 
capital-gains taxes are introduced. This could be attributed to the possible 
offsetting effects of dividend imputation and capital-gains taxes. According to 
Black, Legoria and Sellers (2000), high correlation only has meaningful statistical 
information where the imputation-tax system is in place in the absence of capital-
gains taxes.  
The variable for tax integration MTF is not included in the model due to it not 
being statistically significant. Further, the MTF variable alone does not capture the 
entire effect of the introduction of an imputation-tax system due to a change in tax 
rates. This is in line with Schulman et al. (1996) who argue that this variable 
cannot capture the integration. Therefore, the CTRMTF and NOLMTF variables 
are incorporated in the model to evaluate the full effect of the integration. 
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5.7 Regression results 
This section presents the results of the regression models of the relationship 
between taxes and corporate investment, and of the relationship between the shift 
in the tax system and corporate investment. It employs a fixed-effects model. The 
estimation results between taxes and capital investment, as well as between tax-
system changes to imputation and capital investment are presented in Section 
5.7.1, and Section 5.7.2. Section 5.7.3 shows the robustness test for the structural 
breaks, portfolio groups, and the extended the period of time.  
 The effects of taxes on capital investment 5.7.1
Based on the Equation (5.1), the impacts of taxes on corporate capital investment 
in Canada were examined. This section presents the regression results which 
examine Hypotheses 4 which addresses the research question of whether the taxes 
have an impact on a firm’s capital investment in countries where an imputation 
tax system is well-established. Table 5.9 presents the effects of taxes on capital 
investment in Canada, over the period from 1989 to 2015.  
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Table 5.9 The impacts of taxes on capital investment in Canada, 1989 to 2015 
Variable  
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
-2.1137*** 
(-10.8075) 
-0.9608*** 
(-2.8000) 
-1.3308*** 
(-7.5908) 
-0.0037 
(-0.2115) 
0.0384 
(1.4127) 
0.0169 
(1.0453) 
CTR 
-3.2341*** 
(-14.9337) 
-4.3825*** 
(-12.4595) 
-2.5791*** 
(-11.6915) 
-0.2740*** 
(-10.5326) 
-0.3208*** 
(-8.1309) 
-0.2347*** 
(-9.0580) 
PTR 
8.2296*** 
(20.7383) 
6.6864*** 
(9.2787) 
6.0276*** 
(16.9897) 
0.3135*** 
(11.1788) 
0.2604*** 
(5.6649) 
0.2395*** 
(9.3586) 
LINVP 
-0.2494*** 
(-28.9176) 
-0.2423*** 
(-14.9730) 
-0.2116*** 
(-27.2281) 
   
LINV 
   -0.1532*** 
(-11.8823) 
-0.1555*** 
(-7.8267) 
-0.1468*** 
(-11.4024) 
CF 
0.8670*** 
(6.3303) 
  0.0648*** 
(6.9558) 
  
Cash 
 0.0235 
(0.3295) 
  -0.0069 
(-1.0942) 
 
EBITDA 
  0.0814 
(0.9413) 
  -0.0017 
(-0.2672) 
SalesGrowth 
-0.4372*** 
(-10.0594) 
-0.5392*** 
(-9.3626) 
-0.5659*** 
(-11.1361) 
-0.0335*** 
(-10.0046) 
-0.0415*** 
(-9.2542) 
-0.0418*** 
(-10.9251) 
ΔSize 
-0.0710 
(-0.7924) 
-0.0280 
(-0.2164) 
-0.1167 
(-1.1235) 
-0.0083 
(-1.2120) 
-0.0028 
(-0.2894) 
-0.0096 
(-1.3033) 
ΔDebt 
0.1297*** 
(3.0707) 
0.0948* 
(1.7721) 
0.1139** 
(2.3356) 
0.0240*** 
(7.5149) 
0.0228*** 
(5.2927) 
0.0220*** 
(6.3251) 
NOLPMTF 
0.0972*** 
(3.6508) 
0.1359*** 
(4.2893) 
0.1058*** 
(3.6868) 
-0.0024 
(-0.8168) 
0.0019 
(0.5238) 
-0.0021 
(-0.6856) 
CPMTF 
-1.6697*** 
(-25.0363) 
-1.6957*** 
(-16.7730) 
-1.4420*** 
(-21.1347) 
-0.1209*** 
(-15.5662) 
-0.1186*** 
(-10.4390) 
-0.1100*** 
(-13.8379) 
Firm Ffixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 13,363 8,210 13,232 13,363 8,210 13,232 
R-sq 0.235 0.207 0.158 0.174 0.154 0.127 
Adj. R-sq 0.235 0.206 0.158 0.174 0.153 0.127 
Notes: Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are: corporate tax 
(CTR) and personal tax (PTR). Firm-control variables are: lagged investment (LINV and LINVP), 
operating cash flow (CF, Cash and EBITDA), growth opportunities (SalesGrowth), change in firm 
size (ΔSize) and change in debt (Δdebt). The interaction terms are: the variable to capture the 
effects of the taxes on net operating loss firms (NOLPMTF), and the interactive variable controls 
for the effect of the changes of tax system (from partial to full imputation) on capital investment in 
Canada (CPMTF). This table reports the adjusted R
2
 and number of firm-year observations. t 
statistics are given in parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors in parentheses after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 5.9 presents the regression results for Equation (5.1) for the impacts of taxes 
on corporate investment in Canada. The primary variables are corporate tax (CTR) 
and personal tax (PTR). The relationships between the primary variables and 
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INVP are presented in Models (1), (2), and (3). Following the same format, the 
association between the same variables and INV are shown in Models (4), (5), and 
(6). 
The estimated effect of corporate tax rate on corporate investment (INVP) is 
captured by the variable CTR. All estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all models. In Table 5.9 are the coefficient estimates 
between CTR and INVP. Of particular interest, the coefficient estimates of CTR 
are -3.2341 (t-stat=-14.9337), -4.3825 (t-stat=-12.4595), and -2.5791 (t-stat=-
11.6915), respectively. This study obtains a negative and significant coefficient 
for CTR.  
The results for the relationship between corporate tax and corporate investment 
(INV) are consistent with those between CTR and INVP. All estimated coefficients 
are significant at the 1% significance level. Shown in Table 5.9 are the coefficient 
estimates between CTR and INV. These coefficient estimates of CTR are 
negatively significant, -0.2740 (t-stat=-10.5326), -0.3208 (t-stat =-8.1309), and -
0.2347 (t-stat =-9.0580). These results indicate that CTR is negatively correlated 
with corporate investment.  
The estimated effect of the personal tax rate on corporate investment (INVP and 
INV) is captured by the variable PTR. All estimated coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all models. 
As for the tax-rate tax-reform interaction variables, note that although these 
variables are included in the model, their impacts are not the main focus for 
Canada. The first variable, CPMTF, measured by the interaction between CTR 
and MTP, represents the effects of the changes of tax system on capital investment 
(INVP, INV). The results show that the coefficients of CPMTF are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for all regressions. The second variable, 
NOLPMTF, represents the impacts of the changing tax system on firms with an 
operating loss. The coefficients of NOLPMTF are positive and significant at the 
1% level for regressions (1) to (3), but not for regressions (4) to (6). These 
findings show that the change of tax system from partial to full imputation has a 
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positive impact on corporate investment for NOL firms. It can be deduced from 
this result that the imputation tax system has resulted in a lower marginal tax rate 
for NOL firms in Canada. 
As for the control variables, the results are mostly consistent with theory and 
existing research (Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000; Becker, Jacob & Jacob 2013). 
The coefficient estimates of SalesGrowth in all regressions are negatively 
significant at the 1% level. By contrast, ΔDebt is positively significant at the 1% 
level from Models (1), (4), (5), and (6). The results for CF are positive significant 
impact on both INV and INVP. Finally, LINV and LINVP are negatively 
significant at the 1% level for corporate investment. This provides some evidence 
that financial leverage has influenced corporate capital investment in Canada. 
Overall, these results show that both CTR and CPMTF are negatively correlated 
with corporate investment. However, PTR is positively correlated with corporate 
investment. The outcomes indicate that an increase in corporate tax might cause a 
decrease in corporate investment. Personal tax promotes higher corporate 
investment for the well-established imputation period in Canada. When personal 
tax rises, shareholders may not prefer dividend payments, which could instead 
provide more retained earnings for investment. These findings provide support for 
Hypothesis 4 in that taxes have a significant impact on a firm’s capital investment 
in Canada’s well-established imputation tax regime. However, the results indicate 
a decrease in capital investment for the whole study period. This is contrary to 
what would be expected, which is that corporate investment would increase in a 
well-established imputation tax system (Becker, Jacob & Jacob 2013). 
The focus on the effects of taxes in Canada is emphasised by eliminating the year 
2009 in the additional test. There are valid reasons for doing this. First, 2009 is the 
year when Canada changed its tax regime. Second, following Canada’s switch to 
full-imputation, there was a coincidental decrease in corporate investment, which 
was expected as the consequence of the global financial crisis. Third, higher 
provincial corporate income tax rates (despite the decrease in federal corporate tax 
rate) and a higher personal tax rate were recorded after 2009, particularly after 
2012 (Bazel & Mintz 2016). For these reasons, the data for Canada are divided 
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into two periods: pre-2009 and post-2009, and 2009 is eliminated from the data to 
diminish the effects that the financial crisis may have had on corporate investment 
in Canada. 
Table 5.10 The impacts of taxes on capital investment in Canada before 2009 
Before 2009 
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
-3.7672*** 
(-15.7121) 
-3.6485*** 
(-9.5430) 
-3.3716*** 
(-16.3391) 
-0.1732*** 
(-9.6526) 
-0.1834*** 
(-6.3787) 
-0.1652*** 
(-10.0810) 
CTR 
1.4295*** 
(-4.6311) 
1.5228*** 
(-2.6614) 
1.6922*** 
(-5.5173) 
0.1351*** 
(-5.0272) 
0.1668*** 
(-3.6788) 
0.1439*** 
(-5.4656) 
PTR 
7.9192*** 
(-16.5477) 
7.7296*** 
(-10.3823) 
6.9154*** 
(-18.3158) 
0.3619*** 
(-11.4758) 
0.3711*** 
(-7.2671) 
0.3393*** 
(-12.4223) 
NOL 
0.1039* 
(-1.7649) 
0.1073 
(-1.0965) 
0.1393** 
(-2.2216) 
0.0078* 
(-1.6714) 
-0.0087 
(-1.1724) 
-0.0054 
(-1.1716) 
LINVP 
-0.2141*** 
(-18.4633) 
-0.2461*** 
(-13.1888) 
-0.2078*** 
(-22.2477) 
   
LINV 
   -0.1938*** 
(-13.6068) 
-0.2331*** 
(-9.5721) 
-0.2026*** 
(-14.7748) 
CF 
2.4464*** 
(7.5372) 
  0.1557*** 
(6.9090) 
  
Cash 
 0.0221 
(0.1285) 
  -0.0059 
(-0.4159) 
 
EBITDA 
  -0.1669 
(-0.6661) 
  -0.0129 
(-0.7925) 
Salesgrowth 
-0.7714*** 
(-8.3102) 
-1.1053*** 
(-8.9006) 
-1.1193*** 
(-10.9773) 
-0.0497*** 
(-7.6572) 
-0.0712*** 
(-7.6703) 
-0.0705*** 
(-10.0093) 
ΔSize 
-0.0499 
(-0.2760) 
-0.0074 
(-0.0289) 
0.0129 
(0.0641) 
-0.0092 
(-0.7438) 
0.0023 
(0.1267) 
-0.0024 
(-0.1809) 
ΔDebt 
0.2519*** 
(3.0977) 
0.0997 
(0.8229) 
0.1273 
(1.3699) 
0.0312*** 
(5.4129) 
0.0265*** 
(2.8733) 
0.0234*** 
(3.8213) 
Firm fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 7,352 4,251 7,602 7,325 4,251 7,602 
Adj. R-sq 0.405 0.285 0.248 0.366 0.243 0.212 
Notes: Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are: corporate tax 
(CTR), personal tax (PTR) and net operating loss (NOL). The study period is between 1989 and 
2015. This table also reports the adjusted R
2
 and number of firm-year observations. t statistics are 
given in parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in 
parentheses after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.11. The impacts of taxes on corporate investment in Canada after 
2009 
After 2009 
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
12.8277*** 
(22.0536) 
7.4256*** 
(54.9317) 
13.1681*** 
(21.7445) 
0.8235*** 
(9.2192) 
0.5133*** 
(5.3805) 
0.8625*** 
(9.2848) 
CTR 
-30.305*** 
(-32.042) 
-33.745*** 
(-1.4e+02) 
-30.588*** 
(-32.079) 
-1.6344*** 
(-11.316) 
-1.418*** 
(-9.573) 
-1.6915*** 
(-11.443) 
PTR 
-7.9651*** 
(-8.023) 
5.6874*** 
(-30.62) 
-8.5229*** 
(-8.085) 
-0.6773*** 
(-5.782) 
-0.149*** 
(-1.171) 
-0.7260*** 
(-5.902) 
NOL 
-0.0169 
(-0.361) 
-0.0314*** 
(-3.400) 
-0.0017 
(-0.251) 
-0.0064* 
(-1.688) 
-0.0024 
(-0.656) 
-0.0063 
(-1.595) 
LINVP 
-0.3249*** 
(-17.3627) 
-0.5342*** 
(-1.2e+02) 
-0.3238*** 
(-16.7456) 
   
LINV    
-0.0523* 
(-1.9295) 
-0.0596** 
(-2.1326) 
-0.0541* 
(-1.9553) 
CF 
-0.0706 
(-1.0708) 
  
0.0084 
(1.5328) 
  
Cash  
0.0032 
(0.3243) 
  
-0.0103* 
(-1.8411) 
 
EBITDA   
0.0495 
(1.2749) 
  
-0.0092* 
(-1.7583) 
Salesgrowth 
-0.0051 
(-0.1645) 
-0.0170*** 
(-3.3944) 
0.0096 
(0.3098) 
-0.0074* 
(-1.8539) 
-0.010*** 
(-3.2748) 
-0.0055 
(-1.3969) 
ΔSize 
-0.2978*** 
(-4.6345) 
-0.0061 
(-0.6013) 
-0.2888*** 
(-4.1987) 
-0.0218*** 
(-2.8664) 
-0.0096 
(-1.4354) 
-0.0202*** 
(-2.7134) 
ΔDebt 
0.0300 
(1.0741) 
0.0224*** 
(4.4146) 
0.0190 
(0.6099) 
0.0167*** 
(5.4025) 
0.0117*** 
(4.5505) 
0.0148*** 
(4.4219) 
Firm fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 5,046 3,367 4,718 5,046 3,367 4,718 
Adj. R-sq 0.096 0.848 0.092 0.066 0.115 0.059 
Notes: Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are: corporate tax 
(CTR), personal tax (PTR) and net operating loss (NOL). The study period is between 1989 and 
2015. This table also reports the adjusted R
2
 and number of firm-year observations. t statistics are 
given in parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in 
parentheses after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Results in Table 5.10 and Table 5.11 provide evidence that taxes had a different 
impact on Canadian firms in the periods before and after 2009. This study finds a 
positive relationship between corporate investment and each of the following 
variables: corporate tax (CTR), personal tax (PTR), and net operating loss (NOL) 
before 2009. Before 2009, these coefficients are positively significant. These 
outcomes are consistent with Hypothesis 4.1, except that the positive impacts of 
146 
 
dividend imputation exceed the negative impacts of the new capital gains tax; and 
that corporate capital investment will increase in a well-established imputation tax 
system. These results are consistent with Becker, Jacob and Jacob (2013) who 
suggest that tax has a positive impact on corporate investment. In addition, as 
expected, there is evidence that after 2009 Canada experienced negatively 
significant relationships among corporate tax (CTR), personal tax (PTR), net 
operating loss (NOL), and corporate investment (INVP, INV). The results support 
Hypothesis 4.2 that if the negative effects of the new capital gains tax exceed the 
positive effects of dividend imputation, then corporate capital investment will 
decrease in an imputation tax system. 
Overall, these results are evidence of a relationship between taxes and capital 
investment in Canada, with a well-established imputation tax system. The findings 
demonstrate that taxes are one of the important driving forces of corporate capital 
investment in Canada. These findings provide support for Hypothesis 4 that taxes 
had a significant impact on corporate capital investment in Canada during the 
imputation tax regime period.  
 The effects of tax-system changes on capital investment 5.7.2
This section first presents the relationship between the tax-system changes and 
capital investment in Australia; then it shows the relationship between the tax-
system changes and capital investment in Taiwan. The findings are that a firm’s 
corporate investment increases when an imputation tax system is introduced in 
these two countries. 
5.7.2.1 The effects of tax-system changes on capital investment in Australia 
Based on Equation (5.2), the effect of a tax-system change on a firm’s corporate 
investment in Australia was investigated. This section presents the effects of a tax-
system change on capital investment in Australia from 1982 to 1998, thus 
examining Hypotheses 5 on whether the implementation of an imputation tax 
system integrated with a capital gains tax would have an impact on corporate 
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capital investment in firms. Table 5.12 shows the main findings regarding such 
impacts. 
Table 5.12 Firm investment and tax-system changes, Australia, 1982 to 1998 
Variable  
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
0.7560 
(0.9221) 
1.1019 
(1.3126) 
0.4203 
(0.3899) 
1.1925*** 
(3.7580) 
1.2467*** 
(4.5167) 
0.8953** 
(2.5563) 
CTR 
17.6087*** 
(19.5254) 
17.455*** 
(19.1192) 
17.5899*** 
(19.3315) 
12.486*** 
(18.6301) 
12.7135*** 
(19.7121) 
12.4555*** 
(18.4646) 
PTR 
-2.1096  
(-1.0699) 
-2.4605 
(-1.2655) 
-1.3735 
(-0.5949) 
-1.5337** 
(-2.0909) 
-1.8689*** 
(-2.9359) 
-1.1049 
(-1.4618) 
LINVP 
-0.0055  
(-0.2122) 
-0.0100 
(-0.3529) 
-0.0063 
(-0.2285) 
   
LINV 
   0.1816*** 
(3.7909) 
0.1807*** 
(3.8530) 
0.1908*** 
(3.8958) 
CF 
-0.0501*** 
(-0.8510) 
  0.0144 
(0.9017) 
  
Cash 
 -0.1057 
(-1.1603) 
  0.0609** 
(2.0303) 
 
EBITDA 
  0.0350 
(0.3575) 
  0.0487 
(1.5714) 
Salesgrowth 
0.0144 
(0.8850) 
0.0173 
(1.1156) 
0.0173 
(1.0256) 
-0.0092 
(-1.2635) 
-0.0094 
(-1.3275) 
-0.0071 
(-0.9483) 
ΔSize 
0.8065*** 
(12.1938) 
0.859*** 
(12.1908) 
0.7921*** 
(12.5561) 
0.1753*** 
(7.0133) 
0.1479*** 
(6.0119) 
0.1679*** 
(6.7809) 
ΔDebt 
0.0217 
(0.2929) 
-0.0169 
(-0.2344) 
0.0356 
(0.4850) 
0.0084 
(0.2602) 
0.0239 
(0.7467) 
0.0086 
(0.2651) 
NOLMTF 
0.0293 
(1.0273) 
0.0380 
(1.3046) 
0.0385 
(1.2993) 
0.0386* 
(1.9242) 
0.0336* 
(1.7611) 
0.0397* 
(1.9545) 
CTRMTF 
-16.6880*** 
(-28.4574) 
-17.00*** 
(-25.924) 
-16.738*** 
(-23.6450) 
-13.589*** 
(-18.4562) 
-13.553*** 
(-18.9526) 
-13.315*** 
(-17.8085) 
Firm fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 2,275 2,271 2,278 2,240 2,237 2,244 
R-sq 0.622 0.624 0.620 0.730 0.734 0.732 
Adj. R-sq 0.620 0.622 0.619 0.729 0.733 0.731 
Notes: Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are: corporate tax 
(CTR) and personal tax (PTR). The rate-tax reform variables are: the variable to capture the effects 
of the taxes on net operating loss firms (NOLMTF), and the interactive variable controls for the 
effect of the changes of tax system (from classical to full imputation) on capital investment in 
Australia (CTRMTF). Firm-control variables are: lagged investment (LINV and LINVP), operating 
cash flow (CF, Cash, and EBITDA), growth opportunities (SalesGrowth), change in firm size 
(ΔSize) and change in debt (Δdebt). This table also reports the adjusted R2 and number of firm-year 
observations. t statistics are given in parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors in parentheses after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.12 reports the regression results of Equation (5.2) including the effects of 
the tax-regime changes on corporate investment in Australia. The variables of 
primary interest are corporate tax (CTR), personal tax (PTR), the interaction 
between corporate tax and the changes of the tax system (CTRMTF), and the 
interaction between NOL firms and the tax-system change (NOLMTF). The 
relationships between these variables and corporate investment (INVP) are 
presented in Models (1), (2), and (3). In the same way, the associations between 
these variables and corporate investment (INV) are shown in Models (4), (5), and 
(6). 
The estimated effect of the corporate tax rate on corporate investment (INVP) 
prior to integration is captured by the variable CTR. All estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant at the conventional 1% level in all models.  Table 5.11 
contains the coefficient estimates between CTR and INVP. In particular, the 
coefficient estimates of CTR for INVP are 17.6087 (t-stat = 19.5254), 17.455 (t-
stat = 19.1192), and 17.5899 (t-stat = 19.3315). This study obtains a positive and 
significant coefficient for CTR. The adjusted R
2
 is relatively high at around 62 per 
cent. 
The results for the relationship between corporate tax and corporate investment 
(INV) are consistent with those between CTR and INVP. All estimated coefficients 
are statistically significant at the conventional 1% level in all models. In Table 
5.12 are the coefficient estimates between CTR and INV. The coefficient estimates 
of CTR are positively significant: 12.486 (t-stat = 18.6301), 12.7135 (t-stat = 
19.7121), and 12.4555 (t-stat = 18.4646). These results also indicate that CTR is 
positively correlated with corporate investment. The results show that the adjusted 
R
2
 is relatively high, at around 73 per cent. 
The estimated effect of the personal tax rate on corporate investment (INVP and 
INV) is captured by the variable PTR. The estimated coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level in the model in column (4), and at the 1% 
level in column (5). The coefficient estimates of PTR are -1.5337 (t-stat = -
2.0909), and -1.8689 (t-stat = -2.9359). 
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CTRMTF, measured by the interaction between CTR and MTP, represents the 
effects of the adoption of an imputation tax system on capital investment (INVP). 
The coefficient estimates of CTRMTF for INVP are -16.6880 (t-stat = -28.4574), -
17.00 (t-stat = -25.924), and -16.738 (t-stat = -23.6450). The coefficient of 
CTRMTF is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for all 
regressions. These results indicate that the adoption of imputation is negatively 
associated with corporate investment. Similarly, the coefficient estimates of 
CTRMTF for INV are -13.589 (t-stat = -18.4562), -13.553 (t-stat = -18.9526), and 
-13.315 (t-stat = -17.8085), in columns (4) to (6). The coefficients of CTRMTF 
are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level for all regressions.  
NOLMTF captures the effect of an integration of an imputation tax regime on 
capital investment for firms with an operating loss in a particular year. The 
coefficients of NOLMTF are positive and significant for regressions (4) to (6), but 
not for regressions (1) to (3). These findings indicate that the changes of the tax 
system had a positive impact on corporate investment for NOL firms. This 
suggests that firms with NOLs undertook more capital investment after the 
introduction of dividend imputation in Australia. The results show that firms with 
NOL increase capital investment. These firms might move capital expenses into 
the profit and loss statement (in order to reduce income) so that they have 
liquidity for predetermined investment decisions. It is possible that the present 
research cannot verify or refute this with the available data; it is a potential topic 
for future research. 
Overall, corporate investment (INVP and INV) is positively and significantly 
correlated to corporate tax (CTR) at the 1% level, and negatively and significantly 
correlated with CTRMTF at the 1% level for all regressions in Models (1) to (6). 
The opposite signs of CTR and CTRMTF for Australia indicate that the tax-rate 
effects reduced the response of firms to the introduction of an imputation tax 
system. A possible explanation for this is that firms provide investor returns in the 
form of capital gains, and that the imputation in Australia was accompanied by the 
tax on capital gains. These findings support Hypothesis 5 in that the introduction 
of an imputation tax system and a capital gains tax had a significant impact on 
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capital investment. They are in line with Black, Legoria and Sellers (2000), who 
support the view that there is an effect of dividend imputation and capital gains 
tax on corporate capital investment when the tax system changes. Further, PTR is 
not statistically significant; however, NOLMTF is positively significant for NOL 
firms. 
It can be inferred from these results that the integration of dividend imputation in 
Australia had an overall positive effect on corporate investment. In other words, 
the results support Hypothesis 5.1 that, if the positive impacts of dividend 
imputation exceed the negative impacts of the new capital gains tax, corporate 
capital investment would increase in Australian firms post-implementation of an 
imputation tax system. The outcomes are consistent with Jugurnath, Stewart and 
Brooks (2008), which suggests that when the tax system changed in Australia, 
there was a positive effect of dividend imputation on firms’ capital investment 
that exceeds any negative effects of a new capital gains tax. 
For the impacts of control variables on capital investment, the results are mostly 
consistent with existing research (Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000; Becker, Jacob & 
Jacob 2013). The coefficient estimates of ΔSize are positively significant at the 
1% level for all regressions. CF and Cash are positive and are likely to have a less 
significant impact on INV and on INVP when compared to the remaining control 
variables. LINV is positive and significant at the 1% level for corporate 
investment, but LINVP is not significant for corporate investment. Overall, ΔSize, 
CF, and Cash are positive and significant in explaining corporate investment 
within a firm. The positive significant result for cash flow after the introduction of 
dividend imputation indicates that there were increased revenues under the 
imputation system in the Australian economy. This supports the conclusions in  
Pattenden (2006). The results imply that an increase in ΔSize together with a rise 
in operating cash flow (CF and Cash) is expected to be associated with increasing 
capital investment. 
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5.7.2.2 The effects of tax-system changes on capital investment in Taiwan—
1989 to 2009 
The impacts of tax-system changes on corporate investment in Taiwan are 
examined based on Equation (5.2). This section presents the effects of tax-system 
changes on capital investment in Taiwan), thus examining Hypothesis 6 which 
addresses the question of whether the implementation of an imputation tax system 
in Taiwan would have a positive impact on corporate capital investment. 
Table 5.13 presents findings for Taiwan on the impacts of the implementation of 
an imputation tax regime on capital investment from 1989 to2009.  
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Table 5.13 Firm investment and tax-system changes in Taiwan—1989 to 2009 
Variable  
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
-0.8093*** 
(-5.2245) 
-0.5221*** 
(-3.5167) 
-1.3033*** 
(-7.3732) 
-0.0102 
(-1.0984) 
0.0033 
(0.1654) 
-0.0290*** 
(-2.7645) 
CTR -  -  -  -  -  -  
PTR -  -  -  -  -  -  
LINVP 
-0.0290*** 
(-8.5183) 
-0.0354*** 
(-9.1685) 
-0.0253*** 
(-6.2023) 
   
LINV 
   -0.0370*** 
(-9.7168) 
-0.0431*** 
(-4.8819) 
-0.0283*** 
(-5.7851) 
CF 
16.2251*** 
(-27.8213) 
  0.6817*** 
(-13.5131) 
  
Cash 
 23.3879*** 
(26.7212) 
  0.9539*** 
(41.8232) 
 
EBITDA 
  4.4438*** 
(-6.9759) 
  0.2064*** 
(-5.2106) 
SalesGrowth 
-4.2989*** 
(-6.7028) 
-6.3826*** 
(-9.0817) 
-7.0486*** 
(-7.8225) 
-0.2016*** 
(-5.0083) 
-0.3145*** 
(-21.9790) 
-0.2905*** 
(-5.3863) 
ΔSize 
-11.3974*** 
(-10.3245) 
-13.499*** 
(-12.6404) 
-19.427*** 
(-19.1074) 
-0.1999*** 
(-2.8761) 
-0.2898*** 
(-12.9420) 
-0.5458*** 
(-8.9369) 
ΔDebt 
2.8233*** 
(-3.44) 
0.7190 
(0.7839) 
1.8634* 
(-1.9033) 
0.2125*** 
(-4.0863) 
0.1254*** 
(7.3324) 
0.1812*** 
(-3.2193) 
NOLMTF 
 
0.6179*** 
(-3.7687) 
0.6128* 
(1.9331) 
0.6103*** 
(-3.3101) 
0.0395*** 
(-4.5963) 
0.0494*** 
(3.1175) 
0.0391*** 
(-4.0911) 
CTRMTF 
 
3.8998*** 
(-6.2292) 
4.0665*** 
(6.0259) 
6.7416*** 
(-8.5044) 
0.0318 
(-0.7862) 
0.0065 
(0.0751) 
0.1369*** 
(-2.8107) 
Firm fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 9,168 4,338 9,037 9,168 4,338 9,037 
R-sq 0.799 0.810 0.705 0.593 0.588 0.536 
Adj. R-sq 0.799 0.810 0.704 0.593 0.526 0.536 
Notes: Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are: corporate tax 
(CTR) and personal tax (PTR). The rate-tax reform variables are: the variable to capture the effects 
of the taxes on net operating loss firms (NOLMTF), and the interactive variable controls for the 
effect of the changes of tax system (from classical to full imputation) on capital investment in 
Australia (CTRMTF). Firm-control variables are: lagged investment (LINV and LINVP), operating 
cash flow (CF, Cash and EBITDA), growth opportunities (SalesGrowth), change in firm size 
(ΔSize) and change in debt (Δdebt). This table also reports the adjusted R2 and number of firm-year 
observations. t statistics are given in parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors in parentheses after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 5.13 reports the regression results for the examination of the effects of the 
tax-regime change on corporate investment in Taiwan. The main variables are 
CTRMTF and NOLMTF. The relationships between those two variables and INVP 
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are presented in Models (1), (2), and (3). In the same way, the impacts between 
the same variables and INV are shown in Models (4), (5), and (6). 
The estimated impacts of the tax-system change on capital investment (INVP) 
after the integration are measured by CTRMTF. The coefficients of CTRMTF are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This is not for the same variables and INV.  
Table 5.9 reports that the coefficient estimates of CTRMTF for INVP are 3.8998 
(t-stat=-6.2292), 4.0665 (t-stat=6.0259), 6.7416 (t-stat=-8.5044), from columns 
(1) to (3); and Column (6) with 0.1369 (t-stat=-2.8107). These results show that 
the adoption of imputation is positively correlated with corporate investment. The 
adjusted R
2
 is relatively high, from 52 per cent to 81 per cent. This indicates that 
the changes of tax system in Taiwan had a positive impact on capital investment. 
NOLMTF represents the effects of the adoption of an imputation tax system on 
capital investment (INVP) for NOL firms. The coefficient estimates of NOLMTF 
for INVP are 0.6179 (t-stat=-3.7687), 0.6128 (t-stat=1.9331), and 0.6103 (t-stat=-
3.3101). The coefficient of NOLMTF is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level for the regressions, except for the regression in column (2), which is 
significant at the 5% level. These results indicate that the adoption of imputation 
is positively correlated with corporate investment for NOL firms. 
Similarly, the coefficient estimates of NOLMTF for INV are 0.0395 (t-stat=-
4.5963), 0.0494 (t-stat=3.1175), and 0.0391 (t-stat=-4.0911), respectively. The 
coefficients of NOLMTF are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level 
for all regressions. These results report that the change of tax system is positively 
related to corporate investment for NOL firms. 
It is important to note that CRT and PTR are not included in these models because 
their values do not change during the period of study. Further investigation of 
these variables is discussed in Section 5.7.3 on the Robustness test for an extended 
time period—from 1989 to 2015. 
Overall, corporate investment (INVP and INV) is positively and significantly 
correlated with CTRMTF at the 1% level from Models (1) to (3) and Model (6), 
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and positively and significantly connected with NOLMTF at the 1% level for all 
regressions from Models (1) to (6) (except Model (2)). CTRMTF and NOLMTF 
for Taiwan have the same signs, indicating that the change of tax system has 
significant impacts on corporate investment. This supports the idea that there was 
an increase in corporate investment after the tax reform. These findings support 
Hypothesis 6. They are consistent with Chan and Lin (2017) for Taiwan, thus 
supporting the view that the shift of tax system had a significant impact on 
corporate capital investment. It is likely that the change of tax system to an 
imputation one encouraged the increase in capital investment. 
For the impacts of control variables on capital investment, the results are mostly 
consistent with the literature (Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000; Becker, Jacob & 
Jacob 2013). The coefficient estimates of SalesGrowth and ΔSize in all 
regressions are negative and significant at the 1% level. ΔDebt is positive and 
significant at the 1% level (except Model (2) and Model (3). CF, Cash, and 
EBITDA are positive and significant at the 1% level. LINVP and LINV are 
negative and significant at the 1% level. Overall, ΔDebt, CF, Cash, and EBITDA 
are positive and significant in explaining corporate investment within a firm. The 
positive significance of cash flow after the integration supports the conclusions 
drawn from the increased importance of revenue when the Taiwanese tax system 
became well-established after the financial crisis in Asia. Similar to the findings 
for Australia, this makes economic sense, in that a rise in operating cash flow (CF, 
Cash, and EBITDA) would be expected to be associated with increasing capital 
investment. 
 Robustness tests 5.7.3
This section provides three robustness evaluations to assess the reliability of the 
results. First, the structural break is tested. Second, firms that pay dividends and 
firms that do not (portfolio regressions) are partitioned. Third, the results are 
checked by extending the periods of study.  
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5.7.3.1 Test for structural changes 
Since this research examines the impacts of the tax shift on corporate capital 
investment, the tests for structural breaks are appropriate. In particular, the effects 
of a tax-system change on corporate investment between the periods of pre- and 
post- the shift to imputation in Australia and Taiwan were tested.  
The presence of a change in the data is called a ‘structural break’ and can be 
categorised by the change in the parameters of the model. Here, the Chow test was 
used to examine whether the structural break is significant or not. The test results 
are that a structural break is significant at the 1% level for both Australia and 
Taiwan. Therefore, this study rejects the null hypothesis that ‘there is no break 
point’. This means that the change of tax system had significant impacts on 
corporate investment in Australia and in Taiwan. Further results and details are 
presented in Appendix 5.1 and Appendix 5.2. 
5.7.3.2 Portfolio regressions 
The present study further examines the relationship between dividend imputation 
and capital gains by dividing each country’s sample into firms with dividend 
payouts and those without (Black, Legoria & Sellers 2000). Because Canada and 
Australia introduced capital gains taxes along with dividend imputation, the 
sample divisions assist in separating the combined effects of dividend imputation 
and capital gains taxes. This allows us to test Hypothesis 4.1  that if the positive 
impacts of dividend imputation exceed the negative impacts of the capital gains 
tax, corporate capital investment would increase in Canadian firms under a well-
established imputation tax system. This allows us to test Hypothesis 4.2 that if the 
negative effects of the capital gains tax exceed the positive effects of dividend 
imputation, corporate capital investment would decrease in Canadian firms under 
a well-established imputation tax system.  
The examination of these two groups provides clarification on the separate 
impacts of dividend imputation and a capital gains tax on capital investment. The 
robustness test allows us to test Hypothesis 5 that the implementation of an 
imputation tax system, integrated with a capital gains tax, would have an impact 
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on corporate capital investment in Australian firms. It provides for further 
understanding of the separate impacts of the introduction of dividend imputation 
and of capital gains tax on capital investment in Australia. This robustness test 
does not include Taiwan, because the implementation of imputation there was not 
accompanied by the introduction of a capital gains tax. Another reason for this is 
that corporate tax (CTR) and personal tax (PTR) are constant over the period of 
study.  
On the one hand, a firm not paying dividends would be unaffected by shareholder-
level taxes on dividends, but would be affected by capital gains taxes. On the 
other hand, a firm providing all of its returns to shareholders in the form of 
dividends would only be influenced by dividend imputation, but not by capital 
gains taxes. 
5.7.3.2.1 Canada 
Table 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17 present the results of robustness tests for the 
relationship between corporate tax (CTR) and corporate investment, as well as 
between personal tax (PTR) and corporate investment in firms paying dividends. 
These are the supplement tests supporting the main test in which the results are 
displayed in Table 5.10. Results from Table 5.14 to Table 5.17 show that tax 
dividend imputation influenced Canadian firms differently. Before and after 2009 
in Canada, this study finds a relationship between corporate tax (CTR) and 
corporate investment and between personal tax (PTR) and corporate investment in 
the firms paying dividends. For firms not paying dividends, these coefficients are 
less significant. These findings are consistent with expectations that dividend 
imputation will provide a lower cost of capital for firms paying dividends, while 
the capital gains tax will result in an increased cost of capital for firms not paying 
dividends. As predicted, there is weak evidence that Canadian firms not paying 
dividends have a less significant relationship between CTR and corporate 
investment, and between PTR and corporate investment. This supports the idea 
that the Canadian firms not paying dividends would be more strongly influenced 
by the capital gains tax and less by dividend imputation. It is interesting to note 
that the findings for these variables are in opposite directions between ‘before 
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2009’ and ‘after 2009’. This apparently contradictory result may be due to the 
relationship between dividend imputation and a capital-gains tax. Before 2009, the 
positive impacts of dividend imputation exceeded the negative impacts of the new 
capital-gains tax; therefore, corporate capital investment increases in a well-
established imputation-tax system. After 2009, the negative effects of the new 
capital-gains tax exceed the positive effects of dividend imputation; and corporate 
capital investment decreases in an imputation-tax system. 
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Table 5.14 Samples for Canadian firms paying and not paying dividends 
before 2009 
 
Paying 
dividends 
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
-2.8654*** 
(-9.8828) 
-2.8619*** 
(-5.5852) 
-2.9525*** 
(-11.4754) 
-0.1547*** 
(-7.0128) 
-0.1546*** 
(-4.4824) 
-0.1660*** 
(-7.7395) 
CTR 
0.5965 
(1.4233) 
1.0864 
(1.2652) 
1.4785*** 
(3.6165) 
0.0919*** 
(2.6509) 
0.1150* 
(1.8913) 
0.1322*** 
(3.8072) 
PTR 
6.4210*** 
(10.6809) 
6.4127*** 
(6.5802) 
6.2268*** 
(12.9330) 
0.3232*** 
(8.2889) 
0.3252*** 
(5.4601) 
0.3347*** 
(9.7246) 
NOL 
0.2064 
(1.5342) 
0.1451 
(1.1831) 
0.1179 
(1.0405) 
0.0006 
(0.0705) 
-0.0009 
(-0.0981) 
-0.0044 
(-0.6213) 
LINVP 
-0.1941*** 
(-11.6862) 
-0.2219*** 
(-8.7325) 
-0.1994*** 
(-14.7003) 
   
LINV 
   -0.1936*** 
(-10.0844) 
-0.2316*** 
(-7.4966) 
-0.2081*** 
(-11.4455) 
CF 
3.0022*** 
(5.1074) 
  0.1802*** 
(4.7671) 
  
Cash 
 -0.2274 
(-0.5053) 
  -0.0137 
(-0.4358) 
 
EBITDA 
  -0.6067 
(-1.2189) 
  -0.0273 
(-0.8746) 
Salesgrowth 
-0.7658*** 
(-4.3255) 
-1.1028*** 
(-4.3565) 
-1.1975*** 
(-6.3906) 
-0.0417*** 
(-3.3238) 
-0.0612*** 
(-3.5590) 
-0.0655*** 
(-5.2484) 
ΔSize 
0.3130 
(1.0011) 
0.3128 
(0.6843) 
0.3492 
(1.0186) 
0.0268 
(1.3503) 
0.0423 
(1.4990) 
0.0287 
(1.3689) 
ΔDebt 
0.3203** 
(2.2638) 
-0.0969 
(-0.4777) 
0.1908 
(1.1928) 
0.0219** 
(2.4319) 
-0.0030 
(-0.2214) 
0.0160* 
(1.6886) 
Firm fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 3,380 1,889 3,682 3,380 1,889 3,682 
Adj. R-sq 0.431 0.224 0.238 0.372 0.219 0.208 
Notes: Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are: corporate tax 
(CTR), personal tax (PTR) and net operating loss (NOL). The study period is between 1989 and 
2015. This table also reports the adjusted R
2
 and number of firm-year observations. t statistics are 
given in parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in 
parentheses after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.15 Samples for Canadian firms paying and not paying dividends 
before 2009 
 
Not paying 
dividends 
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
-0.0939 
(-0.0892) 
-6.4203* 
(-1.8320) 
-6.2876** 
(-2.1099) 
0.0602 
(0.7519) 
-0.2083 
(-1.4866) 
-0.2281 
(-1.5694) 
CTR 
0.4485 
(0.2851) 
1.7471 
(0.2520) 
10.1517** 
(2.0448) 
-0.0121 
(-0.0864) 
0.1263 
(0.4137) 
0.3994 
(1.5955) 
PTR 
0.0703 
(0.0494) 
14.5956*** 
(3.7151) 
6.4708** 
(2.2794) 
-0.0996 
(-1.3338) 
0.4228*** 
(4.0480) 
0.2301* 
(1.7713) 
NOL 
0.1179 
(1.0450) 
0.1451 
(1.1831) 
0.2064 
(1.5342) 
0.0006 
(0.0705) 
-0.0009 
(-0.0981) 
-0.0044 
(-0.6213) 
LINVP 
-0.0432 
(-0.7399) 
 
-0.3854*** 
(-3.5884) 
-0.1570** 
(-2.5540) 
   
LINV 
   -0.0312 
(-0.4696) 
-0.3227*** 
(-7.6413) 
-0.1266* 
(-1.8320) 
CF 
9.2735*** 
(8.9664) 
  0.4496*** 
(7.6852) 
  
Cash 
 4.1115* 
(1.9597) 
  0.1182 
(0.9733) 
 
EBITDA 
  0.9589 
(0.4592) 
  0.1005 
(0.7717) 
Salesgrowth 
-0.3376 
(-0.8076) 
-1.3522 
(-1.3735) 
-2.1254*** 
(-3.0721) 
-0.0325 
(-1.2979) 
-0.0862* 
(-1.9211) 
-0.1124*** 
(-3.0248) 
ΔSize 
-1.9339*** 
(-2.9861) 
1.3680 
(0.6314) 
-2.5721** 
(-2.3249) 
-0.1433*** 
(-4.6677) 
0.0305 
(0.3878) 
-0.1470** 
(-2.5949) 
ΔDebt 
-0.2162 
(-0.4407) 
-1.9474 
(-1.0231) 
-0.5932 
(-0.6941) 
-0.0116 
(-0.3884) 
-0.0485 
(-0.5468) 
-0.0208 
(-0.7018) 
Firm fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 273 171 342 273 171 342 
Adj. R-sq 0.797 0.426 0.350 0.646 0.366 0.314 
Notes: Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are: corporate tax 
(CTR), personal tax (PTR) and net operating loss (NOL). The study period is between 1989 and 
2015. This table also reports the adjusted R
2
 and number of firm-year observations. t statistics are 
given in parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in 
parentheses after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.16 Samples for Canadian firms paying dividends after 2009 
 
Paying 
dividends 
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
11.7463*** 
(13.4215) 
7.5498*** 
(39.3778) 
12.1210*** 
(12.8005) 
0.6217*** 
(5.1073) 
0.3527*** 
(2.7606) 
0.7091*** 
(5.8333) 
CTR 
-31.6280*** 
(-22.4417) 
-33.7714** 
(-95.7634) 
-32.3486*** 
(-23.6021) 
-1.3719*** 
(-6.4071) 
-1.0936*** 
(-4.8996) 
-1.4641*** 
(-6.8506) 
PTR 
-4.8873*** 
(-3.3885) 
5.4098*** 
(21.3978) 
-5.2385*** 
(-3.3142) 
-0.4176*** 
(-2.9467) 
-0.0122 
(-0.0807) 
-0.5455*** 
(-3.8328) 
NOL 
0.0020 
(0.0279) 
-0.0303* 
(-1.8379) 
0.0101 
(0.1344) 
0.0012 
(0.2263) 
0.0037 
(0.7686) 
0.0016 
(0.2922) 
LINVP 
-0.3793*** 
(-14.2643) 
-0.5381*** 
(-82.8189) 
-0.3963*** 
(-15.7370) 
   
LINV 
   -0.1002** 
(-2.1290) 
-0.0870 
(-1.5598) 
-0.1066** 
(-2.2553) 
CF 
0.3952* 
(1.7972) 
  0.0159 
(1.1968) 
  
Cash 
 0.0328 
(1.5792) 
  0.0036 
(0.4563) 
 
EBITDA 
  -0.1090 
(-1.3141) 
  -0.0267** 
(-2.3072) 
Salesgrowth 
0.0482 
(0.7700) 
-0.0121 
(-1.3999) 
0.0149 
(0.2486) 
-0.0060 
(-0.8705) 
-0.0112** 
(-2.1251) 
-0.0055 
(-0.7428) 
ΔSize 
-0.1328 
(-1.2428) 
0.0078 
(0.4540) 
-0.1960* 
(-1.7475) 
-0.0241** 
(-1.9652) 
-0.0124 
(-1.4173) 
-0.0285** 
(-2.2767) 
ΔDebt 
-0.0041 
(-0.0955) 
0.0152** 
(2.1129) 
-0.0038 
(-0.0805) 
0.0079* 
(1.8094) 
0.0050 
(1.5795) 
0.0073 
(1.5913) 
Firm fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 2,106 1,506 2,015 2,106 1,506 2,015 
Adj. R-sq 0.128 0.852 0.111 0.079 0.105 0.093 
Notes: Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are: corporate tax 
(CTR), personal tax (PTR) and net operating loss (NOL). The study period is between 1989 and 
2015. This table also reports the adjusted R
2
 and number of firm-year observations. t statistics are 
given in parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in 
parentheses after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.17 Samples for Canadian firms not paying dividends after 2009 
 
Not Paying 
dividends 
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
3.0693 
(0.4743) 
8.3229*** 
(5.1313) 
14.2340** 
(2.0975) 
0.2590 
(0.4669) 
0.9850* 
(1.8668) 
0.7978* 
(1.7760) 
CTR 
-16.8156 
(-1.0274) 
-34.5844*** 
(-13.7756) 
-25.3421 
(-1.5475) 
-1.6002 
(-1.5169) 
-2.9406*** 
(-2.8035) 
-1.8659*** 
(-2.8485) 
PTR 
3.5140 
(0.5384) 
4.2870* 
(1.7085) 
-14.0369 
(-1.5216) 
0.4326 
(0.6706) 
-0.2265 
(-0.3703) 
-0.5060 
(-0.7585) 
NOL 
0.0971 
(0.6398) 
-0.0526 
(-1.3449) 
0.0383 
(0.2670) 
0.0142 
(0.5943) 
0.0019 
(0.1111) 
0.0087 
(0.6260) 
LINVP 
-0.1211 
(-0.4346) 
-0.4770*** 
(-8.7666) 
0.0565 
(0.1659) 
   
LINV 
   -0.4048** 
(-2.0220) 
-0.4506* 
(-1.8149) 
-0.0302 
(-0.2176) 
CF 
8.7183*** 
(3.5516) 
  0.5276** 
(2.3279) 
  
Cash 
 -0.7124*** 
(-4.9929) 
  -0.2090*** 
(-3.5837) 
 
EBITDA 
  0.5842 
(0.5244) 
  -0.1667*** 
(-2.6302) 
Salesgrowth 
0.0934 
(0.4388) 
-0.0226 
(-0.6655) 
0.6526** 
(2.3308) 
0.0053 
(0.4569) 
0.0048 
(0.3137) 
0.0171 
(0.9319) 
ΔSize 
-0.8639 
(-1.5954) 
0.0374 
(0.6919) 
-2.1684** 
(-1.9908) 
-0.0752** 
(-2.0888) 
0.0002 
(0.0076) 
-0.1373* 
(-1.6996) 
ΔDebt 
-0.4055 
(-1.6291) 
0.0100 
(0.1531) 
0.7180 
(1.5752) 
0.0025 
(0.1611) 
-0.0020 
(-0.1053) 
0.0546* 
(1.8033) 
Firm fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 188 133 182 188 133 182 
Adj. R-sq 0.483 0.871 0.393 0.480 0.545 0.530 
Notes: Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are: corporate tax 
(CTR), personal tax (PTR) and net operating loss (NOL). The study period is between 1989 and 
2015. This table also reports the adjusted R
2
 and number of firm-year observations. t statistics are 
given in parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in 
parentheses after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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5.7.3.2.2 Australia 
Table 5.18 and Table 5.19 provides evidence that tax integration influenced 
Australian firms differently for firms paying and not paying dividends. The 
present study indicates for the firms that pay dividends a positive relationship 
between corporate tax (CTR) and corporate investment, and a negative 
relationship between CTRMTF and corporate investment. For firms not paying 
dividends, these coefficients are less significant. These findings are consistent 
with the expectation that the change of tax system to imputation will provide a 
lower cost of capital for firms paying dividends, while the capital gains tax will 
result in increased cost of capital for firms not paying dividends. As predicted, 
there is no clear evidence that Australian firms not paying dividends have a less 
significant relationship between corporate tax (CTR) and corporate investment, 
and between CTRMTF and corporate investment. This supports the idea that 
Australian firms not paying dividends would be more significantly influenced by 
the capital gains tax and less by the change of tax system.  
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Table 5.18 Samples of firms paying dividends in Australia 1982 to 1998 
 
Paying 
dividends 
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
1.1409 
(1.1902) 
1.3291 
(1.4540) 
1.1768 
(0.9683) 
0.8552** 
(2.2705) 
1.0361*** 
(3.1417) 
0.6209 
(1.5007) 
CTR 
17.8424*** 
(18.4463) 
17.2800*** 
(18.7579) 
17.7233*** 
(18.5685) 
12.9999*** 
(18.2390) 
13.2098*** 
(18.9057) 
12.9920*** 
(17.9996) 
PTR 
-3.1308 
(-1.3686) 
-2.8857 
(-1.3472) 
-3.0274 
(-1.1658) 
-0.8631 
(-0.9805) 
-1.4238* 
(-1.8418) 
-0.5699 
(-0.6319) 
LINVP 
-0.0128 
(-0.4661) 
-0.0139 
(-0.4904) 
-0.0136 
(-0.4809) 
   
LINV 
   0.1387*** 
(2.6836) 
0.1414*** 
(2.7600) 
0.1482*** 
(2.7841) 
CF 
-0.0346 
(-0.5579) 
  0.0146 
(0.9374) 
  
Cash 
 -0.2185*** 
(-2.5956) 
  0.0440 
(1.2796) 
 
EBITDA 
  -0.0328 
(-0.3141) 
  0.0462 
(1.4327) 
Salesgrowth 
0.0209 
(1.2249) 
0.0236 
(1.4365) 
0.0201 
(1.1601) 
-0.0053 
(-0.7063) 
-0.0054 
(-0.7476) 
-0.0036 
(-0.4555) 
ΔSize 
0.8026*** 
(11.0630) 
0.9091*** 
(11.7115) 
0.8032*** 
(11.4499) 
0.1703*** 
(6.5306) 
0.1522*** 
(5.5656) 
0.1639*** 
(6.4285) 
ΔDebt 
0.0797 
(1.0899) 
0.0088 
(0.1221) 
0.0833 
(1.1297) 
0.0160 
(0.4572) 
0.0263 
(0.7363) 
0.0156 
(0.4386) 
NOLMTF 
-0.0002 
(-0.0089) 
-0.0052 
(-0.2389) 
0.0013 
(0.0559) 
0.0251 
(1.2509) 
0.0243 
(1.2036) 
0.0253 
(1.2173) 
CTRMTF 
-16.658*** 
(-27.2759) 
-16.841*** 
(-25.7949) 
-16.773*** 
(-23.1262) 
-14.027*** 
(-18.1082) 
-14.024*** 
(-18.3140) 
-13.772*** 
(-17.1724) 
Firm fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 2,045 2,043 2,046 2,004 2,003 2,006 
Adj. R-sq 0.617 0.633 0.616 0.725 0.729 0.728 
Notes: Dependent variables are Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are corporate tax (CTR) 
and personal tax (PTR). The tax-rate tax-reform variables are NOLMTF and CTRMTF. This table 
reports the adjusted R
2
 and number of firm-year observations. t statistics are given in parentheses 
which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses after the 
coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5.19 Samples of firms not paying dividends in Australia 1982 to 1998 
 
Not paying 
dividends 
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
-0.6413 
(-0.1576) 
-0.8614 
(-0.3289) 
-1.0798 
(-0.3617) 
1.1654 
(0.7267) 
0.6922 
(0.5667) 
-0.5234 
(-0.3711) 
CTR 
16.1088** 
(2.0420) 
14.3685* 
(1.8014) 
15.3802* 
(2.0236) 
8.5479 
(1.2854) 
8.3421 
(1.2211) 
8.0264 
(1.2497) 
PTR 
-0.1796 
(-0.0204) 
1.0662 
(0.1826) 
0.7714 
(0.1238) 
-2.9739 
(-0.8477) 
-2.1164 
(-0.7924) 
0.2549 
(0.0902) 
LINVP 
0.2090 
(0.6643) 
0.2265 
(0.6698) 
0.2190 
(0.6810) 
   
LINV 
   0.6011 
(1.4330) 
0.6024 
(1.4388) 
0.6056 
(1.5199) 
CF 
0.1483 
(1.0039) 
  0.0687 
(0.9745) 
  
Cash 
 -0.2728 
(-0.7847) 
  0.0273 
(0.1315) 
 
EBITDA 
  -0.0974 
(-0.2354) 
  0.3354 
(1.2555) 
Salesgrowth 
0.0052 
(0.0501) 
-0.0419 
(-0.4153) 
-0.0378 
(-0.3660) 
-0.0306 
(-0.6439) 
-0.0350 
(-0.5491) 
0.0346 
(0.5797) 
ΔSize 
0.3140** 
(2.1466) 
0.4079** 
(2.1797) 
0.3299* 
(1.8718) 
-0.1614* 
(-1.9824) 
-0.1444 
(-1.3822) 
-0.0271 
(-0.2323) 
ΔDebt 
-0.0381 
(-0.3401) 
-0.0387 
(-0.5132) 
-0.0311 
(-0.2504) 
0.0716 
(1.2834) 
0.0727 
(1.1756) 
0.0346 
(0.4548) 
NOLMTF 
0.1128 
(0.6816) 
0.1866 
(1.0691) 
0.1275 
(0.7902) 
0.1040 
(0.8931) 
0.0953 
(0.8321) 
0.0543 
(0.4268) 
CTRMTF 
-14.3555* 
(-1.8721) 
-13.5357* 
(-1.7940) 
-13.5692* 
(-1.8579) 
-8.0879 
(-1.2087) 
-7.6511 
(-1.1161) 
-7.0804 
(-1.0694) 
Firm fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 61 60 61 62 61 62 
Adj. R-sq 0.824 0.825 0.822 0.892 0.891 0.894 
Notes: Dependent variables are Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are corporate tax (CTR) 
and personal tax (PTR). The tax-rate tax-reform variables are NOLMTF and CTRMTF. This table 
reports the adjusted R
2
 and number of firm-year observations. t statistics are given in parentheses 
which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses after the 
coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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5.7.3.3 Extended period of time 
The present research uses an extended period of time to check the robustness of 
the results mentioned in the previous sections. In particular, the data are from 1982 
to 2015 for Australia, and from 1989 to 2015 for Taiwan. This is to cross-check 
the effects of the integration of imputation in the two countries. The aim is to see 
whether the results would change when Taiwan and Australia are in a well-
established imputation regime. The extension of time allows the inclusion of 
corporate tax (CTR) and personal tax (PTR) variables for Taiwan, which were 
opted out as being a constant in the original period studied. Table 5.20 and Table 
5.21 present the effects of tax-system change on capital investment in Australia 
and Taiwan in the extended period. 
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Table 5.20 Firm investment and tax-system changes in Australia between 
1982 and 2015 
Australia 
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
-0.3126 
(-1.1813) 
-0.3036 
(-1.1480) 
-0.3655 
(-1.3512) 
-0.7262*** 
(-5.7885) 
-0.5604*** 
(-4.6845) 
-0.7283*** 
(-5.6759) 
CTR 
17.7411*** 
(41.4381) 
17.8341*** 
(42.0701) 
17.9819*** 
(41.7586) 
17.7743*** 
(61.8163) 
17.1026*** 
(64.9849) 
17.8158*** 
(61.4218) 
PTR 
-0.0789 
(-0.1577) 
-0.0383 
(-0.0755) 
-0.0549 
(-0.1082) 
0.4279* 
(1.8396) 
0.3482 
(1.5458) 
0.4169* 
(1.7676) 
LINVP 
-0.0443*** 
(-4.6257) 
-0.0469*** 
(-4.8769) 
-0.0477*** 
(-4.8880) 
   
LINV 
   -0.1064*** 
(-6.4819) 
-0.0705*** 
(-4.8694) 
-0.1065*** 
(-6.4677) 
CF 
-0.0318*** 
(-3.9691) 
  -0.0068** 
(-2.2092) 
  
Cash 
 0.0539*** 
(4.0329) 
  0.1044*** 
(15.0422) 
 
EBITDA 
  -0.0148 
(-1.1133) 
  0.0006 
(0.0748) 
Salesgrowth 
-0.0014 
(-0.1966) 
0.0003 
(0.0419) 
-0.0012 
(-0.1707) 
-0.0167*** 
(-4.2399) 
-0.0165*** 
(-4.5806) 
-0.0164*** 
(-4.0938) 
ΔSize 
0.5985*** 
(26.5914) 
0.5771*** 
(25.2849) 
0.6081*** 
(25.6919) 
0.0821*** 
(7.4858) 
0.0361*** 
(3.9135) 
0.0825*** 
(7.2800) 
ΔDebt 
0.2430*** 
(5.3191) 
0.2523*** 
(5.5111) 
0.2343*** 
(5.0105) 
0.1251*** 
(4.8853) 
0.1447*** 
(6.2039) 
0.1253*** 
(4.8375) 
NOLMTF 
0.0179 
(1.3063) 
0.0334** 
(2.4699) 
0.0363*** 
(2.6613) 
-0.0078 
(-1.0042) 
-0.0094 
(-1.3458) 
-0.0037 
(-0.4872) 
CTRMTF 
-16.4312*** 
(-36.7346) 
-16.635*** 
(-37.4466) 
-16.552*** 
(-36.5267) 
-15.959*** 
(-55.6415) 
-15.722*** 
(-58.6112) 
-15.980*** 
(-55.7141) 
Firm fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 11,650 11,654 11,661 11,770 11,769 11,776 
Adj. R-sq 0.527 0.529 0.523 0.334 0.437 0.333 
Notes: Dependent variables are Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are corporate tax 
(CTR), personal tax (PTR). The tax-rate- tax-reform variables are NOLMTF and CTRMTF. This 
table also reports the adjusted R
2
 and number of firm-year observations. t-statistics are given in 
parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses 
after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.21 Firm investment and tax-system changes in Taiwan, 1989 to 2015 
Taiwan 
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
C 
13.0598*** 
(5.0673) 
20.7391*** 
(3.2113) 
-6.0133* 
(-1.8168) 
0.7982*** 
(3.5339) 
1.1224*** 
(4.7170) 
-0.0451 
(-0.2430) 
CTR 
2.2394*** 
(4.3117) 
1.6041** 
(2.0917) 
4.2337*** 
(7.2313) 
0.0793*** 
(2.5805) 
0.0375 
(0.7917) 
0.1581*** 
(5.0042) 
PTR 
-35.58*** 
(-5.5598) 
-53.58*** 
(-3.3273) 
9.8452 
(1.1891) 
-2.063*** 
(-3.6635) 
-2.81*** 
(-4.7852) 
-0.0437 
(-0.0940) 
LINVP 
-0.0250*** 
(-7.9034) 
-0.0329*** 
(-8.8760) 
-0.0194*** 
(-5.2308) 
   
LINV 
   -0.0262*** 
(-7.6326) 
-0.031*** 
(-6.9443) 
-0.0162*** 
(-4.0070) 
CF 
16.2091*** 
(28.8845) 
  0.6825*** 
(13.9383) 
  
Cash 
 23.3945*** 
(27.6749) 
  0.9551*** 
(12.3064) 
 
EBITDA 
  4.5501*** 
(7.1590) 
  0.2111*** 
(5.3679) 
SalesGrowth 
-4.0219*** 
(-6.8216) 
-6.1321*** 
(-9.1334) 
-6.5169*** 
(-7.8301) 
-0.1844*** 
(-5.0164) 
-0.301*** 
(-6.5187) 
-0.2650*** 
(-5.3528) 
ΔSize 
-10.9721*** 
(-10.3905) 
-
13.3967*** 
(-13.0899) 
-18.882*** 
(-19.7240) 
-0.1920*** 
(-2.8863) 
-0.294*** 
(-3.7461) 
-0.5327*** 
(-9.1365) 
ΔDebt 
2.6107*** 
(3.4370) 
0.6757 
(0.7684) 
1.6970* 
(1.8708) 
0.1991*** 
(4.1163) 
0.1227* 
(1.9560) 
0.1692*** 
(3.2410) 
NOLMTF 
0.2582*** 
(3.1709) 
0.3407** 
(2.0833) 
0.3194*** 
(3.3683) 
0.0122*** 
(2.9092) 
0.0197** 
(2.1612) 
0.0150*** 
(3.1457) 
CTRMTF 
3.5491*** 
(8.2371) 
3.6011*** 
(8.2360) 
5.7928*** 
(10.4030) 
0.0570** 
(2.1429) 
0.0361 
(1.1740) 
0.1402*** 
(4.1077) 
Firm fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed-
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 16,879 9,418 16,676 16,879 9,418 16,676 
Adj. R-sq 0.790 0.806 0.696 0.584 0.582 0.529 
Notes: Dependent variables are: Investment (INV and INVP). Tax variables are: corporate tax 
(CTR), personal tax (PTR). The tax rate-tax reform variables are NOLMTF and CTRMTF. This 
table also reports the adjusted R
2
 and number of firm-year observations. t statistics are given in 
parentheses which are based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses 
after the coefficient estimates. Symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
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As can be seen from these tables, the results for Australia stay the same. The 
coefficients of CTR, PTR, CTRMTF, and NOLMTF in the models in the expanded 
period of time are consistent with the results of the original models. This indicates 
that the integration of an imputation tax system has resulted in a higher level of 
corporate capital investment.  
For Taiwan, the results of CTRMTF, and NOLMTF in the expanded period of time 
are the same as for those of the original models. CTR is positive and significant 
and PTR is negative and significant. These outcomes indicate that the 
implementation of an imputation tax system has resulted in a higher level of 
corporate capital investment.  
These findings are consistent with those in Chan and Lin (2017) who investigated 
the changes of tax system in Taiwan, using data for much the same period (but 
until 2014). The results in the present research are consistent with those in Li and 
Stathis (2017) who studied the changes of tax regime in Australia in an extended 
time frame. The addition of these years improves the fit of the model, with the 
increase of the adjusted R
2
.  
All in all, the same results are found when using the extended period for Australia 
and for Taiwan. This finding implies that a stronger impact on capital investment 
is likely under a well-established imputation tax system relative to a more recent 
switch-over from a classical system to that system. 
5.8 Discussion of findings 
This study investigates the effects of taxes on capital investment in Canada and 
the impact of a tax-system change on capital investment in Australia and Taiwan. 
To address the research questions, fixed-effect models were used, as they have the 
advantage of controlling for business-cycle and macroeconomic effects. Data 
were collected for Canada (1989–2015), Australia (1982–1998), and Taiwan 
(1989–2009).  
The results provide evidence that suggests that the adoption of imputation will 
produce one of its desired effects—an increase in firms’ capital investment. 
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However, the impact of this implementation of imputation on corporate 
investment is very sensitive to tax rates, particularly to taxes on capital gains. In 
this study, Taiwan’s experience provides strong evidence that the use of 
imputation without a tax on capital gains will significantly increase corporate 
investment. By contrast, Australia—where the effects of the changes of the tax 
system were accompanied by the introduction of a capital gains tax—saw a 
significant increase in capital investment. In Canada, the effects of taxes were 
accompanied by an increased capital gains tax. This latter country experienced an 
increase in corporate investment pre-2009; whereas, there has been a decrease 
post-2009. 
From these findings, it is suggested that a firm’s investment strategies are 
sensitive to taxes, and that taxes affect capital investment under imputation tax 
systems. The results generally point to the relevance of taxes to investment. There 
is evidence of strong investment effects on firms in countries with a well-
established imputation tax system, as well as in countries with the change of the 
tax system to imputation.  
The results of this study have several practical implications for stimulating 
corporate investment. By determining the effects of the adoption of imputation on 
capital investment, policymakers in the countries using an imputation system can 
make well-informed decisions regarding tax policy. First, the results from the 
present study raise the possibility that corporate tax might encourage an increase 
in a firm’s investment in countries under a well-established imputation tax system. 
Second, the research results suggest that tax-system changes may help to boost 
corporate capital investment in the period following such a change.  
5.9 Chapter summary 
In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of what drives corporate 
capital investment, this chapter investigated the impacts of taxes on firms’ capital 
investment in Canada, and the effects of tax-system changes on capital investment 
in Australia and Taiwan. The results from those contexts are compared and 
contrasted, where relevant, to shed light on similarities and differences. This is a 
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way of gaining a more in-depth understanding of the relationships that exist 
between taxes, capital structure, and investment. The methodology employs a 
fixed-effects model to identify and examine the research questions across these 
countries. The control factors under examination are lagged investment (LINV and 
INV), operating cash flow (OPR), change in firm size (ΔSize), growth 
opportunities (SalesGrowth), and change in debt (ΔDebt).  
The regression analysis indicates that there is a strong positive relationship 
between tax-system changes and firms’ capital investment, particularly in the 
contexts of Australia and Taiwan. These results are in line with Black, Legoria 
and Sellers (2000), who argue that the imputation tax system stimulates corporate 
capital investment. The regression analysis for the pre-2009 period has shown that 
corporate tax had a positive and significant impact on capital investment in 
Canada. This indicates that the corporate tax in a well-established imputation 
context is a significant factor in increasing corporate capital investment. These 
findings are consistent with Becker, Jacob and Jacob (2013) who argue that 
dividend imputation possibly stimulates corporate capital investment. 
One unanticipated finding is that the results in Canada for the post-2009 period 
indicate a decrease in corporate capital investment. This can be explained by the 
offsetting impacts of tax changes at the federal and provincial levels (increasing 
both provincial corporate tax rate and personal tax rate after 2012) in this country 
(Bazel & Mintz 2016). Post-2012, federal tax decreases were offset by provincial 
tax increases so that the overall impact on firm investment was negative. 
The results in the present study have important implications. The findings suggest 
that while capital investment shows a significant increase in the two countries 
following the introduction of an imputation tax system, a significant decrease in 
capital investment is observed for the post-2009 period in the well-established 
Canadian imputation tax system. In order to enhance capital investment in 
countries using an imputation tax system—particularly in the context of changing 
to an imputation tax system—there is a need for governments to improve their 
policies rather than just relying on monetary policy.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This study examines whether taxes or corporate tax-regime changes influence the 
capital structure of firms, and whether taxes or tax-regime changes affect firms’ 
capital investment. This is important, because a firm’s investment, capital 
structure, and riskiness are intrinsically linked to a country’s economic growth 
and prosperity. The analysis is done by examining: (i) whether taxes have an 
impact on a firm’s leverage in countries where an imputation tax system has been 
well-established (Chapter 4); (ii) whether changes to a tax system regime (a shift 
from classical to imputation) results in changes in leverage (Chapter 4); (iii) 
whether taxes within a well-established imputation tax system have impacts on a 
firm’s capital investment (Chapter 5); and, (iv) whether shifting from a classical to 
an imputation tax system has an impact on firm investment (Chapter 5). 
This chapter initially provides academic contributions, and then presents the 
contributions to policy and practice. Finally, the limitations of the research and 
possible future directions from the study are outlined and discussed. 
6.2 Academic contributions 
 Summary of empirical findings  6.2.1
This research contributes to the capital-structure literature by examining two big 
questions. The first is, ‘Do taxes have an impact on capital structure?’; the second 
question is, ‘Do taxes have an impact on capital investment?’. More specifically, 
this study answers the question of whether imputation tax-system changes, or 
changes in taxes within a well-established imputation tax system had an effect on 
capital structure and a firm’s investment. In particular, it examines the impact of 
taxes on capital structure and capital investment in the imputation tax system of 
Canada, and the impact of tax-regime changes in Australia and Taiwan. The main 
objectives were: (i) to analyse the impact of taxes on capital structure in a country 
where there is a well-established imputation tax system in place; (ii) to examine 
the effect of taxes on capital structure in two countries where the tax systems 
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change from a classical to an imputation regime; (iii) to investigate the impact of 
taxes on capital investment in a country where there is a well-established 
imputation tax regime; (iv) to study the effect of taxes on capital investment in 
two countries where there is an integration of an imputation tax system. 
Below, we set out the main features for each of the four analyses. 
(i) The impacts of taxes on a firm’s capital structure in the country where an 
imputation tax system is well-established—Canada 
The study focuses on the impact of taxes on the leverage of firms in Canada. It is 
postulated that corporate tax will have a negative impact or no impact at all on the 
capital structure within an imputation system, because that is an intention of the 
system. In particular, when this system has been in place for a significant period, 
it will cause a shift in the capital structure away from debt, because it removes the 
tax shield. These expectations are consistent with the theory of optimal capital 
structure in Modigliani and Miller (1963). It is important to note that the present 
study only focused on the impacts of taxes on capital structure in Canada. This 
country had a well-established imputation tax system from 1989 onwards to the 
present. To diminish the effects of the tax system’s evolution (from partial to full 
imputation in 2009) which may have had impacts on corporate leverage, the year 
2009 is eliminated from the sample. As such, empirical tests were conducted to 
investigate the impacts of taxes on leverage over two separate periods—pre-2009 
and post-2009.  
Chapter 4 finds that, in the Canadian well-established imputation tax system, 
corporate tax has had negative impact on capital structure within an imputation 
system; there was less debt used for financing in corporate capital structures 
within the periods of the study. Debt comes with a tax shield; equity does not. 
Firms have lower debt ratios under an imputation tax system, because there is a 
removal of the tax shield. This is consistent with what would be expected 
according to the theory of optimal capital structure (Modigliani & Miller 1963). 
For pre-2009, the outcomes are consistent with the expectation that corporate tax 
has a negative impact on capital structure within an imputation system, and that 
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the corporate debt levels will decrease in a well-established imputation tax 
regime.  
For the post-2009 period, taxes did not have an impact on leverage. This was as 
expected because—with an imputation tax system—there are no tax credits 
associated with debt. Under a full-imputation tax system, taxes paid by the firm 
on its profits are credits against the tax liability for the shareholder (Pattenden 
2006). These credits should reduce the tax incentives to use debt, because debt 
and equity are treated equally under the tax system (Bell & Jenkinson 2002). 
Canada uses an imputation tax system which is attached to a dividend payment, 
and a shareholder receives full tax credits for tax paid at the corporate level; this 
eliminates double taxation over time. The capital structure of firms would have 
adapted to the imputation system in Canada. Therefore, it is expected that there 
will be no relationship between corporate tax and capital structure in the country 
where a full-imputation tax system is in place. 
(ii) The impacts of a change in a tax-system regime (a shift from classical to 
imputation) on capital structure—Australia and Taiwan 
Another key focus of this study is investigating the impact of tax-system 
change—a shift from a classical to a full-imputation system—and its impact on a 
firm’s leverage. It is postulated that the introduction of an imputation tax system 
influences leverage by reducing the debt level of firms. When there is a tax relief 
on debt, there would be a shift away from debt to equity. A shift to an imputation 
from classical system will be expected to cause a decrease in debt-level financing. 
The results of the empirical tests in Chapter 4 confirm that the introduction of 
imputation reduced the corporate debt levels in both Australia and Taiwan. For the 
shift to an imputation tax system, the findings on the effects of tax-system change 
on leverage are similar in the two different contexts, over the two sample periods, 
of Australia, the open economy, and Taiwan the newly emerging economy. The 
changes of the tax system have an impact on decreasing debt levels, as expected. 
This demonstrates that if a country shifts from a classical to an imputation tax 
regime, firms that are carrying debt will shift away from debt to equity.  
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(iii) The impacts of taxes on corporate capital investment in the country where an 
imputation tax system is well-established—Canada 
The present research investigates the impacts of taxes on capital investment in 
Canada, where the imputation tax system has been imposed for a long time. It is 
theorised (Modigliani & Miller 1963) that when there is tax relief on debt, the cost 
of debt falls, which makes capital investment more attractive. It is postulated that 
capital investment would increase in the Canadian imputation tax system because 
the cost of debt falls. Similarly to the previous discussion on capital structure for 
Canada, this study only focused on the impacts of taxes (not tax-system change) 
on capital investment. In order to eliminate the effect of this change in the tax 
regime, the year 2009 is excluded from the data.  
Empirical results in Chapter 5 confirm the expectation that corporate capital 
investment in Canada increased in the period pre-2009 (partial imputation). 
However, there was a decrease in corporate investment in the period post-2009. 
This finding was rather unexpected, as the theory predicts that capital investment 
would increase in the context of full dividend imputation. As such, it may perhaps 
be concluded that taxes may not have a significant impact on capital investment in 
Canada. 
(iv) The impacts of a change in a tax-system regime (a shift from classical to 
imputation) on capital investment—Australia and Taiwan 
This research investigates the impact of a shift in the tax system on capital 
investment in Australia and Taiwan. These two countries were used in the study 
because they recently shifted from a classical to an imputation tax system. It is 
theorised (Modigliani & Miller 1963) that when there is a tax relief on debt, the 
cost of debt falls, which makes investment more attractive. A shift to imputation 
from a classical system would cause an increase in capital investment because the 
cost of debt falls. These expectations are consistent with the theory of optimal 
capital structure Modigliani and Miller (1963). It is predicted that if a country 
shifts to an imputation tax system, capital investment would increase. Empirical 
results from Chapter 5 confirm that capital investment did increase as expected in 
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both Australia and Taiwan after the introduction of an imputation tax regime. The 
findings provide the first empirical evidence on whether tax-system change—
when moving from a classical to an imputation tax system—has impacts on 
corporate capital investment in different economies (Australia and Taiwan) with 
different economic systems (open, free-market and newly emerging).  
 Theoretical contributions  6.2.2
Capital-structure theory has been developed and tested based on the theoretical 
model of capital structure presented by Modigliani and Miller (1963). Many 
empirical studies have investigated how taxes influence capital structure and 
capital investment. Findings generally indicate that debt will be favoured over 
equity due to the tax shield, and that capital investment will increase at the 
introduction of an imputation tax system. The cost of equity capital will decrease 
and create an increase in investment by the corporate sector in an imputation tax 
system.  
The present study is an extension of existing studies. In this study, three diverse 
countries under imputation tax systems were investigated. This enables us to 
examine the effects of taxes on capital structure and (or) capital investment, as 
well as how the introduction of an imputation tax system affects a firm’s capital 
structure and capital-investment decisions. This study is not a comparison across 
countries; it instead uses different economies to test the consistency of findings. 
This makes the work stand out from previous research in terms of a contribution 
to the theory of capital structure and its impact on investment. 
The empirical tests confirm the (Modigliani & Miller 1963) theory which predicts 
that taxes will influence capital structure. In particular, the empirical results have 
demonstrated that corporate leverage decreased after the introduction of the 
imputation system in Australia and Taiwan. Similarly, the results indicate that 
leverage decreased throughout the period of study in Canada, the country with the 
well-established imputation tax system. It is interesting to note that taxes reduce 
debt-level financing in Canada, regardless of whether there is a full or a partial 
imputation tax system.  
176 
 
The study demonstrates that tax system changes play a significant role in capital 
investment. The outcomes from the study are consistent with the capital-structure 
theory on the relationship between taxes and corporate investment. Specifically, in 
the cases of Australia and Taiwan, test results confirm that corporate investment 
increased after the introduction of their imputation systems, as predicted by 
theory.  
The study demonstrates that taxes do not play a significant role in capital 
investment. In the case of Canada, however, the expected increase is only for the 
pre-2009, the period of a partial imputation tax system. One unanticipated finding 
was that, in the period post-2009, corporate investment decreased in a full-
imputation tax regime in Canada. This is an important contribution. Many 
governments are trying to use corporate-tax cuts to stimulate capital investment; 
however, this approach is questionable. These results imply that corporate-tax cuts 
might be one aspect of a policy package, but to stimulate capital investment and 
economic growth, policy should combine many strategies at the same time. 
6.3 Contributions to policy and practice 
This study complements the literature on imputation tax systems and suggests 
important implications about the benefits of taxes in countries with a well-
established imputation tax system, and the beneficial effects of tax-system change 
to an imputation tax system on capital structure, as well as on capital investment. 
Due to the current global economic climate, which is characterised by low 
inflation and slow economic growth, this research is important for governments 
who seek policy options to promote economic growth.  
The results of this study include several practical contributions for firms’ capital-
structure decisions. By determining the effects of the adoption of imputation on 
leverage, policymakers in the countries using an imputation system can make 
well-informed decisions regarding tax policy.  
As for the impact of taxes on leverage, the findings of the present research 
indicate that firms in countries with well-established imputation tax systems are 
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likely to use less debt and more equity. In other words, taxes do matter in 
determining and affecting the capital structure in the countries using an imputation 
tax system for a significant period of time. As such, it would be beneficial for 
governments to use taxes to promote investment in an imputation tax system, 
because this would alter the capital structure and thus the weighted average cost of 
capital. If the cost of capital does fall, then it is expected that there would be an 
increase in a firm’s investment.  
Regarding the shift of tax regime, the adoption of an imputation tax system was 
found to reduce debt levels. This would alter a firm’s capital structure towards 
equity. Therefore, a dividend imputation tax system continues to provide benefits 
for firms, such as by weakening firms’ desire to use debt financing for capital 
investment. The shift to an imputation tax reduces the potential for financial 
distress and lowers the risks of bankruptcy.  
The present research has numerous policy implications for firms’ capital 
investment decisions. As for the countries moving from a classical to an 
imputation system, the findings confirm that the shift in tax regime has positive 
impacts on corporate investment, as in the contexts of Australia and Taiwan. This 
implies that there is an advantage of imputation tax over the classical system in 
terms of stimulating capital investment. The success of the given cases can be set 
as an example for other countries—which currently use classical tax systems—to 
adopt an imputation system. Although this thesis does not focus on macro 
variables, it is observed that Australia and Taiwan shifted to imputation tax 
systems when they were suffering from a stock market crash and the Asian 
financial crisis, respectively. As such, it is advisable for countries in a global and 
(or) national financial crisis situation to switch to imputation regimes to promote 
capital investment and, in turn, boost these economies in a downturn. 
For countries using an imputation tax system for a relatively long time, it is 
important for policymakers to be cautious about using taxes to stimulate corporate 
investment, in view of the empirical findings of the present study. It is evidenced 
from this research that taxes do have impacts on—but do not play a significant 
role in—stimulating capital investment. Specifically, there was a decrease in 
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corporate investment in Canada post-2009. Although the purpose of an imputation 
tax system is to stimulate capital investment, other determinants might influence 
capital investment too. The explanation for this may be that the imposition of high 
tax rates in Canada post-2009 might have influenced a decrease in capital 
investment in this period. Therefore, it would be of benefit for governments to 
recognise the role of taxes on capital investment and to develop a broader policy 
set to promote corporate investment. Governments that are currently attempting to 
use federal corporate tax cuts to stimulate capital investment and economic 
growth need to be aware of this. President Trump promised tax cuts to boost 
annual economic growth and the financial stock markets. However, stock market 
falls in the second half of 2017 and the first half of 2018 (Goldman 2018), and a 
federal budget deficit increase of 17 per cent in 2018 (Liptak & Borak 2018), 
suggests that this tax policy cannot save the situation. In fact, the Director of the 
US Economic Council, Gary John noted that, “The years when we increased 
deficits are years when the economy is slowing down”. 
6.4 Research limitations and further studies 
The present research provides evidence, from empirical studies for a number of 
research questions that are yet to be addressed. However, an imputation system 
was only part of the tax reforms applied in Australia and Taiwan. There were 
other important changes in the economies that occurred at the same time, and 
which influenced capital structure and (or) capital investment. For example 
interest rates might interfere with the possible effects of the adoption of the 
imputation system. Therefore, further work is required before governments can 
make decisions based on our current understanding of the impact of the tax-
system change on corporate capital structure and (or) capital investment. 
Another limitation of this research is related to the dataset employed in the 
models. As mentioned in the empirical studies described (in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5), it was a large dataset, but a small proportion of it was for the early 
period (a classical tax system) in Australia. Recall that this was based on 
collecting data and it was dependent on the availability of financial statements of 
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firms. This can introduce possible bias through a relatively small sample size for 
that early period, which could reduce the accuracy of statistical tests. 
As for the suggestions for future research, it is important to determine indicators 
of economic activity that may influence the effects of taxes and the changes of tax 
system on corporate capital structure and corporate investment. Countries using a 
well-established dividend imputation tax system, or shifting to the imputation tax 
system do so in the presence of macroeconomic variables which may be 
responsible for changes in capital structure and capital investment. It is believed 
that macroeconomic indicators have impacts on corporate tax-policy changes and 
that this leads to an impact on corporate investment (IMF 2018). For example a 
factor such as interest rates diminished the impacts of taxes and of the changes of 
tax system on corporate leverage and corporate investment. 
Another suggestion for future research is to use the methodology employed in this 
study to test the effects of taxes and tax-system change on capital structure and 
(or) capital investment in a broader context. The present research used two well-
developed countries and one emerging country to address the research questions; 
hence, it would be valuable for future research to be undertaken including more 
countries in order to assess impacts. Countries using an imputation system such as 
Norway, Chile, and New Zealand should be tested against existing theories to 
confirm or to extend the current understanding of the impacts of taxes and tax-
system change on capital structure and capital investment. 
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APPENDIX 
Chapter 4 
Appendix 4.1 Test for structural changes for Australia and Taiwan 
Australia Taiwan 
F(1,86) = 7.8 F(1,1037) = 65.42 
Pro>F = 0.000 Pro>F = 0.000 
 
Appendix 4.2 Summary statistics of variables for Canada
 
Appendix 4.3 Summary statistics of variables for Australia 
 
Appendix 4.4 Summary statistics of variables for Taiwan 
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Appendix 4.6 Pairwise correlation analysis for Australia 
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         TAN     0.2644*  0.0941*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
        Size    -0.1449*  1.0000 
              
              
   Mleverage     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Mlever~e     Size      TAN     Beta      DIV   Zscore    LagGO
. pwcorr  Mleverage Size TAN Beta DIV Zscore LagGO FCF y_break  if Year<2010, sig star(.05)
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Appendix 4.9 Regression results for firms paying dividends in Canada 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.10 Regression results for firms not paying dividends in Canada 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .77767182   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .10214986
     sigma_u    .19104633
                                                                              
       _cons     1.815776   .2033798     8.93   0.000     1.409715    2.221837
  movetoFull    -.0006386   .0191182    -0.03   0.973    -.0388093    .0375322
         FCF     .0059437   .0430248     0.14   0.891     -.079958    .0918454
       LagGO     1.020001   3.100286     0.33   0.743     -5.16992    7.209922
      Zscore    -.1003829    .022082    -4.55   0.000    -.1444711   -.0562947
         DIV    -.0004844    .006025    -0.08   0.936    -.0125136    .0115449
        Beta    -.0831108   .0220473    -3.77   0.000    -.1271297   -.0390919
         TAN     .1498791   .1036848     1.45   0.153    -.0571342    .3568924
        Size    -.0922513   .0116228    -7.94   0.000    -.1154569   -.0690457
         PTR     .0649851   .0854123     0.76   0.449     -.105546    .2355162
Corporatetax    -.5248447   .1023414    -5.13   0.000    -.7291759   -.3205134
                                                                              
   Mleverage        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 67 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5038                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(10,66)          =      15.35
     overall = 0.0546                                         max =         33
     between = 0.0278                                         avg =       15.8
     within  = 0.3176                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         67
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      1,061
. xtreg Mleverage  Corporatetax PTR Size TAN Beta DIV Zscore LagGO FCF movetoFull if (DP>0&Year>1981) , fe robust
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .84952098   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .09437223
     sigma_u    .22422979
                                                                              
       _cons     1.893934   .4870132     3.89   0.000     .9141901    2.873678
  movetoFull     .0094155   .0804623     0.12   0.907    -.1524537    .1712846
         FCF    -.2497184   .1028011    -2.43   0.019    -.4565276   -.0429092
       LagGO     3.172814   .8815046     3.60   0.001     1.399456    4.946173
      Zscore     -.108807   .0494834    -2.20   0.033    -.2083547   -.0092593
         DIV     -.004942   .0041158    -1.20   0.236    -.0132218    .0033379
        Beta    -.2144602   .0445435    -4.81   0.000    -.3040702   -.1248502
         TAN    -.1833006   .1297378    -1.41   0.164    -.4442994    .0776981
        Size    -.0823619   .0260961    -3.16   0.003    -.1348605   -.0298632
         PTR     .0390582   .1512988     0.26   0.797    -.2653157    .3434321
Corporatetax    -.3098683   .2689012    -1.15   0.255    -.8508277    .2310911
                                                                              
   Mleverage        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 48 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2662                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(10,47)          =      26.40
     overall = 0.2220                                         max =         13
     between = 0.0672                                         avg =        3.7
     within  = 0.4921                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         48
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        179
. xtreg Mleverage  Corporatetax PTR Size TAN Beta DIV Zscore LagGO FCF movetoFull if (DP<0&Year>1981) , fe robust
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Appendix 4.11 Regression results for pre-2009 for Canada 
 
 
Appendix 4.12 Regression results for post-2009 for Canada 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .81796765   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .11107119
     sigma_u    .23544811
                                                                              
       _cons     1.911867   .2252457     8.49   0.000     1.462628    2.361105
  movetoFull            0  (omitted)
         FCF    -.0028811   .0379957    -0.08   0.940    -.0786611    .0728989
       LagGO     2.586348    2.17858     1.19   0.239    -1.758693    6.931389
      Zscore    -.1072938   .0237154    -4.52   0.000    -.1545927    -.059995
         DIV    -.0022617   .0052682    -0.43   0.669    -.0127689    .0082455
        Beta    -.1041155   .0208908    -4.98   0.000    -.1457808   -.0624501
         TAN     .1031113   .0888644     1.16   0.250    -.0741232    .2803458
        Size    -.0962551   .0132409    -7.27   0.000    -.1226633   -.0698468
         PTR     .0338023   .0801525     0.42   0.675    -.1260568    .1936614
Corporatetax    -.5328087    .125949    -4.23   0.000    -.7840061   -.2816113
                                                                              
   Mleverage        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 71 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5276                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,70)           =      16.85
     overall = 0.0706                                         max =         27
     between = 0.0016                                         avg =       17.6
     within  = 0.3371                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         71
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      1,253
note: movetoFull omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Mleverage  Corporatetax PTR Size TAN Beta DIV Zscore LagGO FCF movetoFull if (Year<2009&Year>1981) , fe robust
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .96914051   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .06499402
     sigma_u    .36422724
                                                                              
       _cons     2.602579   .5163598     5.04   0.000     1.539116    3.666042
  movetoFull            0  (omitted)
         FCF     .0700797   .0503367     1.39   0.176    -.0335908    .1737502
       LagGO    -1.425208   3.449303    -0.41   0.683    -8.529181    5.678764
      Zscore    -.1358897    .109212    -1.24   0.225     -.360816    .0890367
         DIV    -.0092864   .0092048    -1.01   0.323    -.0282441    .0096713
        Beta    -.0747222   .0373719    -2.00   0.057     -.151691    .0022466
         TAN     .1640865   .1807938     0.91   0.373    -.2082654    .5364385
        Size    -.1515669   .0333412    -4.55   0.000    -.2202344   -.0828993
         PTR     .4143397   .7753105     0.53   0.598    -1.182442    2.011122
Corporatetax    -.9471647   .7433541    -1.27   0.214    -2.478131    .5838016
                                                                              
   Mleverage        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8203                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,25)           =      14.83
     overall = 0.0324                                         max =          6
     between = 0.0034                                         avg =        4.6
     within  = 0.4553                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         26
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        120
note: movetoFull omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Mleverage  Corporatetax PTR Size TAN Beta DIV Zscore LagGO FCF movetoFull if (Year>2009&Year>1981) , fe robust
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Appendix 4.13 Regression results for Australia 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.14 Regression results for Taiwan 
 
 
                                                                                  
             rho    .80246289   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
         sigma_e    .11238709
         sigma_u    .22651896
                                                                                  
           _cons     .9106543   .3019578     3.02   0.003      .310382    1.510926
         y_break     .2758153   .0987873     2.79   0.006     .0794326     .472198
             FCF    -.0642936   .0642828    -1.00   0.320    -.1920836    .0634964
           LagGO      .829439   1.548231     0.54   0.594    -2.248343    3.907221
          Zscore    -.0337173   .0455863    -0.74   0.462    -.1243397    .0569052
             div    -.0687285   .1026928    -0.67   0.505    -.2728749     .135418
            Beta    -.0383949   .0250418    -1.53   0.129    -.0881764    .0113867
             TAN     .1547709   .1324539     1.17   0.246    -.1085387    .4180805
            Size    -.0720471    .019797    -3.64   0.000    -.1114023    -.032692
corporatetaxrate     .4650426     .21481     2.16   0.033     .0380145    .8920708
                                                                                  
       Mleverage        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                 Robust
                                                                                  
                                        (Std. Err. adjusted for 87 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4765                        Prob > F          =     0.0004
                                                F(9,86)           =       3.82
     overall = 0.0706                                         max =         15
     between = 0.0060                                         avg =        6.1
     within  = 0.1982                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         87
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        531
. xtreg Mleverage corporatetaxrate Size TAN Beta div Zscore LagGO FCF y_break  if (Year<1999), fe robust
                                                                                  
             rho     .6764623   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
         sigma_e    .10856877
         sigma_u    .15698721
                                                                                  
           _cons     .1375853   .0341593     4.03   0.000     .0705562    .2046144
         y_break     .6996955   .0865055     8.09   0.000     .5299497    .8694413
             FCF    -.1500022   .0250474    -5.99   0.000    -.1991516   -.1008529
           LagGO    -3.613254   2.673315    -1.35   0.177    -8.858977     1.63247
          Zscore     -.022033    .010751    -2.05   0.041    -.0431292   -.0009367
            Beta    -.1599994   .0081039   -19.74   0.000    -.1759013   -.1440975
             DIV    -1.058246   .1009838   -10.48   0.000    -1.256402   -.8600903
             TAN     .1840432   .0394152     4.67   0.000     .1067006    .2613859
            Size     .0117121   .0046592     2.51   0.012     .0025695    .0208547
Corporatetaxrate            0  (omitted)
                                                                                  
       Mleverage        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                 Robust
                                                                                  
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,038 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1841                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,1037)         =      88.19
     overall = 0.3418                                         max =         17
     between = 0.3844                                         avg =        5.9
     within  = 0.2673                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,038
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      6,092
note: Corporatetaxrate omitted because of collinearity
.  xtreg Mleverage Corporatetaxrate  Size TAN DIV Beta Zscore LagGO FCF y_break  if Year<2010, fe robust
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Chapter 5 
Appendix 5.1 Test for structural changes for Australia  
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CF Cash EBITDA CF Cash EBITDA 
F(1,421) = 
810.20 
F(1,420) = 
672.52 
F(1,421) = 
559.35 
F(1,422) = 
340.57 
F(1,421) = 
359.05 
F(1,422) = 
317.07 
Pro>F = 
0.000 
Pro>F = 
0.000 
Pro>F = 
0.000 
Pro>F = 
0.000 
Pro>F = 
0.000 
Pro>F = 
0.000 
 
Appendix 5.2 Test for structural changes for Taiwan 
INVP INVP INVP INV INV INV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CF Cash EBITDA CF Cash EBITDA 
F(1,1353) = 
129.25 
F(1,562) = 
126.72 
F(1,1353) = 
83.97 
F(1,1353) = 
19.21 
F(1,562) = 
14.95 
F(1,1353) = 
8.85 
Pro>F = 
0.000 
Pro>F = 
0.000 
Pro>F = 
0.000 
Pro>F = 
0.000 
Pro>F = 
0.0459 
Pro>F = 
0.0030 
 
Appendix 5.3 Summary statistics of variables for Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  MovetoFull      103,248    .2592593    .4382303          0          1
         NOL      103,248     .204866    .4036056          0          1
                                                                       
Changeindebt       32,764    .0377582    .4176581  -1.584889   1.610571
   DeltaSize       29,099    .0870663    .5133029  -2.052809   2.215371
 SalesGrowth       15,681   -.1317759    .6431421   -2.59342   2.741873
      EBITDA       26,053   -.0035246     .486807  -2.770094   2.400552
        Cash       17,817    .0694839     .460394  -.8808864   3.438432
                                                                       
    Cashflow       29,441   -.0961759    .6033245  -4.251317    1.71858
         PTR      103,248    .3977407    .0898312        .29      .4953
         CTR      103,248    .3647296    .0647228       .263      .4556
 InvestmentP       31,593    .3270802    1.185851  -7.293324    1.39657
  Investment       31,593    .0386493    .1146733  -.5626166    .457068
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize Investment InvestmentP CTR PTR Cashflow Cash EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize Ch ngeindebt NOL MovetoFull
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Appendix 5.4 Summary statistics of variables for Australia 
 
Appendix 5.5 Summary statistics of variables for Taiwan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  MovetoFull       20,306           1           0          1          1
         NOL       20,306    .0254605    .1575228          0          1
                                                                       
Changeindebt        4,395    .0156671    .2822534  -1.020212   1.211421
   DeltaSize        4,489    .1255192    .7538225  -3.907148   5.300576
 SalesGrowth        2,446   -.1822214    1.193104  -7.842027   7.369687
      EBITDA        4,475   -.0370755    .9323547  -6.382152   9.938145
        Cash        4,499    .4472997    1.046969  -.0021048   7.267857
                                                                       
    CashFlow        4,312    -.157016    1.220844   -14.1746   3.419661
         PTR       20,306    .4732059    .0066305        .47        .49
         CTR       20,306    .3662908     .022468        .33        .39
 InvestmentP        4,352    .2961263    .8376994  -2.652462   5.029501
  Investment        4,257    .2292114    .4382514  -1.810948   1.999595
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum Investment InvestmentP CTR PTR CashFlow Cash EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize Changeindebt NOL MovetoFull if Year<=1998
  MovetoFull       34,333    .5263158    .4993143          0          1
         NOL       34,333    .1303702    .3367152          0          1
                                                                       
Changeindebt       10,688   -.0178841    .2962017  -1.712505   1.126163
 SalesGrowth        9,532    -.015194    .3200214  -1.868145   .6840523
   DeltaSize       10,992   -.0173744    .2140438  -1.321001   .5675729
      EBITDA       10,744    .1426698    1.063673    -6.9712   33.52294
    CashFlow       10,953    .0637866    .3354266  -.1331544   2.180507
                                                                       
        Cash        5,080    .0703264    .2829446  -.1402353    1.53328
         PTR       34,333    .4052632      .02233         .4         .5
         CTR       34,333         .25           0        .25        .25
 InvestmentP       12,363    3.408809    11.32588  -.3751419   43.94871
  Investment       12,363    .1298725    .5502393  -.0523888   3.348711
                                                                       
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum Investment InvestmentP CTR PTR Cash CashFlow EBITDA DeltaSize SalesGrowth Changeindebt NOL MovetoFull if Year<=2009
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Appendix 5.6 Pairwise correlation analysis for Canada 
 
Appendix 5.7 Pairwise correlation analysis for Australia 
 
 
              
                 0.9691   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
CTRMovetof~l    -0.0002   0.0306* -0.0506*  0.0330*  0.5333*  0.5619*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1323   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
NOLmovetoF~l    -0.0093   0.0310* -0.0424*  0.0391*  0.2999*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0202   0.0000   0.9738   0.0000
         PTR    -0.0144* -0.0776* -0.0002   0.0321*  1.0000 
              
                 0.4167   0.0000   0.0000
Changeindebt    -0.0055  -0.1890*  0.1447*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize    -0.0732* -0.3791*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.0397*  1.0000 
              
              
Payout_EBI~A     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Payout~A SalesG~h DeltaS~e Change~t      PTR NOLmov~l CTRMov~l
              
                 0.0000   0.0024   0.0000   0.9000   0.0000   0.5762   0.0630
CTRMovetof~l    -0.0307*  0.0171* -0.7991* -0.0007   0.0676*  0.0042   0.0108 
              
                 0.1401   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0014   0.0000
NOLmovetoF~l     0.0083   0.0214* -0.4503*  0.0368*  0.0544*  0.0239* -0.0238*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.1116   0.0292
         PTR     0.1450*  0.2641* -0.8223*  0.2200*  0.3822*  0.0119  -0.0127*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.1926   0.0014   0.0904
Changeindebt     0.1357*  0.0872* -0.0445*  0.0383*  0.0083  -0.0259* -0.0108 
              
                 0.0000   0.4837   0.0000   0.5688   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize     0.0454* -0.0041   0.0306*  0.0034  -0.0277*  0.3101* -0.1975*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.3162   0.0000   0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.2934* -0.2719*  0.0480* -0.0475*  0.0081  -0.0454* -0.1596*
              
                 0.8698   0.0000   0.0356   0.0067   0.2366   0.0000   0.0000
Payout_EBI~A     0.0010   0.0486*  0.0130*  0.0169* -0.0074  -0.1215*  0.1588*
              
                 0.1482   0.0261   0.0000   0.3654   0.0034   0.0000
   Payout_CF    -0.0087   0.0134*  0.0299*  0.0053  -0.0172* -0.3146*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1760   0.9899   0.3773   0.7904   0.2220
 Payout_Cash     0.0103   0.0001  -0.0066   0.0020  -0.0092   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
L.Investme~P    -0.0255* -0.0742* -0.2460*  0.6630*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
L.Investment     0.1279* -0.0464* -0.1361*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
         CTR    -0.0987* -0.1746*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 InvestmentP     0.6727*  1.0000 
              
              
  Investment     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Invest~t Invest~P      CTR L.Inve~t L.Inve~P Payout~h Payout~F
> hangeindebt PTR NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull, sig star(.05)
. pwcorr Investment InvestmentP CTR l.Investment l.InvestmentP Payout_Cash Payout_CF Payout_EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize C
              
                 0.9691   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
CTRMovetof~l    -0.0002   0.0306* -0.0506*  0.0330*  0.5333*  0.5619*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1323   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
NOLmovetoF~l    -0.0093   0.0310* -0.0424*  0.0391*  0.2999*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0202   0.0000   0.9738   0.0000
         PTR    -0.0144* -0.0776* -0.0002   0.0321*  1.0000 
              
                 0.4167   0.0000   0.0000
Changeindebt    -0.0055  -0.1890*  0.1447*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize    -0.0732* -0.3791*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.0397*  1.0000 
              
              
Payout_EBI~A     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Payout~A SalesG~h DeltaS~e Change~t      PTR NOLmov~l CTRMov~l
              
                 0.0000   0.0024   0.0000   0.9000   0.0000   0.5762   0.0630
CTRMovetof~l    -0.0307*  0.0171* -0.7991* -0.0007   0.0676*  0.0042   0.0108 
              
                 0.1401   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0014   0.0000
NOLmovetoF~l     0.0083   0.0214* -0.4503*  0.0368*  0.0544*  0.0239* -0.0238*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.1116   0.0292
         PTR     0.1450*  0.2641* -0.8223*  0.2200*  0.3822*  0.0119  -0.0127*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.1926   0.0014   0.0904
Changeindebt     0.1357*  0.0872* -0.0445*  0.0383*  0.0083  -0.0259* -0.0108 
              
                 0.0000   0.4837   0.0000   0.5688   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize     0.0454* -0.0041   0.0306*  0.0034  -0.0277*  0.3101* -0.1975*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.3162   0.0000   0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.2934* -0.2719*  0.0480* -0.0475*  0.0081  -0.0454* -0.1596*
              
                 0.8698   0.0000   0.0356   0.0067   0.2366   0.0000   0.0000
Payout_EBI~A     0.0010   0.0486*  0.0130*  0.0169* -0.0074  -0.1215*  0.1588*
              
                 0.1482   0.0261   0.0000   0.3654   0.0034   0.0000
   Payout_CF    -0.0087   0.0134*  0.0299*  0.0053  -0.0172* -0.3146*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1760   0.9899   0.3773   0.7904   0.2220
 Payout_Cash     0.0103   0.0001  -0.0066   0.0020  -0.0092   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
L.Investme~P    -0.0255* -0.0742* -0.2460*  0.6630*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
L.Investment     0.1279* -0.0464* -0.1361*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
         CTR    -0.0987* -0.1746*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 InvestmentP     0.6727*  1.0000 
              
              
  Investment     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Invest~t Invest~P      CTR L.Inve~t L.Inve~P Payout~h Payout~F
> hangeindebt PTR NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull, sig star(.05)
. pwcorr Investment InvestmentP CTR l.Investment l.InvestmentP Payout_Cash Payout_CF Payout_EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize C
              
                 0.0365   0.4633   0.0000   0.2663   0.0000   0.0026
CTRMovetof~l    -0.0312*  0.0148  -0.1224*  0.0168   0.3711* -0.0211*  1.0000 
              
                 0.6995   0.1377   0.3512   0.6073   0.0000
NOLmovetoF~l     0.0058   0.0300  -0.0139   0.0078  -0.0489*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0327   0.0311   0.9436
         PTR     0.0811*  0.0432* -0.0322*  0.0011   1.0000 
              
                 0.8231   0.0000   0.0000
Changeindebt     0.0034  -0.1549*  0.2575*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize    -0.0626* -0.2700*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.1567*  1.0000 
              
              
      EBITDA     1.0000 
                                                                             
                 EBITDA SalesG~h DeltaS~e Change~t      PTR NOLmov~l CTRMov~l
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.3647
CTRMovetof~l    -0.4657* -0.2823*  0.9089* -0.4018* -0.2200* -0.1342*  0.0138 
              
                 0.0024   0.0501   0.0000   0.0068   0.1148   0.0804   0.2310
NOLmovetoF~l    -0.0465* -0.0297  -0.0297* -0.0452* -0.0260  -0.0261   0.0182 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
         PTR     0.5073*  0.2691*  0.5102*  0.5654*  0.2987* -0.1031*  0.0743*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.1460   0.0025   0.0035   0.1514   0.4969
Changeindebt     0.1191*  0.2369*  0.0219   0.0508*  0.0485*  0.0217  -0.0105 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0254   0.3839   0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize     0.3732*  0.7006* -0.1588*  0.0375*  0.0144   0.5898* -0.2546*
              
                 0.0002   0.0000   0.0053   0.0032   0.0000   0.0001   0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.0770* -0.1323*  0.0563* -0.0621* -0.1861* -0.0797* -0.1170*
              
                 0.0000   0.2612   0.0053   0.5623   0.0085   0.0000   0.0000
      EBITDA    -0.0705* -0.0170   0.0417* -0.0098   0.0435* -0.2262*  0.5044*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0021   0.4415   0.0639   0.0000
    CashFlow    -0.1346* -0.2393*  0.0469* -0.0129   0.0306  -0.3520*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.3294   0.0017
        Cash     0.2671*  0.3336* -0.2247* -0.0164  -0.0520*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0001   0.0000
L.Investme~P     0.3160*  0.1856*  0.0655*  0.6368*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
L.Investment   0.6202*  .3207*  .1685*  1. 0 0 
           
                 0.0000   0.8788
         CTR     0.0849* -0.0023   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
InvestmentP    0.6383*  1.0000 
     
   
  Investment     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Invest~t Invest~P      CTR L.Inve~t L.Inve~P     Cash CashFlow
> NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull if Year<1999, sig star(.05)
. pwco r Investment InvestmentP CTR l.Investment l.InvestmentP Cash CashFlow EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize Changeindebt PTR
              
              0.0365   0.4633   0.0000   0.2663   0.0000   0.0026
CTRMovetof~l   -0.0312*  0.0148  -0.1224*  0.0168   0.3711* -0.0211*  1.0000 
              
              0.6995   0.1377   0.3512   0.6073   0.0000
NOLmovetoF~l    0.0058   0.0300  -0.0139   0.0078  -0.0489*  1.0000 
              
              0.0000   0.0327   0.0311   0.9436
       PTR     0.0811*  0.0432* -0.0322*  0.0011   1.0000 
              
              0.8231   0.0000   0.0000
Changeindebt    0.0034  -0.1549*  0.2575*  1.0000 
              
              0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize    -0.0626* -0.2700*  1.0000 
              
              0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.1567*  1.0000 
              
           
      EBITDA     1.0000 
                                                                             
                 EBITDA SalesG~h DeltaS~e Change~t      PTR NOLmov~l CTRMov~l
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.3647
CTRMovetof~l    -0.4657* -0.2823*  0.9089* -0.4018* -0.2200* -0.1342*  0.0138 
              
                 0.0024   0.0501   0.0000   0.0068   0.1148   0.0804   0.2310
NOLmovetoF~l    -0.0465* -0.0297  -0.0297* -0.0452* -0.0260  -0.0261   0.0182 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
         PTR     0.5073*  0.2691*  0.5102*  0.5654*  0.2987* -0.1031*  0.0743*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.1460   0.0025   0.0035   0.1514   0.4969
Changeindebt     0.1191*  0.2369*  0.0219   0.0508*  0.0485*  0.0217  -0.0105 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0254   0.3839   0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize     0.3732*  0.7006* -0.1588*  0.0375*  0.0144   0.5898* -0.2546*
              
                 0.0002   0.0000   0.0053   0.0032   0.0000   0.0001   0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.0770* -0.1323*  0.0563* -0.0621* -0.1861* -0.0797* -0.1170*
                 0.0000   0.2612   0.0053   0.5623   0.0085   0.0000   0.0000
      EBITDA    -0.0705* -0.0170   0.0417* -0.0098   0.0435* -0.2262*  0.5044*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0021   0.4415   0.0639   0.0000
    CashFlow    -0.1346* -0.2393*  0.0469* -0.0129   0.0306  -0.3520*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.3294   0.0017
        Cash     0.2671*  0.3336* -0.2247* -0.0164  -0.0520*  1.0000 
              
               0.0000   0.0000   0.0001   0.0000
L.Investme~P   .3160*  .1856*  0.0655* 0.6368*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
L.Investment     0.6202*  0.3207*  0.1685*  1.0000 
              
         . 000   0.8788
       CTR    0.0849* - .0023   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 InvestmentP     0.6383*  1.0000 
              
           
Investment     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Invest~t Invest~P      CTR L.Inve~t L.Inve~P     Cash CashFlow
>  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull if Year<1999, sig star(.05)
. pwcorr Investment InvestmentP CTR l.Investment l.InvestmentP Cash CashFlow EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize Changeindebt PTR       
          0.9691   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000 0.0000   0.0000
CTRMovetof~l    -0.0002   0.0306* -0.0506*  0.0330*  0.5333*  0.5619*  1.0000 
       
          0.1323   0.0001   0.0000   0
NOLmovetoF~l    -0.0093   0.0310* -0.0424*  391* 2999 1 00
       
          0.0202   0.0000   0.9738   
         PTR    -0.0144* -0.0776* -0.0002   21 1 000 
       
          0.4167   0.0000   0.0000
Changeindebt    -0.0055  -0.1890*  0.1447*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize    -0.0732* -0.3791*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.0397*  1.0000 
              
              
Payout_EBI~A     1.0000 
                                                                
              Payout~A SalesG~h DeltaS~e Change~t      PTR NOLmov~l CTRMov~l
              
                0.0000   0.0024   0.0000   0.9000   0.0000   0.5762   0.0630
CTRMovetof~l    -0.0307*  0.0171* -0.7991* -0.0007   0.0676*  0.0042   0.0108 
              
                 0.1401   0.0001   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0014   0.0000
NOLmovetoF~l     0.0083   0.0214* -0.4503*  0.0368*  0.0544*  0.0239* -0.0238*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.1116   0.0292
         PTR     0.1450*  0.2641* -0.8223*  0.2200*  0.3822*  0.0119  -0.0127*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.1926   0.0014   0.0904
Changeindebt     0.1357*  0.0872* -0.0445*  0.0383*  0.0083  -0.0259* -0.0108 
              
                 0.0000   0.4837   0.0000   0.5688   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize     0.0454* -0.0041   0.0306*  0.0034  -0.0277*  0.3101* -0.1975*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.3162   0.0000   0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.2934* -0.2719*  0.0480* -0.0475*  0.0081  -0.0454* -0.1596*
              
                 0.8698   0.0000   0.0356   0.0067   0.2366   0.0000   0.0000
Payout_EBI~A     0.0010   0.0486*  0.0130*  0.0169* -0.0074  -0.1215*  0.1588*
              
                 0.1482   0.0261   0.0000   0.3654   0.0034   0.0000
   Payout_CF    -0.0087   0.0134*  0.0299*  0.0053  -0.0172* -0.3146*  1.0000 
              
                 0.1760   0.9899   0.3773   0.7904   0.2220
 Payout_Cash     0.0103   0.0001  -0.0066   0.0020  -0.0092   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
L.Investme~P    -0.0255* -0.0742* -0.2460*  0.6630*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
L.Investment     0.1279* -0.0464* -0.1361*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
         CTR    -0.0987* -0.1746*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 InvestmentP     0.6727*  1.0000 
              
              
  Investment     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Invest~t Invest~P      CTR L.Inve~t L.Inve~P Payout~h Payout~F
> hangeindebt PTR NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull, sig star(.05)
. pwcorr Investment InvestmentP CTR l.Investment l.InvestmentP Payout_Cash Payout_CF Payout_EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize C
              
                 0.0365   0.4633   0.0000   0.2663   0.0000   0.0026
CTRMovetof~l    -0.0312*  0.0148  -0.1224*  0.0168   0.3711* -0.0211*  1.0000 
              
                 0.6995   0.1377   0.3512   0.6073   0.0000
NOLmovetoF~l     0.0058   0.0300  -0.0139   0.0078  -0.0489*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0327   0.0311   0.9436
         PTR     0.0811*  0.0432* -0.0322*  0.0011   1.0000 
              
                 0.8231   0.0000   0.0000
Changeindebt     0.0034  -0.1549*  0.2575*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize    -0.0626* -0.2700*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.1567*  1.0000 
              
              
      EBITDA     1.0000 
                                                                             
                 EBITDA SalesG~h DeltaS~e Change~t      PTR NOLmov~l CTRMov~l
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.3647
CTRMovetof~l    -0.4657* -0.2823*  0.9089* -0.4018* -0.2200* -0.1342*  0.0138 
              
                 0.0024   0.0501   0.0000   0.0068   0.1148   0.0804   0.2310
NOLmovetoF~l    -0.0465* -0.0297  -0.0297* -0.0452* -0.0260  -0.0261   0.0182 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
    PTR   .5073*  .2691*  .5102*  0.5654*  0.2987* -0.1031*  0.0743*
           
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.1460   0.0025   0.0035   0.1514   0.4969
Changeindebt     0.1191*  0.2369*  0.0219   0.0508*  0.0485*  0.0217  -0.0105 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0254   0.3839   0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize     0.3732*  0.7006* -0.1588*  0.0375*  0.0144   0.5898* -0.2546*
         
          . 002   .0000   0.0053   0.0032   0.0000   0.0001   0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.0770* -0.1323*  0.0563* -0.0621* -0.1861* -0.0797* -0.1170*
              
                 0.0000   0.2612   0.0053   0.5623   0.0085   0.0000   0.0000
      EBITDA    -0.0705* -0.0170   0.0417* -0.0098   0.0435* -0.2262*  0.5044*
         
             . 000   0.0000   0.0021   0.4415   0.0639   0.0000
    CashFlow    -0.1346* -0.2393*  0.0469* -0.0129   0.0306  -0.3520*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.3294   0.0017
        Cash     0.2671*  0.3336* -0.2247* -0.0164  -0.0520*  1.0000 
          
            0.0000   0.0000   0.0001   0.0000
L.Investme~P   .3160*  .1856*  .0655*  0.6368* 1.000  
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
L.Investment     0.6202*  0.3207*  0.1685*  1.0000 
          
       . 00   .8788
       CTR   0.0849* -0.0023   1.0 00 
              
                 0.0000
 InvestmentP     0.6383*  1.0000 
       
         
Investment     1.0000 
                                                           
               Invest~t Invest~P      CTR L.Inve~t L.Inve~P     Cash CashFlow
>  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull if Year<1999, sig star(.05)
. pwcorr Investment InvestmentP CTR l.Investment l.InvestmentP Cash CashFlow EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize Changeindebt PTR
207 
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                 0.7307   0.0540   0.4196   0.0000   0.0000
CTRMovetof~l     0.0033  -0.0197  -0.0078   0.3592*  1.0000*  1.0000 
              
                 0.7307   0.0540   0.4196   0.0000
CTRMovetof~l     0.0033  -0.0197  -0.0078   0.3592*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.6461
NOLmovetoF~l    -0.0862*  0.0422* -0.0044   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0522
Changeindebt     0.4785*  0.0200   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.1014*  1.0000 
              
              
   DeltaSize     1.0000 
                                                                    
               DeltaS~e SalesG~h Change~t NOLmov~l CTRMov~l CTRMov~l
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0011
CTRMovetof~l     0.0571*  0.0714*  0.0547*  0.0692*  0.0846*  0.0434*  0.0314*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0011
CTRMovetof~l     0.0571*  0.0714*  0.0547*  0.0692*  0.0846*  0.0434*  0.0314*
              
                 0.1142   0.3873   0.8731   0.6921   0.7882   0.0005   0.0000
NOLmovetoF~l    -0.0142  -0.0078  -0.0015   0.0038   0.0038  -0.0332* -0.0626*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0029   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
Changeindebt    -0.0709* -0.2409*  0.0455*  0.0292* -0.1691* -0.3032* -0.1180*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0074   0.4260   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.5106* -0.5082* -0.0277*  0.0082  -0.5149* -0.5237* -0.5452*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize    -0.1839* -0.4052*  0.0831*  0.0624* -0.1785* -0.2835*  0.0603*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.5480   0.2965   0.0000   0.0000
      EBITDA     0.5989*  0.6295* -0.0059  -0.0102   0.6393*  0.6844*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.2932   0.4555   0.0000
    CashFlow     0.7211*  0.8455*  0.0102   0.0072   0.7827*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.6809   0.9656
        Cash     0.7063*  0.8239*  0.0059   0.0006   1.0000 
              
                 0.1408   0.0031   0.0000
L.Investme~P    -0.0143  -0.0287*  0.8000*  1.0000 
              
                 0.9629   0.0163
L.Investment     0.0005  -0.0233*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 InvestmentP     0.8018*  1.0000 
              
              
  Investment     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Invest~t Invest~P L.Inve~t L.Inve~P     Cash CashFlow   EBITDA
> RMovetofull if Year<=2009, sig star(.05)
. pwcorr Investment InvestmentP l.Investment l.InvestmentP Cash CashFlow EBITDA DeltaSize SalesGrowth Changeindebt   NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull CT
. 
              
                 0.7307   0.0540   0.4196   0.0000   0.0000
CTRMovetof~l     0.0033  -0.0197  -0.0078   0.3592*  1.0000*  1.0000 
              
                 0.7307   0.0540   0.4196   0.0000
CTRMovetof~l     0.0033  -0.0197  -0.0078   0.3592*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.6461
NOLmovetoF~l    -0.0862*  0.0422* -0.0044   1.0000 
              
              0.0000   0.0522
Changeindebt     0.4785*  0.0200   1.0000 
              
              0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.1014*  1.0000 
              
           
   DeltaSize     1.0000 
                                                                    
               DeltaS~e SalesG~h Change~t NOLmov~l CTRMov~l CTRMov~l
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0011
CTRMovetof~l     0.0571*  0.0714*  0.0547*  0.0692*  0.0846*  0.0434*  0.0314*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0011
CTRMovetof~l     0.0571*  0.0714*  0.0547*  0.0692*  0.0846*  0.0434*  0.0314*
              
                 0.1142   0.3873   0.8731   0.6921   0.7882   0.0005   0.0000
NOLmovetoF~l    -0.0142  -0.0078  -0.0015   0.0038   0.0038  -0.0332* -0.0626*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0029   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
Changeindebt    -0.0709* -0.2409*  0.0455*  0.0292* -0.1691* -0.3032* -0.1180*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0074   0.4260   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.5106* -0.5082* -0.0277*  0.0082  -0.5149* -0.5237* -0.5452*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize    -0.1839* -0.4052*  0.0831*  0.0624* -0.1785* -0.2835*  0.0603*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.5480   0.2965   0.0000   0.0000
      EBITDA     0.5989*  0.6295* -0.0059  -0.0102   0.6393*  0.6844*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.2932   0.4555   0.0000
    CashFlow     0.7211*  0.8455*  0.0102   0.0072   0.7827*  1.0000 
             
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.6809   0.9656
        Cash     0.7063*  0.8239*  0.0059   0.0006   1.0000 
              
                 0.1408   0.0031   0.0000
L.Investme~P    -0.0143  -0.0287*  0.8000*  1.0000 
              
                 0.9629   0.0163
L.Investment     0.0005  -0.0233*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 InvestmentP     0.8018*  1.0000 
              
              
  Investment     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Invest~t Invest~P L.Inve~t L.Inve~P     Cash CashFlow   EBITDA
> RMovetofull if Year<=2009, sig star(.05)
. pwcorr Investment InvestmentP l.Investment l.InvestmentP Cash CashFlow EBITDA DeltaSize SalesGrowth Changeindebt   NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull CT
. 
. 
                                                                               
          rho    .20063942   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e     1.103832
      sigma_u    .55301863
                                                                               
        _cons    -2.113746   .1955822   -10.81   0.000    -2.497327   -1.730165
NOLmovetoFull     .0972167   .0266288     3.65   0.000     .0449916    .1494417
CTRMovetofull    -1.669699   .0666911   -25.04   0.000    -1.800495   -1.538903
 Changeindebt      .129697   .0422374     3.07   0.002       .04686     .212534
    DeltaSize    -.0710082   .0896076    -0.79   0.428     -.246749    .1047326
  SalesGrowth    -.4372411    .043466   -10.06   0.000    -.5224877   -.3519945
     Cashflow     .8669927   .1369597     6.33   0.000     .5983837    1.135602
               
          L1.    -.2493885   .0086241   -28.92   0.000    -.2663024   -.2324747
  InvestmentP  
               
          CTR    -3.234094   .2165639   -14.93   0.000    -3.658825   -2.809363
          PTR     8.229588   .3968311    20.74   0.000     7.451312    9.007863
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,881 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3401                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                       F(9,1880)         =     327.85
     overall = 0.2238                                         max =         23
     between = 0.2402                                         avg =        7.1
     within = 0.2 52                                   min =          1
R-sq:                                      Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,881
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     13,363
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cashflow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  CTRMovetofull NOLmovetoFull  , fe r
            
    0.7307   0.0540   0.4196   0.0000   0.0000
CTRMovetof~l     0.0033 -0. 197 -0. 78  0.3592*  1. 00*  1. 00
             
                 0.7307   0.0540   0.4196   0.0000
CTRMovetof~l     0.0033  -0.0197  -0.0078   0.3592*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.6461
NOLmovetoF~l    -0.0862*  0.0422* -0.0044   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0522
Changeindebt     0.4785*  0.0200   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.1014*  1.0000 
              
              
   DeltaSize     1.0000 
                                                       
            DeltaS~e SalesG~h Change~t NOLmov~l CTRMov~l CTRMov~l
              
                0.0000  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  0.0000   0.0000   0.0011
CTRMovetof~l     0.0571*  0.0714*  0.0547*  0.0692*  0.0846*  0.0434*  0.0314*
              
    0.0000  0. 0  0.0 00  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0011
CTRMovetof~l     0.0571*  0.0714*  0. 47*  0.0692*  . 846*  0.0434*  0.0314*
 
    0.1142  0.3873  0.8731   0.6921   0.7882   0.0005   0.0000
NOLmove oF l    -0.0142  -0.00 8 -0. 15  0.0038   0.0038  -0.0332* -0.0626*
 
    0.0000  0.0000   0.0000   0.0029   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
Cha g ind b    -0.0709* -0. 409*  0. 455*  0.0292* -0.1691* -0.3032* -0.1180*
 
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0074   0.4260   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
 SalesGrowth    -0.5106* -0.5082* -0.0277*  0.0082  -0.5149* -0.5237* -0.5452*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000
   DeltaSize    -0.1839* -0.4052*  0.0831*  0.0624* -0.1785* -0.2835*  0.0603*
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.5480   0.2965   0.0000   0.0000
      EBITDA     0.5989*  0.6295* -0.0059  -0.0102   0.6393*  0.6844*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.2932   0.4555   0.0000
    CashFlow     0.7211*  0.8455*  0.0102   0.0072   0.7827*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0000   0.6809   0.9656
        Cash     0.7063*  0.8239*  0.0059   0.0006   1.0000 
              
                 0.1408   0.0031   0.0000
L.Investme~P    -0.0143  -0.0287*  0.8000*  1.0000 
              
                 0.9629   0.0163
L.Investment     0.0005  -0.0233*  1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
 InvestmentP     0.8018*  1.0000 
              
              
  Investment     1.0000 
                                                                             
               Invest~t Invest~P L.Inve~t L.Inve~P     Cash CashFlow   EBITDA
> RMovetofull if Year<=2009, sig star(.05)
. pwcorr Investment InvestmentP l.Investment l.InvestmentP Cash CashFlow EBITDA DeltaSize SalesGrowth Changeindebt   NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull CT
. 
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Appendix 5.10 Regression results for Canada (INVP and Cash) 
 
 
Appendix 5.11 Regression results for Canada (INVP and EBITDA) 
 
 
 
                                                                               
          rho    .25023397   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .98162678
      sigma_u     .5670961
                                                                               
        _cons    -.9608065   .3431469    -2.80   0.005    -1.633863   -.2877499
NOLmovetoFull     .1359278   .0316896     4.29   0.000      .073771    .1980846
CTRMovetofull    -1.695748      .1011   -16.77   0.000    -1.894048   -1.497448
 Changeindebt     .0948311   .0535125     1.77   0.077    -.0101297    .1997918
    DeltaSize    -.0279544   .1291793    -0.22   0.829    -.2813297    .2254209
  SalesGrowth     -.539152   .0575857    -9.36   0.000     -.652102   -.4262021
         Cash     .0235312   .0714134     0.33   0.742    -.1165409    .1636032
               
          L1.    -.2422988   .0161824   -14.97   0.000    -.2740394   -.2105582
  InvestmentP  
               
          CTR    -4.382533   .3517416   -12.46   0.000    -5.072448   -3.692619
          PTR     6.686405   .7206162     9.28   0.000     5.272972    8.099839
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,627 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4230                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,1626)         =     101.29
     overall = 0.1783                                         max =         25
     between = 0.2518                                         avg =        5.0
     within  = 0.2074                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,627
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      8,210
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  CTRMovetofull NOLmovetoFull  , fe r
                                                                               
          rho    .16636089   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    1.1654953
      sigma_u     .5206515
                                                                               
        _cons     -1.33075   .1753107    -7.59   0.000    -1.674579   -.9869215
NOLmovetoFull     .1057838   .0286926     3.69   0.000     .0495103    .1620574
CTRMovetofull    -1.442029   .0682304   -21.13   0.000    -1.575846   -1.308212
 Changeindebt      .113858   .0487488     2.34   0.020     .0182492    .2094668
    DeltaSize    -.1166557   .1038293    -1.12   0.261    -.3202913      .08698
  SalesGrowth     -.565929   .0508195   -11.14   0.000    -.6655989   -.4662592
       EBITDA     .0813518   .0864223     0.94   0.347    -.0881442    .2508478
               
          L1.    -.2116139   .0077719   -27.23   0.000    -.2268565   -.1963713
  InvestmentP  
               
          CTR    -2.579073   .2205946   -11.69   0.000    -3.011715   -2.146431
          PTR     6.027583   .3547779    16.99   0.000     5.331773    6.723392
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,842 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3622                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,1841)         =     250.71
     overall = 0.1473                                         max =         26
     between = 0.2350                                         avg =        7.2
     within  = 0.1582                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,842
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     13,232
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP EBITDA  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  CTRMovetofull NOLmovetoFull  , fe r
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Appendix 5.12 Regression results for Canada (INV and CF) 
 
 
Appendix 5.13 Regression results for Canada (INV and Cash) 
 
 
. 
                                                                               
          rho     .4097795   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .08774063
      sigma_u    .07310864
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0036527    .017272    -0.21   0.833    -.0375271    .0302216
NOLmovetoFull    -.0023766   .0029095    -0.82   0.414    -.0080829    .0033297
CTRMovetofull     -.120888   .0077661   -15.57   0.000     -.136119   -.1056569
 Changeindebt     .0240339   .0031982     7.51   0.000     .0177616    .0303062
    DeltaSize    -.0082871   .0068376    -1.21   0.226    -.0216972    .0051231
  SalesGrowth    -.0334888   .0033473   -10.00   0.000    -.0400536   -.0269239
     Cashflow     .0647537   .0093093     6.96   0.000      .046496    .0830113
               
          L1.    -.1532301   .0128957   -11.88   0.000    -.1785214   -.1279388
   Investment  
               
          CTR    -.2740319   .0260176   -10.53   0.000    -.3250583   -.2230056
          PTR     .3134634   .0280408    11.18   0.000     .2584691    .3684577
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,881 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1651                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,1880)         =      92.59
     overall = 0.1230                                         max =         23
     between = 0.0591                                         avg =        7.1
     within  = 0.1741                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,881
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     13,363
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cashflow  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  CTRMovetofull NOLmovetoFull  , fe r
. 
                                                                               
          rho    .45870396   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .08135046
      sigma_u    .07488742
                                                                               
        _cons      .038408   .0271882     1.41   0.158    -.0149196    .0917357
NOLmovetoFull     .0018798   .0035885     0.52   0.600    -.0051589    .0089184
CTRMovetofull    -.1185907   .0113604   -10.44   0.000    -.1408731   -.0963082
 Changeindebt     .0228245   .0043124     5.29   0.000      .014366     .031283
    DeltaSize    -.0028143    .009726    -0.29   0.772     -.021891    .0162625
  SalesGrowth    -.0414882   .0044832    -9.25   0.000    -.0502816   -.0326948
         Cash    -.0068827   .0062902    -1.09   0.274    -.0192204     .005455
               
          L1.    -.1554675   .0198638    -7.83   0.000    -.1944288   -.1165063
   Investment  
               
          CTR    -.3208263   .0394577    -8.13   0.000    -.3982195   -.2434331
          PTR     .2603935   .0459661     5.66   0.000     .1702345    .3505526
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,627 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2342                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,1626)         =      39.82
     overall = 0.0799                                         max =         25
     between = 0.0331                                         avg =        5.0
     within  = 0.1537                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,627
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      8,210
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cash  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  CTRMovetofull NOLmovetoFull  , fe r
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Appendix 5.14 Regression results for Canada (INV and EBITDA) 
 
 
Appendix 5.15 Regression results for Canada (INVP and CF) pre-2009 
 
 
 
                                                                               
          rho    .36725491   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .08942825
      sigma_u     .0681309
                                                                               
        _cons     .0169137   .0161801     1.05   0.296    -.0148194    .0486469
NOLmovetoFull    -.0020761   .0030282    -0.69   0.493    -.0080152    .0038631
CTRMovetofull     -.109987   .0079483   -13.84   0.000    -.1255755   -.0943984
 Changeindebt     .0220072   .0034793     6.33   0.000     .0151834    .0288311
    DeltaSize    -.0096063   .0073707    -1.30   0.193    -.0240621    .0048495
  SalesGrowth    -.0418326    .003829   -10.93   0.000    -.0493423   -.0343229
       EBITDA    -.0017251   .0064556    -0.27   0.789    -.0143862    .0109359
               
          L1.    -.1468449   .0128784   -11.40   0.000    -.1721027   -.1215871
   Investment  
               
          CTR     -.234684   .0259091    -9.06   0.000    -.2854984   -.1838697
          PTR     .2395083   .0255923     9.36   0.000     .1893153    .2897012
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,842 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1739                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,1841)         =      76.64
     overall = 0.0849                                         max =         26
     between = 0.0484                                         avg =        7.2
     within  = 0.1274                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,842
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =     13,232
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment EBITDA  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  CTRMovetofull NOLmovetoFull  , fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .28762455   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.2422054
     sigma_u    .78931784
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.767164   .2397621   -15.71   0.000    -4.237479   -3.296849
         NOL     .1038688   .0588528     1.76   0.078    -.0115764    .2193141
Changeindebt      .251904     .08132     3.10   0.002     .0923874    .4114206
   DeltaSize    -.0499368   .1809137    -0.28   0.783    -.4048156    .3049419
 SalesGrowth     -.771418   .0928277    -8.31   0.000     -.953508    -.589328
    Cashflow     2.446435   .3245823     7.54   0.000     1.809737    3.083133
              
         L1.    -.2141189    .011597   -18.46   0.000    -.2368676   -.1913703
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR     1.429529   .3086788     4.63   0.000     .8240278    2.035031
         PTR     7.919245   .4785695    16.55   0.000     6.980487    8.858003
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,460 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4229                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,1459)         =     203.21
     overall = 0.3443                                         max =         17
     between = 0.1823                                         avg =        5.0
     within  = 0.4054                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,460
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      7,325
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cashflow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOL  if Year<2009 , fe r
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Appendix 5.16 Regression results for Canada (INVP and Cash) pre-2009 
 
 
Appendix 5.17 Regression results for Canada (INVP and EBITDA) pre-2009 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho      .239579   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.2582429
     sigma_u    .70625548
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.648456   .3823172    -9.54   0.000    -4.398627   -2.898284
         NOL     .1072632   .0978237     1.10   0.273    -.0846836    .2992101
Changeindebt     .0996928   .1211493     0.82   0.411    -.1380228    .3374084
   DeltaSize     -.007385   .2555503    -0.03   0.977    -.5088185    .4940485
 SalesGrowth    -1.105347   .1241876    -8.90   0.000    -1.349024   -.8616695
        Cash     .0221123   .1720824     0.13   0.898    -.3155429    .3597674
              
         L1.    -.2461047   .0186602   -13.19   0.000    -.2827192   -.2094902
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR     1.522816   .5721871     2.66   0.008     .4000867    2.645545
         PTR      7.72962   .7445026    10.38   0.000     6.268778    9.190461
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,077 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4192                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,1076)         =      73.51
     overall = 0.2297                                         max =         19
     between = 0.2293                                         avg =        3.9
     within  = 0.2859                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,077
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      4,251
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL if Year<2009 , fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .16155068   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.3735544
     sigma_u    .60292301
                                                                              
       _cons     -3.37161   .2063523   -16.34   0.000    -3.776397   -2.966822
         NOL     .1392548   .0626819     2.22   0.026      .016296    .2622137
Changeindebt     .1273047   .0929281     1.37   0.171    -.0549861    .3095955
   DeltaSize     .0128706   .2009094     0.06   0.949    -.3812398    .4069811
 SalesGrowth    -1.119309   .1019659   -10.98   0.000    -1.319328    -.919289
      EBITDA     -.166909   .2505643    -0.67   0.505     -.658424     .324606
              
         L1.    -.2078139   .0093409   -22.25   0.000    -.2261373   -.1894904
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR     1.692152   .3066985     5.52   0.000     1.090523    2.293782
         PTR     6.915144   .3775499    18.32   0.000      6.17453    7.655759
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,424 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4264                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,1423)         =     190.58
     overall = 0.2171                                         max =         19
     between = 0.2301                                         avg =        5.3
     within  = 0.2487                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,424
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      7,602
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP EBITDA   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year<2009, fe r
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Appendix 5.18 Regression results for Canada (INV and CF) pre-2009 
 
 
Appendix 5.19 Regression results for Canada (INV and Cash) pre-2009 
 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .41925497   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .08798829
     sigma_u    .07476033
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1732499   .0179485    -9.65   0.000    -.2084576   -.1380422
         NOL    -.0077897   .0046605    -1.67   0.095    -.0169318    .0013523
Changeindebt     .0311956   .0057632     5.41   0.000     .0198906    .0425006
   DeltaSize    -.0092427   .0124256    -0.74   0.457    -.0336165    .0151312
 SalesGrowth    -.0496503   .0064841    -7.66   0.000    -.0623695   -.0369312
    Cashflow     .1557285     .02254     6.91   0.000     .1115141    .1999428
              
         L1.    -.1938234   .0142446   -13.61   0.000    -.2217654   -.1658813
  Investment  
              
         CTR     .1350643   .0268667     5.03   0.000     .0823628    .1877658
         PTR     .3619016   .0315361    11.48   0.000     .3000406    .4237625
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,460 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2482                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,1459)         =      89.34
     overall = 0.2388                                         max =         17
     between = 0.0618                                         avg =        5.0
     within  = 0.3475                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,460
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      7,325
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cashflow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year<2009 , fe r
                                                                              
         rho    .44330363   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0905524
     sigma_u    .08080559
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1833789   .0287487    -6.38   0.000    -.2397889    -.126969
         NOL    -.0087174   .0074352    -1.17   0.241    -.0233066    .0058718
Changeindebt      .026507   .0092254     2.87   0.004     .0084052    .0446088
   DeltaSize      .002316   .0182798     0.13   0.899    -.0335521    .0381841
 SalesGrowth    -.0712371   .0092874    -7.67   0.000    -.0894605   -.0530137
        Cash    -.0059478   .0143008    -0.42   0.678    -.0340085    .0221129
              
         L1.    -.2331029   .0243524    -9.57   0.000    -.2808864   -.1853194
  Investment  
              
         CTR     .1668497   .0453539     3.68   0.000     .0778577    .2558418
         PTR     .3710818    .051063     7.27   0.000     .2708874    .4712761
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,077 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2567                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,1076)         =      45.95
     overall = 0.1408                                         max =         19
     between = 0.0131                                         avg =        3.9
     within  = 0.2638                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,077
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      4,251
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year<2009 , fe r
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Appendix 5.20 Regression results for Canada (INV and EBITDA) pre-2009 
 
 
Appendix 5.21 Regression results for Canada (INVP and CF) post-2009 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .34839162   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .09398059
     sigma_u    .06871929
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1651599   .0163833   -10.08   0.000     -.197298   -.1330219
         NOL     -.005444   .0046468    -1.17   0.242    -.0145593    .0036712
Changeindebt     .0234213   .0061291     3.82   0.000     .0113982    .0354444
   DeltaSize    -.0023996   .0132644    -0.18   0.856    -.0284194    .0236203
 SalesGrowth    -.0704964   .0070431   -10.01   0.000    -.0843123   -.0566804
      EBITDA    -.0129448   .0163336    -0.79   0.428    -.0449854    .0190958
              
         L1.    -.2025984   .0137124   -14.77   0.000     -.229497   -.1756997
  Investment  
              
         CTR      .143873   .0263233     5.47   0.000     .0922364    .1955097
         PTR     .3393254   .0273159    12.42   0.000     .2857416    .3929092
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,424 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2223                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,1423)         =      86.77
     overall = 0.1492                                         max =         19
     between = 0.0215                                         avg =        5.3
     within  = 0.2251                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,424
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      7,602
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment EBITDA  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year<2009, fe r
                                                                              
         rho    .23942507   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .66170055
     sigma_u    .37125756
                                                                              
       _cons     12.82772   .5816595    22.05   0.000     11.68661    13.96882
         NOL    -.0169123   .0468078    -0.36   0.718    -.1087403    .0749157
Changeindebt     .0299516   .0278865     1.07   0.283    -.0247563    .0846596
   DeltaSize    -.2977582   .0642486    -4.63   0.000    -.4238017   -.1717146
 SalesGrowth    -.0050991   .0309925    -0.16   0.869    -.0659004    .0557021
    Cashflow    -.0705711   .0659076    -1.07   0.284    -.1998691     .058727
              
         L1.    -.3249237   .0187139   -17.36   0.000    -.3616368   -.2882106
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR    -30.30582   .9458057   -32.04   0.000    -32.16131   -28.45033
         PTR    -7.965137   .9927054    -8.02   0.000    -9.912636   -6.017639
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,288 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0753                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,1287)         =     764.29
     overall = 0.0733                                         max =          6
     between = 0.0204                                         avg =        3.9
     within  = 0.0974                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,288
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      5,046
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cashflow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009 , fe r
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Appendix 5.23 Regression results for Canada (INVP and EBITDA) post-2009 
 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .46146049   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .11049481
     sigma_u    .10228227
                                                                              
       _cons     7.425648   .1351796    54.93   0.000     7.160415    7.690881
         NOL    -.0314134   .0092374    -3.40   0.001    -.0495379    -.013289
Changeindebt     .0223932   .0050725     4.41   0.000     .0124405    .0323459
   DeltaSize    -.0061472   .0102235    -0.60   0.548    -.0262065    .0139122
 SalesGrowth     -.017037   .0050191    -3.39   0.001    -.0268849    -.007189
        Cash     .0032454   .0100072     0.32   0.746    -.0163895    .0228802
              
         L1.    -.5342019   .0045158  -118.30   0.000    -.5430623   -.5253416
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR    -33.74559   .2385601  -141.46   0.000    -34.21367   -33.27752
         PTR     5.687373   .1856374    30.64   0.000     5.323138    6.051608
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,125 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1226                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,1124)         =    5359.86
     overall = 0.7664                                         max =          5
     between = 0.5858                                         avg =        3.0
     within  = 0.8484                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,125
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      3,367
.  xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009 , fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .27371578   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .66729486
     sigma_u    .40965135
                                                                              
       _cons     13.16807   .6055812    21.74   0.000        11.98    14.35614
         NOL    -.0116685   .0464823    -0.25   0.802    -.1028604    .0795234
Changeindebt     .0189573   .0310821     0.61   0.542    -.0420214    .0799361
   DeltaSize    -.2888397    .068792    -4.20   0.000    -.4238003   -.1538792
 SalesGrowth     .0096421   .0311273     0.31   0.757    -.0514255    .0707096
      EBITDA     .0494596   .0387956     1.27   0.203    -.0266521    .1255712
              
         L1.    -.3238429    .019339   -16.75   0.000    -.3617833   -.2859025
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR     -30.5884   .9535344   -32.08   0.000    -32.45911    -28.7177
         PTR    -8.522866   1.053565    -8.09   0.000    -10.58982   -6.455914
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,251 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0598                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,1250)         =     540.91
     overall = 0.0715                                         max =          6
     between = 0.0275                                         avg =        3.8
     within  = 0.0934                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,251
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      4,718
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP EBITDA   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009, fe r
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Appendix 5.25 Regression results for Canada (INV and Cash) post-2009 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .50786756   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07145566
     sigma_u    .07258902
                                                                              
       _cons     .8234875   .0893228     9.22   0.000     .6482533    .9987217
         NOL    -.0063601   .0037666    -1.69   0.092    -.0137495    .0010293
Changeindebt     .0167134   .0030936     5.40   0.000     .0106443    .0227826
   DeltaSize    -.0218033   .0076065    -2.87   0.004    -.0367257   -.0068809
 SalesGrowth    -.0074161   .0040002    -1.85   0.064    -.0152638    .0004315
    Cashflow     .0084438   .0055088     1.53   0.126    -.0023635     .019251
              
         L1.    -.0522508   .0270794    -1.93   0.054    -.1053755    .0008738
  Investment  
              
         CTR    -1.634448   .1444279   -11.32   0.000    -1.917788   -1.351108
         PTR    -.6773209   .1171244    -5.78   0.000    -.9070966   -.4475451
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,288 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0646                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,1287)         =      37.43
     overall = 0.0258                                         max =          6
     between = 0.0042                                         avg =        3.9
     within  = 0.0673                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,288
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      5,046
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cashflow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009 , fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .63189587   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .05030253
     sigma_u    .06590635
                                                                              
       _cons     .5132541   .0953909     5.38   0.000     .3260898    .7004184
         NOL    -.0023551   .0035855    -0.66   0.511    -.0093901      .00468
Changeindebt     .0117453   .0025811     4.55   0.000      .006681    .0168095
   DeltaSize      -.00958   .0066742    -1.44   0.151    -.0226752    .0035153
 SalesGrowth     -.010129    .003093    -3.27   0.001    -.0161978   -.0040602
        Cash    -.0103075   .0055984    -1.84   0.066    -.0212921     .000677
              
         L1.    -.0595888   .0279421    -2.13   0.033    -.1144133   -.0047643
  Investment  
              
         CTR    -1.418562   .1481711    -9.57   0.000    -1.709285   -1.127839
         PTR    -.1490376   .1272761    -1.17   0.242     -.398763    .1006879
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,125 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0714                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,1124)         =      30.76
     overall = 0.0325                                         max =          5
     between = 0.0075                                         avg =        3.0
     within  = 0.1170                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,125
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      3,367
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009 , fe r
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Appendix 5.27 Regression results for sample for firms paying dividends in 
Canada (INVP and CF) pre-2009 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .51785569   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07070101
     sigma_u    .07327258
                                                                              
       _cons     .8625108   .0928952     9.28   0.000     .6802631    1.044758
         NOL    -.0062507   .0039167    -1.60   0.111    -.0139348    .0014334
Changeindebt     .0147752   .0033414     4.42   0.000     .0082198    .0213306
   DeltaSize    -.0202319   .0074564    -2.71   0.007    -.0348604   -.0056035
 SalesGrowth    -.0055469   .0039708    -1.40   0.163    -.0133372    .0022433
      EBITDA    -.0092374   .0052536    -1.76   0.079    -.0195443    .0010694
              
         L1.    -.0541242   .0276803    -1.96   0.051    -.1084292    .0001808
  Investment  
              
         CTR    -1.691499   .1478106   -11.44   0.000    -1.981483   -1.401515
         PTR    -.7259667   .1229887    -5.90   0.000    -.9672537   -.4846797
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,251 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0899                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,1250)         =      36.62
     overall = 0.0163                                         max =          6
     between = 0.0021                                         avg =        3.8
     within  = 0.0606                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,251
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      4,718
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment EBITDA  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009, fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .31135909   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.3001423
     sigma_u    .87422912
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.865436   .2899429    -9.88   0.000    -3.434731    -2.29614
         NOL     .2064421    .134562     1.53   0.125    -.0577669     .470651
Changeindebt     .3203286   .1415011     2.26   0.024     .0424948    .5981624
   DeltaSize     .3129875   .3126366     1.00   0.317    -.3008665    .9268415
 SalesGrowth    -.7657946   .1770414    -4.33   0.000    -1.113411   -.4181784
    Cashflow     3.002192    .587814     5.11   0.000     1.848034     4.15635
              
         L1.    -.1941098   .0166102   -11.69   0.000    -.2267235   -.1614962
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR     .5965365   .4191188     1.42   0.155    -.2263926    1.419466
         PTR     6.420979   .6011642    10.68   0.000     5.240608    7.601349
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 678 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4091                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,677)          =     102.54
     overall = 0.3490                                         max =         16
     between = 0.0456                                         avg =        5.0
     within  = 0.4328                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        678
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      3,380
.  xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cashflow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOL  if Year<2009&DP>0 , fe r
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Appendix 5.29 Regression results for sample for firms paying dividends in 
Canada (INVP and EBITDA) pre-2009  
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .25192605   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.3050762
     sigma_u    .75735612
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.861896   .5124035    -5.59   0.000    -3.868691   -1.855102
         NOL     .1451078   .1226491     1.18   0.237    -.0958789    .3860946
Changeindebt    -.0968659   .2027604    -0.48   0.633    -.4952591    .3015274
   DeltaSize     .3128105   .4571539     0.68   0.494    -.5854271    1.211048
 SalesGrowth    -1.102824   .2531423    -4.36   0.000    -1.600209   -.6054376
        Cash    -.2273806   .4500021    -0.51   0.614    -1.111566    .6568046
              
         L1.    -.2219313   .0254143    -8.73   0.000    -.2718665   -.1719961
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR     1.086375   .8586634     1.27   0.206    -.6007669    2.773518
         PTR      6.41272     .97455     6.58   0.000     4.497878    8.327562
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 488 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4196                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,487)          =      27.19
     overall = 0.1642                                         max =         19
     between = 0.1116                                         avg =        3.9
     within  = 0.2276                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        488
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      1,889
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL if Year<2009&DP>0 , fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .18911226   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.4490829
     sigma_u    .69979802
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.952503   .2572902   -11.48   0.000    -3.457688   -2.447319
         NOL     .1179023    .113312     1.04   0.298    -.1045835    .3403881
Changeindebt     .1907659   .1599299     1.19   0.233    -.1232531    .5047849
   DeltaSize     .3492384   .3428489     1.02   0.309    -.3239385    1.022415
 SalesGrowth    -1.197457    .187377    -6.39   0.000    -1.565368   -.8295461
      EBITDA    -.6067319   .4977749    -1.22   0.223    -1.584103    .3706388
              
         L1.    -.1993743   .0135626   -14.70   0.000    -.2260042   -.1727443
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR      1.47853   .4088334     3.62   0.000     .6757938    2.281266
         PTR      6.22678   .4814645    12.93   0.000     5.281435    7.172126
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 677 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4092                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,676)          =     108.28
     overall = 0.1979                                         max =         19
     between = 0.1032                                         avg =        5.4
     within  = 0.2397                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        677
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      3,682
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP EBITDA   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year<2009&DP>0, fe r
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Appendix 5.31 Regression results for sample for firms paying dividends in 
Canada (INV and Cash) pre-2009  
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .38528081   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .08672637
     sigma_u    .06865964
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1546879   .0220579    -7.01   0.000    -.1979979   -.1113779
         NOL     .0006349   .0090081     0.07   0.944    -.0170523     .018322
Changeindebt     .0218578   .0089878     2.43   0.015     .0042104    .0395051
   DeltaSize     .0268409   .0198773     1.35   0.177    -.0121875    .0658694
 SalesGrowth    -.0416757   .0125388    -3.32   0.001    -.0662953   -.0170562
    Cashflow     .1801878   .0377981     4.77   0.000     .1059721    .2544035
              
         L1.    -.1935528   .0191933   -10.08   0.000    -.2312384   -.1558671
  Investment  
              
         CTR     .0919402   .0346821     2.65   0.008     .0238427    .1600377
         PTR     .3232022   .0389922     8.29   0.000     .2466421    .3997623
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 678 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2964                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,677)          =      49.30
     overall = 0.2651                                         max =         16
     between = 0.0134                                         avg =        5.0
     within  = 0.3740                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        678
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      3,380
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cashflow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year<2009&DP>0 , fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .41724451   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .08309639
     sigma_u    .07031278
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1545553   .0344803    -4.48   0.000    -.2223039   -.0868068
         NOL    -.0008681    .008846    -0.10   0.922    -.0182492    .0165131
Changeindebt      -.00304   .0137338    -0.22   0.825    -.0300248    .0239449
   DeltaSize     .0422767   .0282025     1.50   0.135    -.0131368    .0976902
 SalesGrowth    -.0611658   .0171861    -3.56   0.000    -.0949338   -.0273978
        Cash     -.013654   .0313299    -0.44   0.663    -.0752126    .0479045
              
         L1.    -.2315783    .030891    -7.50   0.000    -.2922745   -.1708822
  Investment  
              
         CTR     .1149977   .0608039     1.89   0.059    -.0044728    .2344681
         PTR     .3252334   .0595652     5.46   0.000      .208197    .4422699
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 488 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3215                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,487)          =      17.77
     overall = 0.1002                                         max =         19
     between = 0.0064                                         avg =        3.9
     within  = 0.2223                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        488
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      1,889
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year<2009&DP>0 , fe r
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Appendix 5.32 Regression results for sample for firms paying dividends in 
Canada (INV and EBITDA) pre-2009  
 
 
Appendix 5.33 Regression results for sample for firms not paying dividends in 
Canada (INVP and CF) pre-2009  
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .30886872   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0933225
     sigma_u    .06238685
                                                                              
       _cons     -.166044   .0214542    -7.74   0.000     -.208169   -.1239191
         NOL     -.004379   .0070476    -0.62   0.535    -.0182169    .0094589
Changeindebt     .0159907     .00947     1.69   0.092    -.0026035     .034585
   DeltaSize     .0286822   .0209527     1.37   0.171    -.0124581    .0698224
 SalesGrowth    -.0654939   .0124788    -5.25   0.000    -.0899958    -.040992
      EBITDA    -.0272687   .0311774    -0.87   0.382    -.0884849    .0339475
              
         L1.    -.2081416   .0181854   -11.45   0.000    -.2438483    -.172435
  Investment  
              
         CTR     .1322309   .0347315     3.81   0.000     .0640363    .2004255
         PTR     .3347151   .0344195     9.72   0.000     .2671331    .4022971
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 677 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2795                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,676)          =      44.65
     overall = 0.1365                                         max =         19
     between = 0.0194                                         avg =        5.4
     within  = 0.2095                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        677
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      3,682
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment EBITDA  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year<2009&DP>0, fe r
                                                                              
         rho    .62972676   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .94209237
     sigma_u     1.228594
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0938878   1.052343    -0.09   0.929     -2.17187    1.984094
         NOL     .2990632   .2065733     1.45   0.150    -.1088415    .7069678
Changeindebt    -.2162021   .4905435    -0.44   0.660    -1.184841    .7524371
   DeltaSize     -1.93387   .6476146    -2.99   0.003    -3.212665   -.6550738
 SalesGrowth    -.3376135   .4180553    -0.81   0.421    -1.163116    .4878888
    Cashflow     9.273475   1.034246     8.97   0.000     7.231228    11.31572
              
         L1.    -.0431829   .0583619    -0.74   0.460    -.1584257      .07206
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR     .4485404   1.573499     0.29   0.776    -2.658529     3.55561
         PTR     .0703494   1.423545     0.05   0.961    -2.740618    2.881317
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 164 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6522                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,163)          =      13.11
     overall = 0.6980                                         max =          8
     between = 0.7628                                         avg =        1.7
     within  = 0.8028                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        164
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        273
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cashflow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOL  if Year<2009&DP<0 , fe r
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. 
                                                                              
         rho    .54386069   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.4923676
     sigma_u     1.629562
                                                                              
       _cons    -6.420335   3.504633    -1.83   0.070    -13.36938     .528706
         NOL     .8399129   .5193608     1.62   0.109    -.1898836    1.869709
Changeindebt    -1.947365   1.903316    -1.02   0.309    -5.721288    1.826559
   DeltaSize      1.36803   2.166529     0.63   0.529    -2.927796    5.663857
 SalesGrowth    -1.352204    .984489    -1.37   0.173    -3.304264    .5998558
        Cash     4.111517   2.098048     1.96   0.053    -.0485248    8.271558
              
         L1.     -.385359   .1073899    -3.59   0.001    -.5982932   -.1724247
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR     1.747082   6.931969     0.25   0.802    -11.99773     15.4919
         PTR     14.59564   3.928792     3.72   0.000      6.80557    22.38571
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 106 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6420                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,105)          =       8.64
     overall = 0.1479                                         max =          5
     between = 0.1629                                         avg =        1.6
     within  = 0.4532                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        106
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        171
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL if Year<2009&DP<0 , fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .43424702   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    1.4512917
     sigma_u    1.2714805
                                                                              
       _cons    -6.287629   2.980075    -2.11   0.036     -12.1701   -.4051566
         NOL     .5441832   .3691335     1.47   0.142     -.184462    1.272828
Changeindebt    -.5931686   .8545818    -0.69   0.489    -2.280057    1.093719
   DeltaSize    -2.572106   1.106321    -2.32   0.021    -4.755911   -.3883019
 SalesGrowth    -2.125414    .691844    -3.07   0.002    -3.491069   -.7597598
      EBITDA     .9588976    2.08826     0.46   0.647    -3.163189    5.080985
              
         L1.    -.1569702   .0614595    -2.55   0.012    -.2782873   -.0356531
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR     10.15172   4.964587     2.04   0.042     .3519501    19.95149
         PTR     6.470834   2.838793     2.28   0.024     .8672449    12.07442
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 172 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3969                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,171)          =       5.08
     overall = 0.1946                                         max =         11
     between = 0.1015                                         avg =        2.0
     within  = 0.3656                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        172
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        342
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP EBITDA   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year<2009&DP<0, fe r
221 
 
Appendix 5.36 Regression results for sample for firms not paying dividends in 
Canada (INV and CF) pre-2009  
 
 
Appendix 5.37 Regression results for sample for firms not paying dividends in 
Canada (INV and Cash) pre-2009 
 
                                                                              
         rho    .54395445   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07005106
     sigma_u    .07650536
                                                                              
       _cons      .060172   .0800248     0.75   0.453     -.097847     .218191
         NOL    -.0042554   .0152436    -0.28   0.780    -.0343559     .025845
Changeindebt    -.0116363   .0299567    -0.39   0.698    -.0707895    .0475168
   DeltaSize    -.1432544   .0306905    -4.67   0.000    -.2038566   -.0826522
 SalesGrowth    -.0325291   .0250627    -1.30   0.196    -.0820185    .0169603
    Cashflow      .449619   .0585046     7.69   0.000     .3340943    .5651437
              
         L1.    -.0311755     .06639    -0.47   0.639    -.1622708    .0999199
  Investment  
              
         CTR    -.0120699   .1396682    -0.09   0.931    -.2878621    .2637224
         PTR    -.0996199   .0746893    -1.33   0.184    -.2471033    .0478635
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 164 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4326                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,163)          =      33.61
     overall = 0.5686                                         max =          8
     between = 0.5546                                         avg =        1.7
     within  = 0.6567                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        164
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        273
.  xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cashflow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year<2009&DP<0 , fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .56671042   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .07903581
     sigma_u    .09038896
                                                                              
       _cons    -.2082974   .1401123    -1.49   0.140    -.4861142    .0695194
         NOL     .0197281   .0141771     1.39   0.167    -.0083826    .0478387
Changeindebt    -.0485378   .0887601    -0.55   0.586    -.2245328    .1274571
   DeltaSize     .0304563   .0785377     0.39   0.699    -.1252695    .1861821
 SalesGrowth     -.086189   .0448636    -1.92   0.057    -.1751452    .0027672
        Cash     .1182435   .1214933     0.97   0.333    -.1226552    .3591421
              
         L1.    -.3226797   .0422283    -7.64   0.000    -.4064105   -.2389488
  Investment  
              
         CTR     .1262834   .3052876     0.41   0.680    -.4790454    .7316122
         PTR     .4227618   .1044375     4.05   0.000     .2156815    .6298421
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 106 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1692                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,105)          =      26.32
     overall = 0.2549                                         max =          5
     between = 0.2939                                         avg =        1.6
     within  = 0.3957                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        106
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        171
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year<2009&DP<0 , fe r
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. 
                                                                              
         rho    .54380199   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .08332953
     sigma_u    .09097931
                                                                              
       _cons    -.2280701   .1453214    -1.57   0.118     -.514925    .0587848
         NOL     .0100992   .0189577     0.53   0.595     -.027322    .0475204
Changeindebt    -.0208229   .0296713    -0.70   0.484     -.079392    .0377462
   DeltaSize     -.146966   .0566362    -2.59   0.010    -.2587622   -.0351697
 SalesGrowth    -.1124493   .0371756    -3.02   0.003    -.1858314   -.0390672
      EBITDA     .1005219   .1302619     0.77   0.441    -.1566065    .3576504
              
         L1.    -.1266492   .0691321    -1.83   0.069    -.2631114     .009813
  Investment  
              
         CTR      .399377   .2503146     1.60   0.112    -.0947276    .8934815
         PTR     .2301303   .1299251     1.77   0.078    -.0263333    .4865938
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 172 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2303                        Prob > F          =     0.0025
                                                F(8,171)          =       3.13
     overall = 0.1786                                         max =         11
     between = 0.1011                                         avg =        2.0
     within  = 0.3300                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        172
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        342
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment EBITDA  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year<2009&DP<0, fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .64072929   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .54958988
     sigma_u    .73394769
                                                                              
       _cons      3.06927   6.471183     0.47   0.636    -9.733191    15.87173
         NOL     .0970524   .1516968     0.64   0.523    -.2030615    .3971663
Changeindebt    -.4054797   .2488916    -1.63   0.106    -.8978819    .0869225
   DeltaSize    -.8638667   .5414898    -1.60   0.113     -1.93514    .2074062
 SalesGrowth     .0933555   .2127356     0.44   0.662    -.3275165    .5142275
    Cashflow     8.718309   2.454742     3.55   0.001     3.861895    13.57472
              
         L1.    -.1211111   .2786837    -0.43   0.665    -.6724535    .4302312
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR    -16.85162   16.40275    -1.03   0.306     -49.3025    15.59925
         PTR     3.514009   6.527161     0.54   0.591      -9.3992    16.42722
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 131 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4906                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,130)          =      11.81
     overall = 0.3410                                         max =          4
     between = 0.3288                                         avg =        1.4
     within  = 0.5054                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        131
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        188
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cashflow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOL  if Year>2009&DP<0 , fe r
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. 
                                                                              
         rho    .78127922   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .10418527
     sigma_u    .19690848
                                                                              
       _cons     8.322929   1.621995     5.13   0.000     5.101507    11.54435
         NOL    -.0525862   .0390998    -1.34   0.182    -.1302417    .0250694
Changeindebt     .0100387   .0655689     0.15   0.879    -.1201868    .1402642
   DeltaSize     .0374302   .0540981     0.69   0.491    -.0700133    .1448738
 SalesGrowth    -.0226005   .0339584    -0.67   0.507    -.0900449    .0448438
        Cash     -.712445   .1426917    -4.99   0.000    -.9958431   -.4290469
              
         L1.    -.4769518   .0544058    -8.77   0.000    -.5850065   -.3688972
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR    -34.58441   2.510553   -13.78   0.000    -39.57059   -29.59824
         PTR     4.287013   2.509195     1.71   0.091    -.6964651    9.270491
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 93 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4639                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,92)           =     144.35
     overall = 0.5337                                         max =          4
     between = 0.3657                                         avg =        1.4
     within  = 0.8787                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         93
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        133
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL if Year>2009&DP<0 , fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho     .7310006   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .61071313
     sigma_u    1.0067473
                                                                              
       _cons     14.23403   6.786325     2.10   0.038     .8051197    27.66295
         NOL     .0382911   .1434284     0.27   0.790    -.2455279    .3221101
Changeindebt      .718035   .4558428     1.58   0.118    -.1839956    1.620066
   DeltaSize    -2.168398   1.089184    -1.99   0.049    -4.323697   -.0130997
 SalesGrowth      .652571   .2799713     2.33   0.021     .0985584    1.206584
      EBITDA     .5841878   1.113924     0.52   0.601    -1.620068    2.788443
              
         L1.     .0564855   .3405152     0.17   0.869    -.6173327    .7303037
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR    -25.34206   16.37569    -1.55   0.124    -57.74659    7.062474
         PTR    -14.03689   9.224947    -1.52   0.131     -32.2914    4.217611
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 128 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6040                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,127)          =       6.07
     overall = 0.0814                                         max =          4
     between = 0.0339                                         avg =        1.4
     within  = 0.4198                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        128
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        182
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP EBITDA   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009&DP<0, fe r
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. 
                                                                              
         rho    .75453558   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .04509082
     sigma_u     .0790558
                                                                              
       _cons     .2589602   .5546043     0.47   0.641    -.8382581    1.356178
         NOL     .0141795    .023858     0.59   0.553    -.0330207    .0613797
Changeindebt     .0024558   .0152395     0.16   0.872    -.0276938    .0326054
   DeltaSize    -.0752371   .0360192    -2.09   0.039    -.1464967   -.0039774
 SalesGrowth     .0053295   .0116632     0.46   0.648    -.0177447    .0284037
    Cashflow     .5275788   .2266341     2.33   0.021     .0792103    .9759474
              
         L1.    -.4048437   .2002146    -2.02   0.045    -.8009444    -.008743
  Investment  
              
         CTR    -1.600199   1.054939    -1.52   0.132    -3.687269    .4868713
         PTR     .4325641   .6450491     0.67   0.504    -.8435883    1.708717
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 131 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4877                        Prob > F          =     0.0061
                                                F(8,130)          =       2.84
     overall = 0.0284                                         max =          4
     between = 0.0012                                         avg =        1.4
     within  = 0.5019                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        131
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        188
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cashflow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009&DP<0 , fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .87753476   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03505068
     sigma_u    .09382579
                                                                              
       _cons     .9850229    .527654     1.87   0.065    -.0629435    2.032989
         NOL     .0018709   .0168383     0.11   0.912    -.0315714    .0353132
Changeindebt    -.0020196   .0191814    -0.11   0.916    -.0401155    .0360762
   DeltaSize     .0001991   .0262154     0.01   0.994     -.051867    .0522652
 SalesGrowth     .0047932   .0152776     0.31   0.754    -.0255495    .0351359
        Cash    -.2090078   .0583212    -3.58   0.001    -.3248388   -.0931767
              
         L1.    -.4505807    .248267    -1.81   0.073    -.9436603     .042499
  Investment  
              
         CTR    -2.940592     1.0489    -2.80   0.006    -5.023799    -.857385
         PTR    -.2264823   .6116935    -0.37   0.712    -1.441358    .9883937
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 93 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6987                        Prob > F          =     0.0011
                                                F(8,92)           =       3.60
     overall = 0.0215                                         max =          4
     between = 0.0584                                         avg =        1.4
     within  = 0.5730                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         93
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        133
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009&DP<0 , fe r
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. 
                                                                              
         rho    .73782185   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .04406619
     sigma_u    .07392358
                                                                              
       _cons     .7978425   .4492441     1.78   0.078    -.0911304    1.686815
         NOL     .0086979   .0138946     0.63   0.532     -.018797    .0361929
Changeindebt     .0545855   .0302691     1.80   0.074    -.0053115    .1144825
   DeltaSize    -.1373368   .0808039    -1.70   0.092    -.2972331    .0225595
 SalesGrowth     .0170847   .0183332     0.93   0.353    -.0191934    .0533629
      EBITDA    -.1667147   .0633849    -2.63   0.010    -.2921419   -.0412875
              
         L1.     -.030185   .1387397    -0.22   0.828    -.3047259    .2443559
  Investment  
              
         CTR    -1.865885   .6550391    -2.85   0.005    -3.162089   -.5696809
         PTR    -.5059998   .6671207    -0.76   0.450    -1.826111    .8141116
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 128 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3863                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,127)          =      10.61
     overall = 0.1145                                         max =          4
     between = 0.0384                                         avg =        1.4
     within  = 0.5510                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        128
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        182
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment EBITDA  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009&DP<0, fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .26801165   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .58270841
     sigma_u    .35259491
                                                                              
       _cons     11.74635   .8751875    13.42   0.000     10.02753    13.46516
         NOL     .0020197    .072514     0.03   0.978    -.1403934    .1444327
Changeindebt    -.0040763   .0426951    -0.10   0.924    -.0879269    .0797744
   DeltaSize    -.1327732   .1068378    -1.24   0.214    -.3425962    .0770497
 SalesGrowth     .0481634   .0625483     0.77   0.442    -.0746776    .1710044
    Cashflow     .3951551   .2198772     1.80   0.073    -.0366703    .8269805
              
         L1.    -.3792655   .0265884   -14.26   0.000    -.4314835   -.3270475
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR    -31.62798   1.409337   -22.44   0.000    -34.39583   -28.86013
         PTR    -4.887323   1.442306    -3.39   0.001    -7.719924   -2.054723
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 599 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1279                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,598)          =     328.51
     overall = 0.0944                                         max =          6
     between = 0.0446                                         avg =        3.5
     within  = 0.1316                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        599
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,106
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cashflow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOL  if Year>2009&DP>0 , fe r
226 
 
Appendix 5.46 Regression results for sample for firms paying dividends in 
Canada (INVP and Cash) post-2009  
 
Appendix 5.47 Regression results for sample for firms paying dividends in 
Canada (INVP and EBITDA) post-2009 
 
 
 
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .44432187   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .10516846
     sigma_u    .09404219
                                                                              
       _cons     7.549751    .191726    39.38   0.000     7.173107    7.926396
         NOL    -.0302573   .0164632    -1.84   0.067    -.0625992    .0020847
Changeindebt     .0151696   .0071797     2.11   0.035     .0010652     .029274
   DeltaSize     .0077537    .017079     0.45   0.650    -.0257978    .0413052
 SalesGrowth    -.0120725    .008624    -1.40   0.162    -.0290143    .0048694
        Cash     .0328214    .020784     1.58   0.115    -.0080087    .0736514
              
         L1.    -.5380599   .0064968   -82.82   0.000    -.5508229    -.525297
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR    -33.77145   .3526551   -95.76   0.000    -34.46424   -33.07866
         PTR     5.409837   .2528219    21.40   0.000      4.91317    5.906504
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 526 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0761                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,525)          =    2484.95
     overall = 0.7865                                         max =          5
     between = 0.6532                                         avg =        2.9
     within  = 0.8532                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        526
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      1,506
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL if Year>2009&DP>0 , fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .25219679   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .5926048
     sigma_u    .34414486
                                                                              
       _cons     12.12096   .9469165    12.80   0.000     10.26118    13.98074
         NOL     .0101479   .0754793     0.13   0.893    -.1380965    .1583923
Changeindebt    -.0037816   .0469886    -0.08   0.936    -.0960691    .0885059
   DeltaSize     -.195974   .1121462    -1.75   0.081    -.4162338    .0242857
 SalesGrowth     .0148661   .0597982     0.25   0.804      -.10258    .1323123
      EBITDA    -.1089732   .0829259    -1.31   0.189     -.271843    .0538967
              
         L1.    -.3963182   .0251839   -15.74   0.000    -.4457803    -.346856
 InvestmentP  
              
         CTR    -32.34857   1.370582   -23.60   0.000    -35.04045   -29.65669
         PTR    -5.238456   1.580604    -3.31   0.001    -8.342827   -2.134086
                                                                              
 InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 584 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0601                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,583)          =     289.42
     overall = 0.0867                                         max =          6
     between = 0.0368                                         avg =        3.5
     within  = 0.1149                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        584
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,015
. xtreg InvestmentP  PTR CTR l.InvestmentP EBITDA   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009&DP>0, fe r
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. 
                                                                              
         rho    .58041615   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0535428
     sigma_u    .06297402
                                                                              
       _cons     .6216865    .121724     5.11   0.000     .3826281    .8607449
         NOL     .0011994   .0052992     0.23   0.821    -.0092078    .0116066
Changeindebt     .0079085   .0043708     1.81   0.071    -.0006755    .0164926
   DeltaSize    -.0240847   .0122554    -1.97   0.050    -.0481536   -.0000158
 SalesGrowth    -.0060189   .0069146    -0.87   0.384    -.0195988     .007561
    Cashflow     .0158765   .0132657     1.20   0.232    -.0101766    .0419296
              
         L1.     -.100226   .0470758    -2.13   0.034    -.1926799   -.0077721
  Investment  
              
         CTR    -1.371885    .214119    -6.41   0.000    -1.792402   -.9513687
         PTR     -.417603   .1417177    -2.95   0.003    -.6959279   -.1392781
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 599 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1163                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,598)          =      17.13
     overall = 0.0152                                         max =          6
     between = 0.0029                                         avg =        3.5
     within  = 0.0824                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        599
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,106
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cashflow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009&DP>0 , fe r
. 
                                                                              
         rho    .69286695   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0403224
     sigma_u    .06056308
                                                                              
       _cons     .3526523   .1277461     2.76   0.006      .101696    .6036085
         NOL     .0037044   .0048196     0.77   0.442    -.0057637    .0131725
Changeindebt     .0050063   .0031695     1.58   0.115    -.0012202    .0112328
   DeltaSize    -.0123526   .0087157    -1.42   0.157    -.0294745    .0047693
 SalesGrowth    -.0112163   .0052781    -2.13   0.034    -.0215851   -.0008476
        Cash      .003601   .0078908     0.46   0.648    -.0119005    .0191024
              
         L1.    -.0869718   .0557573    -1.56   0.119    -.1965067    .0225631
  Investment  
              
         CTR     -1.09358    .223196    -4.90   0.000    -1.532047   -.6551129
         PTR    -.0122323   .1515486    -0.08   0.936    -.3099485    .2854839
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 526 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1253                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,525)          =      12.90
     overall = 0.0109                                         max =          5
     between = 0.0006                                         avg =        2.9
     within  = 0.1098                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        526
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      1,506
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009&DP>0 , fe r
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. 
                                                                              
         rho    .59660185   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .05214618
     sigma_u    .06341585
                                                                              
       _cons     .7090653   .1215539     5.83   0.000     .4703284    .9478021
         NOL     .0015944   .0054564     0.29   0.770    -.0091222    .0123109
Changeindebt      .007328    .004605     1.59   0.112    -.0017164    .0163723
   DeltaSize    -.0284621   .0125013    -2.28   0.023    -.0530152    -.003909
 SalesGrowth    -.0055089   .0074164    -0.74   0.458     -.020075    .0090571
      EBITDA    -.0267005   .0115725    -2.31   0.021    -.0494293   -.0039717
              
         L1.    -.1065842   .0472601    -2.26   0.024    -.1994049   -.0137635
  Investment  
              
         CTR    -1.464128   .2137215    -6.85   0.000    -1.883885    -1.04437
         PTR    -.5454781   .1423189    -3.83   0.000    -.8249984   -.2659579
                                                                              
  Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                   (Std. Err. adjusted for 584 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1834                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(8,583)          =      17.27
     overall = 0.0073                                         max =          6
     between = 0.0055                                         avg =        3.5
     within  = 0.0967                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        584
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,015
. xtreg Investment  PTR CTR l.Investment EBITDA  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOL  if Year>2009&DP>0, fe r
                                                                               
          rho    .41328951   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .36909734
      sigma_u      .309782
                                                                               
        _cons     .7560382   .8199133     0.92   0.357    -.8555954    2.367672
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -16.68796   .5864194   -28.46   0.000    -17.84063   -15.53528
NOLmovetoFull     .0292769   .0284984     1.03   0.305      -.02674    .0852938
 Changeindebt     .0217005    .074088     0.29   0.770     -.123928     .167329
    DeltaSize     .8065128   .0661413    12.19   0.000     .6765044    .9365212
  SalesGrowth     .0143511   .0162152     0.89   0.377    -.0175217    .0462238
     CashFlow    -.0501328   .0589119    -0.85   0.395    -.1659309    .0656653
               
          L1.    -.0054585   .0257269    -0.21   0.832    -.0560278    .0451107
  InvestmentP  
               
          PTR    -2.109588   1.971802    -1.07   0.285    -5.985391    1.766214
          CTR      17.6087   .9018338    19.53   0.000     15.83604    19.38135
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 422 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1036                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,421)          =     241.41
     overall = 0.6837                                         max =         14
     between = 0.7979                                         avg =        5.4
     within  = 0.6218                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        422
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,275
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
> r
. xtreg InvestmentP CTR  PTR l.InvestmentP CashFlow  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt   NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999, fe 
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          rho    .44137888   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .36711604
      sigma_u    .32632509
                                                                               
        _cons     1.101892   .8394483     1.31   0.190    -.5481509    2.751936
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -17.00023   .6557599   -25.92   0.000    -18.28921   -15.71125
NOLmovetoFull     .0380083   .0291334     1.30   0.193    -.0192571    .0952736
 Changeindebt    -.0168935   .0720846    -0.23   0.815    -.1585851    .1247981
    DeltaSize     .8599282    .070539    12.19   0.000     .7212748    .9985816
  SalesGrowth     .0172633    .015475     1.12   0.265    -.0131547    .0476813
         Cash    -.1057358   .0911317    -1.16   0.247    -.2848669    .0733953
               
          L1.    -.0099703   .0282503    -0.35   0.724    -.0654998    .0455593
  InvestmentP  
               
          PTR    -2.460534   1.944307    -1.27   0.206     -6.28232    1.361251
          CTR     17.45542   .9129769    19.12   0.000     15.66085       19.25
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 421 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0930                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,420)          =     253.12
     overall = 0.6754                                         max =         14
     between = 0.7862                                         avg =        5.4
     within  = 0.6238                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        421
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,271
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg InvestmentP CTR PTR l.InvestmentP Cash  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999, fe r
                                                                               
          rho    .41398981   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .36963072
      sigma_u    .31067785
                                                                               
        _cons      .420327   1.078125     0.39   0.697    -1.698852    2.539506
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -16.73842   .7079058   -23.64   0.000    -18.12989   -15.34695
NOLmovetoFull     .0385049   .0296345     1.30   0.195    -.0197452     .096755
 Changeindebt     .0355694   .0733454     0.48   0.628    -.1085995    .1797383
    DeltaSize     .7921392   .0630881    12.56   0.000     .6681323    .9161461
  SalesGrowth     .0172571   .0168271     1.03   0.306    -.0158185    .0503327
       EBITDA     .0349535   .0977802     0.36   0.721    -.1572447    .2271517
               
          L1.    -.0063234   .0276728    -0.23   0.819    -.0607175    .0480707
  InvestmentP  
               
          PTR    -1.373478   2.308729    -0.59   0.552     -5.91155    3.164593
          CTR     17.58993   .9099097    19.33   0.000      15.8014    19.37846
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 422 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0737                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,421)          =     247.26
     overall = 0.6763                                         max =         14
     between = 0.7931                                         avg =        5.4
     within  = 0.6200                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        422
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,278
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg InvestmentP CTR  PTR l.InvestmentP EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999, fe r
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          rho    .42426256   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e     .1816731
      sigma_u    .15595372
                                                                               
        _cons     1.192503   .3173247     3.76   0.000     .5687692    1.816237
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -13.58981   .7363257   -18.46   0.000    -15.03713   -12.14249
NOLmovetoFull     .0385672    .020043     1.92   0.055    -.0008294    .0779638
 Changeindebt     .0083624   .0321343     0.26   0.795    -.0548009    .0715257
    DeltaSize     .1752511   .0249883     7.01   0.000      .126134    .2243682
  SalesGrowth    -.0091549   .0072457    -1.26   0.207     -.023397    .0050872
     CashFlow      .014357    .015922     0.90   0.368    -.0169393    .0456534
               
          L1.     .1815572   .0478926     3.79   0.000     .0874194    .2756949
   Investment  
               
          PTR    -1.533727   .7335216    -2.09   0.037    -2.975538   -.0919157
          CTR     12.48617   .6702139    18.63   0.000      11.1688    13.80354
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 423 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0987                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,422)          =    1793.57
     overall = 0.7912                                         max =         14
     between = 0.8155                                         avg =        5.3
     within  = 0.7300                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        423
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,240
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Investment CTR PTR  l.Investment CashFlow  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt   NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999, fe r
                                                                               
          rho    .41711491   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .18054542
      sigma_u    .15272947
                                                                               
        _cons     1.246749   .2760308     4.52   0.000     .7041787    1.789319
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -13.55306   .7151034   -18.95   0.000    -14.95868   -12.14744
NOLmovetoFull     .0336329   .0190974     1.76   0.079    -.0039053    .0711711
 Changeindebt     .0239418   .0320634     0.75   0.456    -.0390825    .0869661
    DeltaSize      .147882   .0245983     6.01   0.000     .0995313    .1962327
  SalesGrowth    -.0093767   .0070635    -1.33   0.185    -.0232609    .0045075
         Cash     .0609116   .0300016     2.03   0.043       .00194    .1198832
               
          L1.     .1807456   .0469106     3.85   0.000     .0885373    .2729538
   Investment  
               
          PTR    -1.868876   .6365508    -2.94   0.004    -3.120089    -.617662
          CTR     12.71349    .644958    19.71   0.000     11.44575    13.98123
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 422 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1203                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,421)          =    1947.98
     overall = 0.7922                                         max =         14
     between = 0.8204                                         avg =        5.3
     within  = 0.7340                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        422
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,237
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Investment CTR PTR l.Investment Cash  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999, fe r
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          rho    .42096299   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .18105554
      sigma_u    .15437629
                                                                               
        _cons     .8952594    .350216     2.56   0.011     .2068744    1.583644
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -13.31564   .7477134   -17.81   0.000    -14.78535   -11.84593
NOLmovetoFull     .0396558   .0202895     1.95   0.051    -.0002251    .0795368
 Changeindebt     .0086301   .0325497     0.27   0.791    -.0553497    .0726098
    DeltaSize     .1679366   .0247662     6.78   0.000      .119256    .2166171
  SalesGrowth    -.0071215   .0075098    -0.95   0.344    -.0218829    .0076398
       EBITDA     .0486886   .0309851     1.57   0.117    -.0122157    .1095929
               
          L1.     .1908102    .048979     3.90   0.000     .0945371    .2870834
   Investment  
               
          PTR    -1.104946   .7558802    -1.46   0.145    -2.590705    .3808133
          CTR     12.45547   .6745609    18.46   0.000     11.12956    13.78139
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 423 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0588                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,422)          =    1889.36
     overall = 0.7915                                         max =         14
     between = 0.8114                                         avg =        5.3
     within  = 0.7324                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        423
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,244
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Investment CTR  PTR l.Investment EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt   NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999, fe r
                                                                               
          rho    .44616883   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .35948509
      sigma_u    .32265753
                                                                               
        _cons     1.140945   .9586422     1.19   0.235    -.7434818    3.025371
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -16.65882   .6107526   -27.28   0.000    -17.85939   -15.45825
NOLmovetoFull    -.0002126   .0239362    -0.01   0.993    -.0472646    .0468395
 Changeindebt     .0796623   .0730884     1.09   0.276    -.0640094    .2233339
    DeltaSize     .8026409   .0725519    11.06   0.000      .660024    .9452579
  SalesGrowth     .0209059   .0170668     1.22   0.221    -.0126427    .0544545
     CashFlow    -.0346425   .0620983    -0.56   0.577    -.1567106    .0874256
               
          L1.    -.0127923   .0274447    -0.47   0.641     -.066741    .0411564
  InvestmentP  
               
          PTR    -3.130806   2.287543    -1.37   0.172    -7.627486    1.365874
          CTR     17.84245   .9672632    18.45   0.000     15.94107    19.74382
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 414 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1082                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,413)          =     459.51
     overall = 0.6870                                         max =         14
     between = 0.7988                                         avg =        4.9
     within  = 0.6190                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        414
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,045
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
>  fe r
. xtreg InvestmentP CTR  PTR l.InvestmentP CashFlow  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999&DP>0,
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. 
                                                                               
          rho    .50032683   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .35075945
      sigma_u     .3509888
                                                                               
        _cons     1.329085   .9140701     1.45   0.147    -.4677374    3.125908
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -16.84099   .6528817   -25.79   0.000    -18.12438   -15.55759
NOLmovetoFull    -.0052455   .0219549    -0.24   0.811     -.048403    .0379121
 Changeindebt      .008787   .0719364     0.12   0.903    -.1326212    .1501952
    DeltaSize     .9090642   .0776212    11.71   0.000     .7564812    1.061647
  SalesGrowth     .0235946   .0164249     1.44   0.152    -.0086925    .0558816
         Cash    -.2185241   .0841911    -2.60   0.010    -.3840218   -.0530264
               
          L1.    -.0138766    .028294    -0.49   0.624    -.0694951     .041742
  InvestmentP  
               
          PTR    -2.885748   2.141992    -1.35   0.179    -7.096344    1.324848
          CTR        17.28   .9212098    18.76   0.000     15.46914    19.09086
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 413 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0794                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,412)          =     461.85
     overall = 0.6817                                         max =         14
     between = 0.7704                                         avg =        4.9
     within  = 0.6345                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        413
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,043
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg InvestmentP CTR PTR l.InvestmentP Cash  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999&DP>0, fe r
. 
                                                                               
          rho    .43857285   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .35991159
      sigma_u    .31810464
                                                                               
        _cons     1.176843   1.215374     0.97   0.333    -1.212246    3.565933
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -16.77315   .7252844   -23.13   0.000    -18.19886   -15.34744
NOLmovetoFull     .0013274   .0237601     0.06   0.955    -.0453784    .0480333
 Changeindebt     .0832912   .0737286     1.13   0.259    -.0616388    .2282213
    DeltaSize     .8031507   .0701445    11.45   0.000      .665266    .9410355
  SalesGrowth     .0201213    .017345     1.16   0.247    -.0139742    .0542167
       EBITDA    -.0327838   .1043785    -0.31   0.754    -.2379632    .1723956
               
          L1.    -.0135553   .0281879    -0.48   0.631    -.0689649    .0418543
  InvestmentP  
               
          PTR    -3.027324   2.596918    -1.17   0.244     -8.13215    2.077502
          CTR      17.7232   .9544728    18.57   0.000     15.84697    19.59943
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 414 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1147                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,413)          =     445.68
     overall = 0.6842                                         max =         14
     between = 0.8103                                         avg =        4.9
     within  = 0.6173                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        414
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,048
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
>  r
. xtreg InvestmentP CTR PTR  l.InvestmentP EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999&DP>0, fe
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. 
                                                                               
          rho    .48892165   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .17819135
      sigma_u      .174286
                                                                               
        _cons     .8551794   .3766447     2.27   0.024     .1147997    1.595559
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull     -14.0271   .7746286   -18.11   0.000    -15.54981    -12.5044
NOLmovetoFull     .0250907   .0200589     1.25   0.212    -.0143396     .064521
 Changeindebt     .0160462   .0350932     0.46   0.648    -.0529373    .0850298
    DeltaSize     .1702516   .0260699     6.53   0.000     .1190052    .2214979
  SalesGrowth    -.0052621   .0074501    -0.71   0.480     -.019907    .0093828
     CashFlow     .0145971   .0155721     0.94   0.349    -.0160133    .0452075
               
          L1.     .1386927   .0516825     2.68   0.008     .0370991    .2402862
   Investment  
               
          PTR     -.863142   .8802705    -0.98   0.327    -2.593511    .8672273
          CTR     12.99987   .7127506    18.24   0.000      11.5988    14.40094
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 414 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0865                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,413)          =    1061.45
     overall = 0.7897                                         max =         14
     between = 0.7971                                         avg =        4.8
     within  = 0.7266                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        414
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,004
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
> e r
. xtreg Investment CTR PTR  l.Investment CashFlow  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999&DP>0, f
. 
                                                                               
          rho    .48369471   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .17734226
      sigma_u    .17165032
                                                                               
        _cons     1.036098   .3297925     3.14   0.002     .3878125    1.684384
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -14.02406   .7657559   -18.31   0.000    -15.52933   -12.51878
NOLmovetoFull     .0243471    .020229     1.20   0.229    -.0154179     .064112
 Changeindebt     .0263362   .0357674     0.74   0.462    -.0439731    .0966456
    DeltaSize     .1522441   .0273547     5.57   0.000     .0984719    .2060162
  SalesGrowth    -.0053977   .0072204    -0.75   0.455    -.0195912    .0087958
         Cash     .0439936   .0343798     1.28   0.201    -.0235881    .1115752
               
          L1.     .1413581   .0512172     2.76   0.006     .0406784    .2420377
   Investment  
               
          PTR    -1.423831   .7730754    -1.84   0.066    -2.943495    .0958336
          CTR     13.20976   .6987174    18.91   0.000     11.83626    14.58325
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 413 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1013                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,412)          =    1114.76
     overall = 0.7904                                         max =         14
     between = 0.7991                                         avg =        4.8
     within  = 0.7299                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        413
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,003
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Investment CTR  PTR l.Investment Cash  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt   NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999&DP>0, fe r
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. 
                                                                               
          rho    .48289123   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .17769916
      sigma_u    .17171929
                                                                               
        _cons     .6208888   .4137369     1.50   0.134     -.192404    1.434181
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -13.77258   .8020193   -17.17   0.000    -15.34913   -12.19603
NOLmovetoFull     .0252624   .0207524     1.22   0.224    -.0155311    .0660559
 Changeindebt     .0155654   .0354873     0.44   0.661    -.0541929    .0853238
    DeltaSize     .1638719   .0254915     6.43   0.000     .1137627    .2139812
  SalesGrowth    -.0035521   .0077982    -0.46   0.649    -.0188812    .0117769
       EBITDA     .0462098   .0322533     1.43   0.153    -.0171914    .1096109
               
          L1.     .1482446   .0532459     2.78   0.006     .0435778    .2529115
   Investment  
               
          PTR    -.5699363   .9019632    -0.63   0.528    -2.342947    1.203075
          CTR     12.99199   .7217929    18.00   0.000     11.57314    14.41083
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 414 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0479                         Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,413)          =    1098.80
     overall = 0.7904                                         max =         14
     between = 0.7963                                         avg =        4.9
     within  = 0.7288                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        414
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      2,008
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Investment CTR PTR  l.Investment EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999&DP>0, fe r
. 
                                                                               
          rho    .29870181   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .30469363
      sigma_u    .19885244
                                                                               
        _cons    -.6413042   4.068514    -0.16   0.876    -8.909519    7.626911
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -14.35554   7.668051    -1.87   0.070    -29.93889     1.22782
NOLmovetoFull     .1128155    .165504     0.68   0.500     -.223529    .4491601
 Changeindebt    -.0380904   .1119902    -0.34   0.736    -.2656818    .1895011
    DeltaSize     .3140065   .1462815     2.15   0.039     .0167267    .6112862
  SalesGrowth     .0051897   .1035176     0.05   0.960    -.2051834    .2155628
     CashFlow     .1483068   .1477255     1.00   0.323    -.1519076    .4485212
               
          L1.     .2090395   .3146912     0.66   0.511      -.43049    .8485689
  InvestmentP  
               
          PTR    -.1795811   8.809451    -0.02   0.984    -18.08254    17.72338
          CTR     16.10876   7.888612     2.04   0.049     .0771665    32.14034
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 35 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1724                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,34)           =      48.13
     overall = 0.8252                                         max =          5
     between = 0.7577                                         avg =        1.7
     within  = 0.8503                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         35
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =         61
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
> , fe r
. xtreg InvestmentP CTR  PTR l.InvestmentP CashFlow  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt   NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999&DP<0
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. 
                                                                               
          rho    .31995789   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .31175891
      sigma_u    .21384415
                                                                               
        _cons    -.8613826   2.619015    -0.33   0.744    -6.183861    4.461096
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -13.53567   7.545106    -1.79   0.082    -28.86917    1.797835
NOLmovetoFull     .1865997    .174538     1.07   0.293    -.1681042    .5413036
 Changeindebt    -.0386694   .0753454    -0.51   0.611    -.1917896    .1144508
    DeltaSize     .4078937   .1871332     2.18   0.036     .0275933    .7881941
  SalesGrowth    -.0418941   .1008867    -0.42   0.681    -.2469206    .1631324
         Cash    -.2727837   .3476219    -0.78   0.438    -.9792363     .433669
               
          L1.     .2265192   .3382015     0.67   0.508     -.460789    .9138273
  InvestmentP  
               
          PTR     1.066186   5.837364     0.18   0.856    -10.79677    12.92914
          CTR     14.36848   7.976438     1.80   0.081    -1.841594    30.57855
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 35 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2154                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,34)           =     105.40
     overall = 0.8135                                         max =          5
     between = 0.7432                                         avg =        1.7
     within  = 0.8519                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         35
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =         60
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
> r
. xtreg InvestmentP CTR PTR l.InvestmentP Cash  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt   NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999&DP<0, fe 
. 
. 
. 
                                                                               
          rho    .30821327   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .30603595
      sigma_u    .20427348
                                                                               
        _cons    -1.079785   2.985711    -0.36   0.720    -7.147479     4.98791
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -13.56923    7.30366    -1.86   0.072    -28.41205    1.273598
NOLmovetoFull     .1275149   .1613723     0.79   0.435    -.2004331    .4554629
 Changeindebt    -.0310835   .1241319    -0.25   0.804    -.2833498    .2211828
    DeltaSize     .3299439    .176275     1.87   0.070      -.02829    .6881779
  SalesGrowth    -.0377686    .103203    -0.37   0.717    -.2475023     .171965
       EBITDA    -.0973925   .4136918    -0.24   0.815    -.9381155    .7433304
               
          L1.     .2190335   .3216324     0.68   0.500    -.4346021    .8726691
  InvestmentP  
               
          PTR     .7714492   6.229457     0.12   0.902    -11.88833    13.43123
          CTR     15.38015   7.600339     2.02   0.051    -.0655939     30.8259
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 35 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1796                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,34)           =     112.12
     overall = 0.8221                                         max =          5
     between = 0.7518                                         avg =        1.7
     within  = 0.8489                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         35
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =         61
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
> e r
. xtreg InvestmentP CTR PTR  l.InvestmentP EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt   NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999&DP<0, f
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. 
                                                                               
          rho     .1932951   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .19959245
      sigma_u    .09770059
                                                                               
        _cons      1.16536   1.603721     0.73   0.472    -2.090368    4.421087
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -8.087916   6.691242    -1.21   0.235    -21.67186    5.496027
NOLmovetoFull     .1039866   .1164355     0.89   0.378    -.1323901    .3403632
 Changeindebt      .071613   .0558011     1.28   0.208    -.0416692    .1848953
    DeltaSize    -.1614275   .0814311    -1.98   0.055    -.3267413    .0038863
  SalesGrowth    -.0305826   .0474981    -0.64   0.524    -.1270088    .0658436
     CashFlow     .0686825    .070478     0.97   0.336    -.0743954    .2117604
               
          L1.     .6011236   .4194767     1.43   0.161    -.2504595    1.452707
   Investment  
               
          PTR    -2.973938   3.508061    -0.85   0.402    -10.09568    4.147804
          CTR     8.547931   6.650209     1.29   0.207    -4.952711    22.04857
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 36 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0251                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,35)           =     233.28
     overall = 0.9156                                         max =          5
     between = 0.8984                                         avg =        1.7
     within  = 0.9078                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         36
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =         62
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
> e r
. xtreg Investment CTR PTR  l.Investment CashFlow  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999&DP<0, f
. 
                                                                               
          rho    .19411877   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .20610842
      sigma_u    .10115654
                                                                               
        _cons     .6921909   1.221529     0.57   0.575    -1.787645    3.172027
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -7.651094   6.855136    -1.12   0.272    -21.56776    6.265571
NOLmovetoFull      .095315    .114554     0.83   0.411    -.1372421     .327872
 Changeindebt     .0726618   .0618071     1.18   0.248    -.0528134     .198137
    DeltaSize    -.1443745   .1044538    -1.38   0.176    -.3564271     .067678
  SalesGrowth    -.0350249   .0637883    -0.55   0.586    -.1645221    .0944723
         Cash     .0273341   .2077937     0.13   0.896    -.3945096    .4491777
               
          L1.     .6023506   .4186444     1.44   0.159    -.2475427    1.452244
   Investment  
               
          PTR    -2.116369   2.670854    -0.79   0.433     -7.53849    3.305752
          CTR     8.342052   6.831661     1.22   0.230    -5.526957    22.21106
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 36 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0284                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,35)           =     318.68
     overall = 0.9136                                         max =          5
     between = 0.8912                                         avg =        1.7
     within  = 0.9074                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         36
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =         61
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Investment CTR PTR l.Investment Cash  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999&DP<0, fe r
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. 
                                                                               
          rho    .21403203   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .19732015
      sigma_u    .10296945
                                                                               
        _cons     -.523364   1.410267    -0.37   0.713    -3.386358     2.33963
   MovetoFull            0  (omitted)
CTRMovetofull    -7.080423   6.620808    -1.07   0.292    -20.52138    6.360532
NOLmovetoFull     .0543001   .1272306     0.43   0.672    -.2039917    .3125918
 Changeindebt     .0346219   .0761203     0.45   0.652    -.1199105    .1891542
    DeltaSize    -.0270777   .1165396    -0.23   0.818    -.2636656    .2095103
  SalesGrowth     .0345666   .0596266     0.58   0.566    -.0864818     .155615
       EBITDA     .3354418   .2671698     1.26   0.218    -.2069418    .8778253
               
          L1.      .605598   .3984362     1.52   0.138    -.2032705    1.414467
   Investment  
               
          PTR     .2548631   2.824476     0.09   0.929    -5.479127    5.988854
          CTR     8.026442   6.422755     1.25   0.220    -5.012444    21.06533
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 36 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1686                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(9,35)           =     279.70
     overall = 0.9190                                         max =          5
     between = 0.9004                                         avg =        1.7
     within  = 0.9099                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =         36
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =         62
note: MovetoFull omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Investment CTR PTR  l.Investment EBITDA SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull MovetoFull if Year<1999&DP<0, fe r
. 
                                                                               
          rho    .07661903   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    3.4143068
      sigma_u    .98351371
                                                                               
        _cons    -.8093148   .1549063    -5.22   0.000    -1.113197   -.5054322
CTRMovetofull     3.899784   .6260508     6.23   0.000     2.671648     5.12792
NOLmovetoFull      .617939   .1639663     3.77   0.000     .2962833    .9395947
 Changeindebt     2.823335   .8207275     3.44   0.001     1.213298    4.433371
    DeltaSize    -11.39738   1.103921   -10.32   0.000    -13.56296   -9.231794
  SalesGrowth    -4.298938   .6413684    -6.70   0.000    -5.557122   -3.040753
     CashFlow     16.22513   .5831906    27.82   0.000     15.08108    17.36919
               
          L1.    -.0289937   .0034037    -8.52   0.000    -.0356708   -.0223166
  InvestmentP  
               
          PTR            0  (omitted)
          CTR            0  (omitted)
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,354 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0316                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(7,1353)         =     552.66
     overall = 0.7924                                         max =         16
     between = 0.7057                                         avg =        6.8
     within  = 0.7993                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,354
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      9,168
note: PTR omitted because of collinearity
note: CTR omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg InvestmentP  CTR PTR l.InvestmentP  CashFlow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull if Year<2010  , fe r
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          rho    .08152693   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    4.6209157
      sigma_u    1.3767192
                                                                               
        _cons    -.5220804   .1484582    -3.52   0.000    -.8136812   -.2304796
CTRMovetofull     4.066483   .6748306     6.03   0.000     2.740984    5.391981
NOLmovetoFull     .6128322   .3170132     1.93   0.054    -.0098433    1.235508
 Changeindebt     .7189569   .9171809     0.78   0.433    -1.082564    2.520478
    DeltaSize    -13.49897   1.067923   -12.64   0.000    -15.59658   -11.40136
  SalesGrowth    -6.382629   .7027974    -9.08   0.000     -7.76306   -5.002199
         Cash     23.38788    .875255    26.72   0.000     21.66871    25.10705
               
          L1.    -.0354282   .0038641    -9.17   0.000    -.0430181   -.0278383
  InvestmentP  
               
          CTR            0  (omitted)
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 563 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0828                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(7,562)          =     360.68
     overall = 0.7983                                         max =         17
     between = 0.6349                                         avg =        7.7
     within  = 0.8100                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        563
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      4,338
note: CTR omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg InvestmentP  CTR l.InvestmentP Cash   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull if Year<2010 , fe r
. 
                                                                               
          rho    .07553831   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    4.1339642
      sigma_u    1.1816964
                                                                               
        _cons    -1.303343   .1767685    -7.37   0.000    -1.650114   -.9565734
CTRMovetofull     6.741613   .7927184     8.50   0.000     5.186522    8.296704
NOLmovetoFull     .6102719   .1843649     3.31   0.001     .2485997    .9719441
 Changeindebt     1.863435   .9790393     1.90   0.057    -.0571645    3.784035
    DeltaSize    -19.42747   1.016752   -19.11   0.000    -21.42205   -17.43289
  SalesGrowth    -7.048583   .9010698    -7.82   0.000    -8.816228   -5.280937
       EBITDA      4.44382   .6370251     6.98   0.000     3.194156    5.693484
               
          L1.    -.0252791   .0040757    -6.20   0.000    -.0332746   -.0172837
  InvestmentP  
               
          PTR            0  (omitted)
          CTR            0  (omitted)
                                                                               
  InvestmentP        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,354 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0353                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(7,1353)         =     237.87
     overall = 0.6954                                         max =         17
     between = 0.5723                                         avg =        6.7
     within  = 0.7047                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,354
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      9,037
note: PTR omitted because of collinearity
note: CTR omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg InvestmentP CTR  PTR l.InvestmentP EBITDA  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull if Year<2010 , fe r
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. 
                                                                               
          rho    .08246664   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .21609366
      sigma_u    .06478437
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0102037   .0092895    -1.10   0.272    -.0284271    .0080197
CTRMovetofull     .0318193   .0404733     0.79   0.432    -.0475779    .1112165
NOLmovetoFull     .0394702   .0085874     4.60   0.000     .0226241    .0563163
 Changeindebt       .21248   .0519987     4.09   0.000     .1104732    .3144868
    DeltaSize    -.1998559   .0694894    -2.88   0.004    -.3361745   -.0635372
  SalesGrowth    -.2016011   .0402537    -5.01   0.000    -.2805676   -.1226346
     CashFlow     .6817116   .0504484    13.51   0.000     .5827461    .7806771
               
          L1.    -.0369599   .0038037    -9.72   0.000    -.0444217    -.029498
   Investment  
               
          PTR            0  (omitted)
          CTR            0  (omitted)
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,354 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0274                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(7,1353)         =      80.81
     overall = 0.5790                                         max =         16
     between = 0.4378                                         avg =        6.8
     within  = 0.5931                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,354
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      9,168
note: PTR omitted because of collinearity
note: CTR omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Investment  CTR PTR l.Investment  CashFlow   SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull if Year<2010   , fe r
. 
                                                                               
          rho     .0912016   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e     .3069038
      sigma_u    .09722315
                                                                               
        _cons     .0032801   .0100661     0.33   0.745    -.0164917    .0230518
CTRMovetofull      .006482   .0475425     0.14   0.892    -.0869007    .0998646
NOLmovetoFull     .0494131   .0175947     2.81   0.005     .0148537    .0839724
 Changeindebt        .1254   .0650938     1.93   0.055     -.002457    .2532569
    DeltaSize    -.2897515   .0812184    -3.57   0.000    -.4492802   -.1302228
  SalesGrowth    -.3144582   .0483608    -6.50   0.000    -.4094483   -.2194681
         Cash     .9539153   .0793746    12.02   0.000     .7980081    1.109822
               
          L1.    -.0430577   .0049034    -8.78   0.000     -.052689   -.0334264
   Investment  
               
          PTR            0  (omitted)
          CTR            0  (omitted)
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 563 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0480                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(7,562)          =      78.63
     overall = 0.5651                                         max =         17
     between = 0.3385                                         avg =        7.7
     within  = 0.5878                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =        563
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      4,338
note: PTR omitted because of collinearity
note: CTR omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Investment CTR PTR l.Investment Cash  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt  NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull if Year<2010  , fe r
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. 
                                                                               
          rho    .07866586   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
      sigma_e    .23142086
      sigma_u    .06762185
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0289719   .0104801    -2.76   0.006    -.0495309   -.0084129
CTRMovetofull     .1369134    .048711     2.81   0.005     .0413561    .2324707
NOLmovetoFull     .0390541   .0095461     4.09   0.000     .0203274    .0577808
 Changeindebt     .1811871    .056282     3.22   0.001     .0707776    .2915966
    DeltaSize    -.5457593   .0610681    -8.94   0.000    -.6655578   -.4259609
  SalesGrowth    -.2905448   .0539417    -5.39   0.000    -.3963633   -.1847263
       EBITDA     .2064252   .0396163     5.21   0.000     .1287092    .2841412
               
          L1.    -.0282633   .0048855    -5.79   0.000    -.0378474   -.0186792
   Investment  
               
          PTR            0  (omitted)
          CTR            0  (omitted)
                                                                               
   Investment        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                              Robust
                                                                               
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 1,354 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0306                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(7,1353)         =      64.41
     overall = 0.5226                                         max =         17
     between = 0.3845                                         avg =        6.7
     within  = 0.5365                                         min =          1
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: id                              Number of groups  =      1,354
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =      9,037
note: PTR omitted because of collinearity
note: CTR omitted because of collinearity
. xtreg Investment CTR PTR l.Investment EBITDA  SalesGrowth DeltaSize  Changeindebt   NOLmovetoFull CTRMovetofull  if Year<2010 , fe r
